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Abstract 
Some of the main challenges facing education at the beginning of the twenty-
first century concern our relationship with life and living beings. More 
precisely, the main theories of learning which inform educational practice in 
the west - such as behaviourism, constructivism, information processing, and 
situated learning - do not allow for a learning that results in the learner 
having a true understanding of the being of living beings and of life itself. 
Against this kind of learning, which will be called learning as modification and 
growth, a second process is proposed, called learning to be authentic, which is 
based on Heidegger's notion of authenticity as a state in which a true 
understanding of the being of living beings and life itself is present. This 
learning to be authentic allows for the entities involved to be approached in a 
way that is appropriate to life and living beings. It is experienced, on the one 
hand, as a process of letting go and quieting down, and, on the other hand, as a 
process of opening up and being in touch with the entities that are 
encountered. It involves a growing non-reflective self-awareness and the 
awakening of another way of being, and it demands a kind of educational 
practice that is in many ways different from what is current in most 
educational settings. 
Learning as modification and growth and learning to be authentic can merge into 
one process, which allows for the process learning as modcati on and growth to 
take place in such a way that it is guided by the openness that characterizes 
authentic existence. This integrated process, which constitutes a form of 
learning that results in the learner having a true understanding of the being of 
living beings and of life itself, will be called authentic learning. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 General argument of the thesis 
This thesis aims to show that the accounts of learning that inform most 
educational practice in the western world today - such as behaviourism, 
constructivism, and situated learning - need to be supplemented by an account 
of a process which is just as important as the learning processes described by 
these accounts of learning. 
According to the accounts of learning that inform most educational practice in 
the western world, learning is, first of all, seen as essentially a process of 
modification and growth. There will, in Chapter Two, be a discussion of certain 
aspects of some influential accounts of learning: Hebbian Learning (Manukata 
and Pfaffly, 2004), Behaviourism (Bouton, 2007), and Constructivism in both 
its Piagetian and Vygotskyan versions, where the aim is to show that a certain 
family resemblance emerges in these accounts of learning. 
Learning, in these theories, is usually conceived of as a process of modification 
and growth. This can be illustrated briefly now by quoting from Piaget. For 
Piaget the process of learning is essentially one of adaptation (what I call 
modification). Adaptation itself consists of assimilation and accommodation. 
Assimilation is "the action of the organism on surrounding objects, in so far as 
this action depends on previous behaviour involving the same or similar 
objects" (Piaget, 2001, p. 8). Accommodation describes the process by which 
the learner accommodates him or herself to the surrounding objects (Piaget, 
2001, p. 9). But for Piaget this process of adaptation also involves gro wth. "All 
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knowledge is continually in a course of development and of passing from a 
state of lesser knowledge to one which is more complete and effective" (Cited 
in Murray Thomas, 2005, p. 192). During the discussion of this kind of 
learning in Chapter 2, it will also be argued that in this conception of learning, 
learning always involves an object of learning and is characterized by 
increased integration and differentiation, ultimately leading to increased 
rigidity. 
Against this learning as modification and growth, it will be argued, a second 
process exists that dissolves the integration, differentiation and rigidity that 
have emerged as a result of the processes of learning as modification and growth, 
where this second process is not one that occurs in relation to a specific object 
of learning or as a modification of an existing way of being of the learner. 
This second process, which will be called learning to be authentic, is one that 
results in a radical self-renewal of the individual. Learning to be authentic is 
experienced, on the one hand, as a process of letting go and quietening down of 
ways of being (of feeling, acting, perceiving, and relating to things and living 
being), and, on the other hand, as a process of opening up and being in touch 
with the things and living beings that are encountered. It allows for the 
entities involved to not be approached as objects of theoretical or practical 
concern (what exactly such entities are will become clear in Chapter 3) but in a 
way that is appropriate to life and living beings. 
It will be suggested in the final chapter of this thesis that learning as 
modification and growth and learning to be authentic can merge into one process, 
which begins with letting go and opening up, and then allows for the process 
of growth (of integration and differentiation in relation to an object of 
learning) to take place in such a way that it is guided by the openness (letting 
go and being in touch with) that characterizes authentic existence. This 
integrated process will be called authentic learning. 
1.2 The importance of the question of learning to be authentic 
I will begin by considering an argument in favour of the attempt to uncover 
the process of learning to be authentic. The focus of this brief argument will be 
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the difference between learning in relation to a practical or theoretical entity 
and learning in relation to what I will call life and living beings. This restricted 
focus is chosen to keep the argument as simple as possible, even if it means 
that the emotional or interpersonal dimensions of learning remain under-
represented — something that will be rectified later in the thesis. The 
justification for trying to bring to light a process of learning to be authentic 
presented here is by no means the only one possible and it will be set out in 
only very broad brush strokes. But it is hoped that, as the thesis unfolds, it will 
become clear that the indications made here are warranted and that further 
grounds emerge for uncovering this process of learning to be authentic. 
It is, I believe, safe to say that many of the difficulties for education I as it is 
currently practised in the western world (and, increasingly, everywhere else) 
do not lie in the teaching and learning of knowledge and skills. Another way of 
putting this is to say that education often gets those entities right that are 
properly conceived practically, in terms of their use (e.g. how to use a tool or 
how to solve a practical problem) or theoretically, in terms of properties and 
relations (e.g. how to categorise entities into species and genera). That is to 
say, education is often able to teach knowledge and skills that are valid in 
relation to those entities that are theoretical or practical in nature. In contrast 
to this, human beings, the natural world and life as a whole, are not practical 
or theoretical entities. 
In other words, we know, at least to a certain extent, how to teach theoretical 
and practical knowledge and skills and we have ways of ensuring that this 
learning happens in a way that is by and large commensurate with the nature 
of the entities involved, so long as it concerns practical or theoretical entities. 
One clear example of this is learning to drive, which is mainly practical but 
also involves some theoretical knowledge (as tested in the separate theory part 
1 I will use the word education in this thesis mostly to refer to the practice of educating (as 
opposed to the institutions or policies of education), in so far as it is concerned to help bring 
about learning in the pupil, the student, the child, or the adult being educated (what I mean by 
learning will be set out in Chapter Two and the remainder of the thesis). That is, education, in 
this thesis, denotes the event where an individual (or group of individuals) acts to facilitate 
learning in another, where the main question is what the nature of the learning process is that the 
educator ought to aim to facilitate. 
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of the exam), and which most people manage at some point, provided they have 
received appropriate instruction. However, and this will be argued in detail in 
Chapter Three, such theoretical and practical knowledge and skills are not 
capable of grasping what is essential about human beings in their relationship 
with themselves, each other, nature, and life as a whole: they are not adequate 
in relation to life and living beings. That is, if we approach life or a living being 
as a practical or theoretical entity, we miss what is essential to that being. 
Of course the ability to teach knowledge and skills in relation to practical and 
theoretical entities is limited, unacceptably so, some might say. But, to the 
extent that the call for academic standards to be raised is a call for better 
teaching skills (say, a richer learning experience, individually tailored tasks, 
and more knowledgeable teachers), it is usually not so much a call for more 
research into how such teaching can be improved (though more can always be 
done in this area too) but one for a better training of teachers and a better 
organization of the learning experience. To see this, we only need to imagine a 
school which has everything going in its favour: good facilities, sufficient 
funding, well-qualified teachers, well-behaved and motivated pupils, and so on. 
Most people would probably believe that in such a school the circumstances 
are in place for knowledge and skills to be taught in a way that is adequate, 
even if improvements are always welcome. Indeed, the response to a school 
which such favourable conditions failing to do so would come as a surprise to 
most people. In other words, if something is a theoretical or practical entity 
and we want to learn the skills and knowledge that can deal with or 
conceptualize it, we would expect to know more or less how to do that, and we 
can teach this to others. 
Contrary to this, there are many problems facing education that lie in what we 
are calling life and living beings, those areas that do not deal with practical or 
theoretical entities, where there is much less clarity as to how tackle them. In 
concrete terms this means issues surrounding pupil behaviour (lack of 
2 Note that sometimes living beings are appropriately taken as practical entities (e.g. when the 
emergency services liberate an unconscious person from a car wreck) or theoretical entities 
(e.g. when a statistician calculates the likelihood of something occurring in a certain 
population). 
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motivation, bullying, disrespect for teachers, disregard for the environment, 
substance abuse, destructive sexual relationships, and so on), but also in its 
failure to consistently teach values that hold society together in a way that is 
sustainable and fair for all (broadly the domain of citizenship education), or to 
show pupils the way to a life that is meaningful and fulfilling for them. 
Importantly, though many educational approaches get some of the above right, 
getting them all right (even more or less so) poses an added difficulty, for 
example, where a very strict regime makes for pupils who are "well-behaved" 
but not inwardly fulfilled. 
We can easily see how this is the case, if we consider that, if, as we saw, we 
wanted to improve academic standards (such as numeracy and literacy) we 
would have a fairly good idea as to what circumstances we would need to 
create (however difficult that may turn in practice) and what knowledge and 
skills the teachers would need, whereas, with respect to questions of genuinely 
good behaviour (as opposed to mere outward conformity to norms), society, 
the environment and human flourishing we do not have anything like as firm a 
grasp on the difficulties involved. Indeed, the problems of western society as a 
whole seem to reflect this: even though there undoubtedly are still theoretical 
and practical challenges that would bring great benefits if they were solved 
(such as fighting certain diseases or solving the challenges to do with global 
warming), it is issues to do with inequality, social cohesion, the environment, 
violence and conflict, and the meaning of a flourishing life that pose the really 
intractable problems. 
The need for pupils to learn environmental awareness, social and interpersonal 
skills, happiness and personal flourishing, and so on, is widely recognised. 
Thus, in the context of English education, the three overall aims for all schools 
are found in the Qualifications and Curriculum Authority's "Big Picture" of the 
school curriculum which states that the school curriculum should enable all 
young people to become not only "successful learners, who enjoy learning, 
make progress and achieve" but also "confident individuals, who are able to 
live safe, healthy and fulfilling lives; responsible citizens, who make a positive 
contribution to society." (Cited in White, 2008). That is, it is clear that the 
need is there for pupils to learn to relate to life and living beings (persons — 
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including oneself -, animals, nature, and life as a whole). What is not clear, it 
will be argued in this thesis, is how to conceive of the learning that is 
appropriate in relation to these issues, in relation to life and living beings. 
That is, when it is decided that pupils should learn about these things, the way 
this learning is almost invariably approached in terms of the same learning of 
knowledge and skills that has been developed in relation to practical and 
theoretical entities, in terms of learning as modification and growth. It is my 
personal experience, as someone who worked for almost two decades at schools 
that made a point of teaching about life and living beings (including schools 
based on the philosophies of Paulo Freire and Rudolf Steiner), that what is 
being taught tends to be done so in terms of ways of conceiving (i.e. 
theoretically), ways of acting (i.e. practically) either habitually, critically or 
potentially, in the form of an attitude. 
Pupils are, as a result, taught mostly knowledge about the environment and 
habits (such as recycling), as a way of raising environmental awareness; they 
are taught attitudes and manners (ways of acting in a practical way towards 
others) and knowledge about people other than themselves or about the impact 
of their own behaviour on these people, as a way of improving their social 
skills; they are (if they are lucky) given opportunities to try different things, 
explore dimensions of life that may open up perspectives which can enrich 
their lives, as a way of giving them a chance to pick up ways of conceptualizing 
or doing things, as a way of flourishing as individuals and finding what is 
meaningful about life. 
Though such initiatives of raising awareness (which may include critical 
thinking) and of instilling ways of doing things are well-intentioned and often 
very valuable, it is my experience that they often fail to reach their intended 
target. Practicalities (such as time, access, and resources) apart, the hit-and-
miss nature of such initiatives is because they need to be done in "the right 
spirit". To put it differently, the above can either become meaningless, where 
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teachers5 "go through the motions", "ticking boxes" as they go along, or it can 
be done in a meaningful way, where the pupils learn in relation to the actual 
things they are learning about and where the teacher him or herself has and 
conveys a genuine feel for, a passion for, understanding of the entities 
involved. And in this case "the right spirit" means that the entities involved are 
not approached as theoretical or practical entities but in a way that is 
appropriate to life and living beings. In other words, even if the will and ability 
is there to teach in relation to life and living beings, this teaching remains a hit-
and-miss affair. 
When we teach about life and living beings in the same way that we teach about 
theoretical and practical entities, we miss what is essential about these entities. 
What is required is real-life engagement with the entities (for example, going 
out into nature itself rather than just reading about it in the classroom) and, as 
we saw, a teacher who approaches these entities in the right spirit. I will call 
the ability to approach life and living beings in the "right spirit" that of having 
a sense for life and living beings analogous to the expression having a feel for 
such entities. That is, a teacher with, for example, a real passion for the 
environment has a sense for, an understanding of living creatures in a way that 
is, to use a phenomenological term, commensurate to their being. The being of 
life and living beings is neither practical nor theoretical but, for example, 
sensate, self-arising, and an end in itself. Because he or she has this "sense for 
the being of these entities", this teacher may be able to convey it to the pupil, 
provided, of course, the circumstances are favourable. 
One of the difficulties this need for the teacher to have such a sense for the 
being of life and living beings is that the authentic sense for the entities the 
5 For convenience we will keep mentioning the teacher, though this should really include 
everybody involved in the education of a child, like school managers and support staff, and, of 
course, the parents. 
4 The expression having a "sense for" the being of an entity is chosen, because "sense" has a 
receptive quality, has connotations of "meaning", and may refer to emotional, intellectual as 
well as bodily responses to the entity involved. It is as such a very general term denoting an 
understanding or feel for the being of an entity. As will become clear in Chapter 4, the word 
"understanding" itself will be reserved for a certain kind of relationship with an entity, and is, 
as a result, less general than sense. 
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teacher has may well pertain to certain kinds of entities only and, perhaps, not 
to others. Thus a teacher may have a great understanding of nature and be 
able to convey this to the pupil, but have little sense for interpersonal 
relationships or what it is to lead a flourishing life (someone who, for example, 
"comes alive" when out in nature, but who is unfulfilled as a person the rest of 
the time). The difficulty with this is that, by conceiving of the challenge of 
teaching about life and living beings in terms of having a sense for certain kinds 
of entities, there is the possibility of individuals being deeply unbalanced (like 
the nature lover who loves animals but does not know how to get on with 
human beings), where the imbalance itself may well be conveyed to the pupil 
(as when the teacher conveys a fanatical hatred of technology along with their 
love of nature) or where many of the pupils are simply not reached by the 
teacher (for example, the ones who are already committed to a life in front of 
the games console), because he or she does not have a genuine sense for these 
pupils. 
The second issue this raises is that, from a more practical educational 
perspective, there is the problem of deciding for which aspects of life and for 
which living beings the pupils should get a sense. Just to take the social domain 
as an example, should pupils have an authentic sense for their class mates, 
their teachers, ethnic minorities, disabled people, old people; should they learn 
about fairness and equality; should their focus be local, national or global; 
should they learn about conflicts, wars, gangs etc.? The list of things can 
easily grow, potentially leading to a fragmented and oversubscribed 
curriculum. What is more, there is the risk that the interconnections between 
the different domains are missed if the areas are approached separately. 
In sum, if we accept that life and living beings demand a different kind of 
understanding than the practical and the theoretical ones, what is needed is 
that pupils are taught by teachers who have a sense for life and living beings 
while they are in contact with some of the entities in that domain. But, as we 
have seen, this raises the issue of fragmentation, where any individual teacher 
may have a sense for only some of the elements in the domain and where the 
curriculum can easily become fragmented and oversubscribed. Though the 
same problem of fragmentation exists in relation to practical and theoretical 
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entities, the problem is much more serious in relation to life and living beings, 
because, as will hopefully become clear as the thesis progresses, learning in the 
latter domain is a unitary affair and cannot be split up without losing what is 
essential to it. 
It should be clear now that the response to this second issue of generalizing 
theoretically, for example, by teaching models of what it is like to be a member 
of a minority group or models of how conflict arises, thus taking away the 
necessity to teach about a myriad of different cases, is inadequate. The obvious 
shortcoming of such a theoretical approach being that we are back to the initial 
objection, where we said that it is the genuine sense for life and living beings 
and not the theoretical one that counts. Another response is to stay practical 
and pick certain exemplary situations and trust that what is learned there will 
transfer to other situations. There is probably a lot that speaks for this 
approach: having been guided by a person with genuine compassion for other 
people in a situation involving, say, a disabled person will probably be of help 
in a similar situation involving, say, an old person. But there will be important 
limitations to this kind of transfer, for example, across cultural divides. What 
is more, this too brings us back to the issue that such a genuine sense for other 
people is not practical in essence and that this approach, therefore, still leaves 
open the question as to the learning that is called for even in these practical 
situations. 
Given that neither practical nor theoretical generalization will solve the 
problem of fragmentation (both in the individual and in the curriculum), the 
solution may need to be found at a level that is altogether different from either 
the practical or the theoretical. One possibility is that what needs to be taught 
is a sense for entities in general, as they manifests in the different domains of 
life. That is, there may be ways to simplify the plethora of situations where 
such a genuine sense for life and living beings is called for and teach the sense 
for entities itself - where this sense would have to be different from (i.e. more 
general than) either a practical or theoretical understanding, or else we would 
be back at where we started. This would constitute a kind of sense for the 
entity itself, before it was taken as either theoretical, practical or, indeed, 
before it was taken as belonging to life and living beings, because this sense 
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would have to include a sense for what the nature of the entity was in the first 
place. 
This line of argument has been adopted by some philosophers of education, 
such as Donald Vandenberg, who in Being and Education writes that "Each 
province of meaning has its own mode of awakeness, i.e. its own temporal 
structure, cognitive style, and sense of reality, and each has to be 'entered' 
through a specific bracketing or 'leap' from another mode of awakeness and 
province of meaning" (Vandenberg, 1971, pp. 5-6). That is, the thing the pupil 
ought to learn is not so much a sense for certain entities or even specific 
domains but a sense for entities in themselves. Following Heidegger, 
Vandenberg calls this an understanding of being itself: the ability to disclose the 
being of the entities which they encounter. Such a sense for entities in 
themselves, such an awakening to the being of entities, would then not be 
limited to one or two domains (for example, nature but not other people). As a 
result, the individual involved would not be internally fragmented and this 
sense for the being of entities would, in effect, only need to be learned once and 
not separately for every domain that was thought important. 
This could potentially solve the difficulties of fragmentation I highlighted 
above. First there would be a sense for entities, an understanding of the being 
of entities themselves that is so fundamental that it would be able to "decide" 
whether an entity belonged to the category of life and living beings or whether 
it should be approached as a practical or theoretical entity. Second, it would be 
so open to the being of entities that it would simply get them right, be open to 
their being as it presented itself, resulting in the individual having a sense for 
the entity itself, regardless whether the entity was a tree or a bee, a single 
individual or a group of people, oneself or the infinity of the universe. 
Appealing though it may sound, this way of putting it brings with it its own 
potential difficulties. First, it may well become very abstract (indeed, 
theoretical) in such a way that a connection with practice cannot be made. This 
could manifest in the philosopher of education remaining silent about what the 
implications are for the practice of education, (leaving it - perhaps 
conveniently - to the practitioner to work out the practical implications), or 
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coming up with practical recommendations that fail to distinguish themselves 
from other educational approaches, because they are the fruit of logical 
extrapolation rather than experience (such as the importance for the teacher to 
listen to the pupil, to practice what they preach and to be a learner him or 
herself). Second, it puts an unrealistic demand on the educators, as they are 
required to have a sense for the being of entities themselves. In practice this 
would mean that all but the most enlightened educators will either put the 
demand aside altogether or settle for the kind of understanding of being that 
comes natural to them and forget about the rest. 
What is more, even that most rare of teachers who did have an actual sense for 
the being of entities, so that she could "decide" whether an entity she and the 
pupils were engaging with was best approached theoretically, practically or as 
belonging to life and living beings (or, indeed, in a combination of these), where 
her sense for the being of the entities was so genuine she could convey it to the 
pupils and where she was in herself not fragmented (not limited to having a 
genuine sense for the being of some entities but not others), even then she 
would still be faced with the difficulty that all the teaching methods and 
pedagogical tools at her disposal were based on a notion of learning that is 
appropriate in relation to theoretical and practical entities (learning as 
modification and growth) but not to those belonging to life and living beings, let 
alone to entities in themselves as existing prior to belonging to any of these 
worlds. 
In response to this last point some would, no doubt, aver that we need not 
worry about teaching methods and pedagogical tools, because this sense for 
the being of entities "conveys itself'. This may contain some truth, when 
considered in a one-on-one teaching situation where the teacher or, as we said 
earlier, the parent or anyone else involved in the education of the child has a 
6 The term "educator" will be used in its most general sense possible to denote a person in any 
kind of educational role, such as a parent, or grandparent who looks after a grandchild, a 
teacher, teaching assistant, or anyone else who has some sort of educational responsibility for 
a child — and this would include the stranger who tries to explain to noisy youngsters in a 
public library what the conventions of being in a library entail (provided such individuals still 
exist). To put it differently, the educator in this thesis will denote that person who is 
concerned to help bring about learning in another person. 
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fair amount of discretion as to how to educate. But in the context of large-scale 
education, compulsory curriculums and large classroom sizes, the sense for the 
being of entities an individual teacher may bring with them into the classroom 
will simply be drowned out by the surrounding noise. This is not to be 
defeatist about the possibilities of individuals to have their own voice in 
education, but to acknowledge that, compared to, say, charisma or exceptional 
academic competence, the sense for the being of entities themselves is not 
necessarily commanding or persuasive. Indeed, as we will see later in the 
thesis, its "voice" is one of silence. 
In other words, positing something like a sense for the being of entities in 
themselves creates a gap between the reality we find ourselves in and the 
situation where we could have an education that might begin to address the 
problems we are facing in relation to life and living beings. That is, we do not 
usually have the sense for entities in themselves in the way that is required and 
even if we did, we would not have the pedagogical wherewithal to convey this 
sense for entities in themselves. What we need is something that can bridge 
the gap between our current understandings and practices and an education 
that can teach the sense for the being of entities in themselves. The thing that 
in education bridges the gap between current and possible ways of doing and 
understanding is, of course, learning. But, as has been suggested (and this will 
be argued in detail in Chapter Two and Three), the problem is that we have 
accounts of learning that are appropriate in relation to practical and theoretical 
entities, but much less so in relation to life and living beings and a sense for the 
being of entities in themselves includes the latter category. 
What this thesis will argue is that what is needed first of all is a different 
notion of learning, one that is appropriate to learning to get a sense for the 
being of entities in themselves. Rather than saying that the teacher needs to 
have such a sense for the being of entities in themselves, it will be argued that 
they need to have a sense of the importance of getting this sense for the being 
of entities in themselves and some understanding of what it means to learn to 
get that sense. This learning will be called learning to be authentic. In other 
words, not only does the question of learning to be authentic seek to bridge the 
gap between our present educational practices and an understanding of life and 
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living beings, it also changes the demand on those involved in education from 
that of knowing what such an understanding of being actually is and being able 
to practice it (i.e. having a lived, first-person experience of it) to that of having 
a sense, however tentative, of there being something important there that needs 
to be learned. Thus the parent and the teacher, the school director and the 
support staff, the policy maker and the inspector become the first and most 
important learners. 
This learning to be authentic would be very different from the notion of learning 
as modification and growth we have inherited from the dominant theories of 
learning as they are currently used in education - such as behaviourism, 
constructivism, and situated learning. The kind of learning we are after would 
give access to entities before their being as practical, theoretical or otherwise is 
even decided, and it would, therefore need to involve a kind of radically new 
approach to entities in general. The notion of coming to relate to an entity in a 
way that is ruled by mechanisms of modification and growth and how we have 
learned how to act may need to be put aside. In this we will need to be open to 
the possibility that the very way we conceive of experience may be revised, 
even to the extent that some of what needs to be learned about may not 
manifest in quite the same structural or temporal ways as practical or 
theoretical entities. Our entire sense of who we are and what kind of place the 
world is we live in may be challenged. The way we conceive of our relationship 
with ourselves, other people, the natural world and life as a whole may need to 
change. All in all, we would need to be open to a concept of learning that 
differed radically from the notion of learning as modification and growth. 
1.3 The approach taken in this thesis 
It should be clear from the above that the form of learning this thesis aims to 
bring to light is one that cannot readily be discerned, if we start off with our 
current conception of learning as it can be found in the dominant theories of 
learning. That is, our current conception of learning as modification and growth 
is likely to get in the way of our noticing when and where learning to be 
authentic takes place. The approach that will be taken to resolve this difficulty 
can be called hermeneutic (For a discussion of philosophical hermeneutics, see 
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Grondin, 1994), where there is a reciprocal illumination of, on the one hand, a 
possible example of the things one aims to become clear about and, on the 
other hand, a tentative first description of what the thing is. 
What is needed is a "first orientation", a first indication as to where to look for 
such a learning to be authentic. I will do this in chapter 2, by taking an example 
of a teacher who discovers a new way of relating to one of his pupils, which is 
presented as a change experience that cannot be readily explained with the 
help of accounts that take learning as a process of modification and growth. I 
will, in discussing this example, highlight a number of assumptions that these 
accounts of learning make, and show how these assumptions prohibit a 
coherent account of the change experience we have given as an example. The 
questions this raises about our concept of learning concern the philosophical 
assumptions the conventional accounts of learning make about the process of 
learning. These assumptions about learning will be called the metaphysical 
assumptions of learning. 
The issue here is that before learning can be something the teacher aims to 
bring about in their class, before it can be studied empirically by a researcher, 
there needs to be some understanding of what learning is in the first place, 
how, for example, it is different from knowing or acting. A teacher promoting 
or an educationalist studying learning needs to have some sense of what in the, 
for all practical purposes, infinite number of details they could focus on in the 
behaviour or experience of an individual they are going to actually focus on, in 
their study of the phenomenon. This selection of salient aspects of an 
individual's behaviour requires a "first orientation" towards that kind of 
learning, which predates the actual promotion or investigation of learning. 
In many cases this is fairly unproblematic. If, for example, the teacher wants to 
ensure that (or if the researcher wants to study how) the times tables are 
learned, they have relatively (but only relatively) unproblematic criteria of 
what the learning is they are focussing on (something like those events, 
6 In this thesis the word "thing" will be used to indicate something in the most general and 
non-committal way possible, in the way that anything could be called a thing, including a 
process or the world as a whole. 
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between the learner being as yet unable to recite the times table and them 
being able to do so, that are believed to be relevant to the change between 
these two states). In the case of the present investigation there is, however, no 
such prior notion of learning that one can fall back on, as the investigation 
concerns the very nature of learning itself rather than an investigation into 
aspects of a process that has already been called learning. 
What this means is that we need, for the present investigation, a gradual 
development of, at the same time, an increasingly clear sense of instances of 
the learning we are trying to focus on, and an increasingly detailed description 
of the kind of learning we are beginning to focus on. Because this process is 
hermeneutic and, therefore, essentially circular (getting the learning in focus 
depends on a description of the learning, while the description of the learning 
itself depends on getting the learning into focus), my starting point will the 
example of a change event, and I will, provisionally, stipulate that it 
constitutes learning to be authentic. Then, as similar change events are later 
described in increasingly detailed fashion, I will begin to identify other change 
events that fall in the same category of events. With a fuller description of the 
process of learning than the examples which were initially chosen exemplify I 
hope, eventually, to have a description that is self-evidently a form of learning. 
The examples of learning to be authentic given in this thesis are 
phenomenological (for a general introduction to Phenomenology, see 
Sokolowski, 2000), in that they aim to describe the learning in terms of the 
experience of this kind of learning, rather than, say, from a third-person 
perspective, objectively, as in neurological or functional descriptions of 
learning. These examples mostly concern adults (parents and teachers) going 
through a process of becoming authentic in a certain respect. The reason that 
the examples concern adults is that such examples are easier to give than 
examples of children going from an inauthentic way of being to an authentic 
one. As will be explained in Chapter 3, learning to be authentic involves a "dying 
towards" existing ways of being, and it is simply much easier to describe in a 
plausible way what the "falling away" of existing ways of being that make up 
this "dying towards" involves for adults. In the case of children there would, 
first of all, be much less to "fall away", as some or many (depending on the age) 
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of the ways of acting and perceiving things, of responding emotionally, and 
articulating experiences in terms of a particular discourse will simply not yet 
have been developed. This is not to say that we are born as "empty slates", but 
it does imply that much of the person we are eventually to become has not yet 
been shaped fully, making it harder to bring into relief what exactly a "falling 
away" of such ways of being consists of. 
Secondly, as an adult it is much harder to construct plausible 
phenomenological descriptions of the experience of children. If the processes 
described in this thesis were found to be relevant to the education of children, 
it would, therefore, probably be prudent to extend the phenomenological 
investigation done in the context of this thesis and to undertake additional 
empirical phenomenological research into the experiences of children and 
young adults in the domain of learning to be authentic as it is developed in this 
thesis. This could help frame the processes described in this thesis in terms 
that fit the experience of children better and correct any inaccuracies that may 
have slipped in, where the processes described here are not exactly the same 
for children. 
Though the lack of examples, and indeed the claim to full accuracy, of the 
processes described in this thesis in terms of the experience of children is 
undoubtedly a limitation, the importance of this limitation should not be 
overstated. Just as a treatise expounding the importance of children learning 
how to write is of little use if the result is that adults who themselves have no 
sense for what writing is try to teach it to children, so too it is, in many ways, 
of priority that the adults have at least some acquaintance with the process of 
becoming authentic, before they set out to educate the children in their care 
with the aim of awakening their potential for being authentic. As will become 
clear later (e.g. in Chapter 6), such an understanding need not be total and 
complete, because the interaction between the educator and the child may 
develop its own dynamic towards increasing authenticity, and because a 
tentative understanding on behalf of the educator may provide enough of an 
impetus to set the child on a path towards authenticity of their own accord. 
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After I have, in chapter 2, set out how some of the core assumptions about 
learning made in the dominant theories of learning preclude the possibility of 
learning to be authentic, I will take Heidegger's (incomplete) account of the 
process of becoming authentic as a paradigm account of the process of learning 
to be authentic. In this I will draw chiefly on Heidegger's Being and Time 
(Heidegger, 1962), which is probably the canonical text on authenticity as it 
became an influential concept in twentieth-century philosophy. 
One reason for choosing Heidegger's (incomplete) account of the process of 
becoming authentic as such a paradigm is that his account of the process of 
becoming authentic comes very close to the kind of learning to be authentic I am 
after. Another important reason is that Heidegger's account of becoming 
authentic (as an example of the learning I am after) has its counterpart in an 
account of learning as it is conventionally understood. That is, on the one 
hand, the accounts of learning, as we find them in the main theories of learning 
(learning as modification and growth), are silent on the new kind of learning we 
are trying to bring to light in this thesis — as will become clear in Chapter 2. 
On the other hand, accounts of the processes we are trying to bring to light 
and characterize as learning in this thesis, such as accounts of meditative and 
contemplative practices (See, for example, Chapter 3, Radical Self-
Transcendence, in De Nys, 2009) tend to be silent on conventional kinds of 
learning. 
That is, most, if not all, accounts of learning as modification and growth and 
accounts of processes we could call learning to be authentic have in common that 
they see the conventional learning and the other kind of learning as essentially 
separate processes. What is more, those accounts that exist of the processes 
that are like learning to be authentic tend to adhere to a conventional 
conceptualization of the individual (one that is contested in the kind of 
phenomenology that will inform this thesis — see Chapter 3), with the result 
that these processes tend to be formulated in terms of paradoxes (For 
examples from Zen Buddhism, see Yuan-wu, 1977) or in terms of metaphor, 
poetically, because it is believed that the experiences involved transcend the 
possibilities of language (For a discussion of the language used in relation to 
these kinds of experiences see: De Nys, 2009, Ch. 2). Though I am not claiming 
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that they are in all respects the same process, I am claiming that the two are 
related, and that they can be described, with the help of Heidegger's 
philosophy, within one and the same conceptual framework. Indeed, in Chapter 
7, an attempt is made to indicate how the two processes can be combined in 
one movement of learning. 
My starting point for this conceptual apparatus will be Heidegger's 
philosophical writings of the 1920s, centring around his book Being and Time 
(Heidegger, 1962), which, it can be argued, constitutes a coherent whole — that 
is, before he makes certain substantial changes in the language he uses (and 
perhaps even in his entire philosophical approach, but this is subject to debate) 
in the early and mid-1930s, in what is called the Kehre, the "turning", in his 
philosophy. Chapters 3 through 6 will be occupied with this task of, on the one 
hand, trying to distil an account of learning to be authentic from Heidegger's 
writings and, on the other hand taking what can be distilled from Heidegger's 
writings and developing it into a fuller description of this process than can be 
found in his writings. 
That is, Heidegger himself did not provide a sufficiently detailed account of 
the process of becoming authentic for it to become a full-blown account of 
learning to be authentic, which means that a detailed description of such a 
process needs to be in part inferred from his writings or derived from a 
different source, either the work of a later philosopher or one's own 
phenomenological investigations. In this I will attempt to stay true to 
Heidegger's approach to philosophy: it is phenomenological in that it aims to 
describe the structure of the experience as it is experienced and they are 
hermeneutic in the sense, already explained above, of looking for an 
interpretation of these experiences that is true to them in their own right. 
1.4 Contribution to knowledge 
The first contribution to knowledge this thesis aims to make is to further 
Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenological investigations into the nature of 
Dasein (loosely, Heidegger's word for the human being) and authenticity in 
such a way that it yields an account of learning to be authentic. As indicated, 
Heidegger himself did not explicitly address this issue in his writings, and, 
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though there are numerous discussions about Heidegger's notion of 
authenticity as it is found in Being and Time (See, for example, Blattner, 2006; 
Capobianco, 2007; Critchley, 2008; Crowe, 2008; Dahlstrom, 2001; Dreyfus, 
1991; Guignon, 2000; Kisiel, 1993; Levine, 2008; Schuermann, 2008; Thomson, 
2004; Vandenberg, 1971), there is no account of the actual process that leads to 
authenticity. 
As a result, the bulk of this thesis, Chapters 4 to 6, is concerned with taking 
what indications can be found in Being and Time and Heidegger's lectures and 
writings of the late 1920s (Heidegger, 1925; Heidegger, 1982; Heidegger, 
1985; Heidegger, 1995a; Heidegger, 1995b; Heidegger, 1998a; Heidegger, 
1998b) and to continue the phenomenological investigations found in these 
sources, so as to construct an account of the process of becoming authentic. 
The resulting account of the process of becoming authentic is meant to be read 
as explicating some of the structures of experience that pertain to the se kinds 
of learning. These explications are, as we saw earlier, phenomenological, in 
that they describe the structure of experience, and hermeneutic, in that they 
seek to uncover a more originary description of the experience in question 
than would be accessible by merely understanding the experience in terms of 
either our common-sense categories of understanding or in terms of the 
categories of understanding implicit in the main accounts of learning in their 
description of learning as modification and growth. For example, the experience 
of "really listening" to a pupil is (in Chapter 6) described in terms that reject 
the common-sense separation between speaker and listener that we tend to 
take for granted, describing the experience (phenomenologically), but going 
beyond our common-sense perspective by uncovering (hermeneutically) the 
experiential unity of speaker and listener in the event of "really listening". 
It is important to note that the notions used in this investigation are 
phenomenological ones and that this does not entail that what happens at the 
experiential (phenomenological) level is an accurate description of what 
happens at the biological or functional level. For example, the experiential 
claim (made in Chapter 6) that there is a listening without articulating what is 
being heard does not entail that the neurological regularities that can normally 
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be observed (of the same neurons being activated in response to the same kind 
of aural stimuli) no longer holds. What happens at the phenomenological level 
can, after all, be different from what happens at the biological level. What is 
more, the word articulation, to stay with the same example, is itself a 
phenomenological one, in that persons can articulate but neurons cannot 
(unless one attributes such actions to neurons in a way that is metaphorical, as 
when we, for example, say that "the ear listens"). That is, the word articulation 
refers to the irreducible whole-person event we have access to, if at all, at the 
phenomenological level. 
The fact that many people never report having the experiences discussed in 
this thesis does not discount their possibility. Indeed, it is in line with the 
philosophical tradition of hermeneutic phenomenology to aim to awaken the 
reader of such works of philosophy to such possibilities. The function of what 
is written in this thesis is that of indicating the structures of experience that 
can be uncovered by hermeneutic phenomenology, where it is always only the 
way in which the reader for her or himself appropriates what is being indicated 
that constitutes the meaning of what is written. Heidegger referred to this as 
formal indication', which is a way of "making a gesture" in the direction of the 
structures that are at issue, in the understanding that the reader will have 
their own, direct access to those structures, as these are thought to be 
universal, or at least generally valid within the tradition in which the writing 
takes place. 
Because what is written aims to uncover those structures of experience that 
tend to remain hidden in the culture at the time of writing, it is understood 
that at different times and in different cultures different things may be hidden 
7 See Grondin 1994 for a discussion of Heidegger's notion of formal indication. "All the 
propositions on the being of Dasein [...] have, as uttered sentences, the character of an 
indication: they only indicate Dasein [...]they indicate a possible understanding and the 
conceptuality of the structures of Dasein that lies in such an understanding" (Heidegger, 1925, 
cited in Grondin 1994). 
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and, therefore, in need of uncovering. In other words, in some places and at 
some times what is written here will strike people as either too obvious to 
merit mentioning, misguided in that it fails to address "the real issue", or 
indeed, unintelligible. This highlights the fact that what is written here should 
be seen as part of an on-going process of uncovering aspects of our experience 
that tend to remain hidden from us, where what is clear to see at one point in 
time may be hidden from sight at a later point (think, for example, of the ways 
in which many educated medieval men and women will have had a rich and 
varied understanding of different kinds of religious experience, much of which 
was lost with the secularization of society). 
On the basis of the above, we can say that the contribution to knowledge this 
thesis aims to make is not cumulative. Even if the investigation involves and 
elaborates on Heidegger's writings on authenticity, and in that respect 
contributes to Heidegger scholarship, it is not the case that this thesis builds 
on existing knowledge, in order to, as it were, add a further step at the top end 
of the ladder. Rather, it is to uncover, for our times, parts of experience that 
tend to remain hidden, in order to illuminate certain aspects of educational 
theory and practice, and to do so in a way that does not deliver facts others can 
use in their deliberations (though some of what is uncovered in this thesis may 
feature in such deliberations), or prescriptions for practice (though examples 
will be given of how what is uncovered in this thesis may pan out in practice), 
or recommendations for policy (though some implications for policy may 
certainly be drawn), and so on. 
Rather, the aspects of experience that are illuminated are meant to indicate, as 
was said earlier, to the reader the existence of those aspects, so that the reader 
may discover their own way to these aspects of experience, and where it is the 
reader's own understanding of those experiences (which may well be different 
in certain respects from what is described in this thesis, just as what is 
described here is in many respects a modification and elaboration of the 
descriptions that were found in Heidegger) that constitute the real fruit of this 
thesis. That this is so is necessary with respect to the subject matter and not 
the result of a more or less arbitrary choice to work within a certain 
philosophical tradition. 
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We could say that the formal indication that is the fruit of this hermeneutic 
phenomenological investigation directs the reader to the region of experience 
where, it is claimed, learning to be authentic can take place. In this it directs the 
reader to this region without taking the entities in that region as either 
practical or theoretical or, indeed, as having any other kind of being. If, 
however, this thesis aimed to give a theoretical exposition or an account aimed 
at practical guidance, it would take the subject of the investigation, learning to 
be authentic, as such a theoretical or practical entity, which would alienate the 
subject of the investigation from the investigative process even before it 
started. What is at stake is a form of learning that will give access to and be 
able to guide us in relation to what I earlier called life and living beings. But 
access to this form of learning, which itself belongs to life and living beings, is 
only genuine access to the learning itself, if it is the result of learning to be 
authentic. As a result, it would not really be coherent to speak of knowing what 
learning to be authentic is as a result of a process of that took this learning as 
either something theoretical or practical. 
Therefore, since the aim of this thesis is bring to light the process of learning to 
be authentic and, since an understanding of such learning is meaningful only in 
so far as the reader understands it in a way that is appropriate for life and 
living beings, it is only the awakening in themselves of such learning to be 
authentic that could count as a true (true to the subject matter at hand) 
understanding — everything else would be a mere translation into the domain 
of practical or theoretical entities. To put it in these terms does not rule out a 
critical approach on the part of the reader (this possibility will be discussed in 
Chapter 6.4.1) or indeed that what is described in this thesis can from a certain 
perspective be assessed in terms of it meeting or failing to meet certain 
academic standards, but merely that, to the extent that what is described in 
this thesis is valid, an authentic understanding of it consists in the personal 
appropriation for him or herself on the part of the reader. 
In sum, the contribution to knowledge this thesis aims to make is that of 
indicating a way of access to aspects of certain educational experiences that 
tend to remain hidden in western culture in the 2 Pt century, so that the reader 
may come to his or her own understanding of those experiences and do so in 
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such a way that this understanding informs their theoretical and practical 
understanding of education. Apart from this, certain aspects of Heidegger's 
account of becoming authentic will be illuminated and elaborated in a way that 
has not been done before, making an original contribution to Heidegger 
scholarship. What is more, the educational significance of the ensuing account 
of learning will be developed in ways that impinge on both educational 
practice and theory, most importantly with respect the way learning is 
conceived, where existing accounts of learning will be complemented so as to 
include a dimension of human learning that has hitherto remained largely 
unnoticed, un-theorized and undeveloped in practice. 
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2 The metaphysical assumptions 
about learning made in 
conventional theories of learning 
that rule out the possibility of 
learning to be authentic 
2.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to show how certain metaphysical assumptions 
about learning made in some of the main conventional theories of learning rule 
out the possibility of the kind learning to be authentic I discussed in the 
introduction. These metaphysical assumptions are found in a number of 
mechanisms according to which learning is believed to always involve an 
object of learning as well as a process of growth, which is rooted in the 
existing way of being of the learner and which is characterized by increased 
integration and differentiation ultimately leading to increased rigidity. These 
assumptions, it will be argued, rule out a learning that results in radical self-
renewal and a concomitant change in the structure of experience itself. 
Because we have, as yet, no more than provisional characteristics of such a 
learning to be authentic, I will look at what could be considered a concrete 
illustration of such learning. With the help of this illustration I will show that 
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the metaphysical assumptions about learning made in some of the main 
theories of learning rule out the possibility of such learning to be authentic. Like 
the other illustrations in this thesis, it is fictitious and, therefore, does not lay 
claim to having actually taken place. The situation described in the vignette is 
a relatively easy one, one that, to the teacher in a busy school, may strike one 
as unproblematic, even romantic. This is, firstly, because the process of 
learning to be authentic, which these vignettes aim to illustrate, is a subtle one, 
one that demands a lot of attention on behalf of the learner. It is, therefore, 
likely that such a learning to be authentic happens more readily in a situation 
where the stakes are not very high, and where the situation is "under control". 
This is not to say that learning to be authentic cannot happen in difficult, 
conflicted, or chaotic situations, just that it is more realistic to describe them 
occurring, at least initially, in relatively peaceful situations. Secondly, though a 
vignette describing a difficult situation may gain in seeming applicability to 
the realities of the life of a teacher, it wouldn't add to illuminating the actual 
process itself and, as was said in the introduction, the aim of this thesis is to 
acquaint the reader with the process of learning to be authentic, rather than 
direct educational practice. Thirdly, in taking a relatively unproblematic 
situation as a problem, there is the acknowledgement that what is generally 
considered an unproblematic situation may still be one that is inauthentic in 
the normative sense of the word, as it will be developed in this thesis. 
The plausibility of the illustration hangs on whether it accurately reflects the 
kinds of experiences discussed in the thesis and is an accurate 
(phenomenological) description of experiences that individuals are capable of 
having. The function of the following illustration is both negative and positive. 
It is negative, in that it is meant to serve in the argument that our 
metaphysical assumptions about learning preclude the possibility of any kind 
of learning that would lead to such kinds of experience. It is positive in that it 
is meant to give a first concrete indication of the kind of learning I will be 
slowly bringing to light in this thesis. 
In the chapters following this one I will then aim to find a form of learning 
that is free from at least some of these metaphysical assumptions made in the 
main theories of learning. More precisely, I will take Heidegger's notion of 
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authenticity and show how it involves both a change in the structure of 
experience itself and a kind of radical self-renewal, and that, consequently, an 
account of the process of becoming authentic can be taken as an instance of 
learning to be authentic. But, given that an account of such learning is, as far as I 
have been able to establish, as yet unavailable, I will first look at our example, 
which is an educational one, where education is thought of as including both 
schooling and parenting and, as indicated in Section 1.2, is itself defined in 
terms of learning. 
Reports of individuals having the kinds of experiences this thesis seeks to 
investigate are not uncommon (for examples, see Forman, 1998), even if they 
remain the exception rather than the rule. The psychologist Irvin Yalom, for 
example, cites Tolstoy's The Death of Ivan Ilych as a literary example of the 
story of a man who goes through a major and, to remove ambiguity, 
psychological change as he lies dying. Ivan Illych "realizes that all his life he 
has shielded himself from the notion of death through his preoccupation with 
prestige, appearance and money. ... Then, following an astounding 
conversation with the deepest part of himself, he awakens in a moment of great 
clarity to the fact that he is dying so badly because he has lived so badly. His 
whole life has been wrong. In shielding himself from death, he has shielded 
himself from life as well. ... He grows aware that not only he but all living 
things must die. He discovers compassion — a new feeling in himself ... and 
ultimately he  dies not in pain but in the joy of intense compassion" (Yalom, 
2008, pp. 35-36). This may well be an example of learning to be authentic, 
even if it is not detailed enough to tell with certainty. 
To have a more detailed account to consider, I will take as our illustration 
what could be an everyday educational occurrence: a teacher who, at a loss as 
to how to deal with a difficult student, comes to a sudden insight that this 
approach has been wrong-footed, with the result that he finds a different way 
of approaching the student. What makes this occurrence different from that of 
someone, say, merely changing their perspective on the situation is that this 
teacher is himself in some ways transformed in the process: not only does he 
end up perceiving the whole situation concerning the difficult student 
differently, he also has a radically changed experience of himself, he feels 
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different about his relationship with the pupil and, what is more, has found a 
different basis in himself from which to approach the situations. In other 
words, he undergoes a change in the structure of experience itself and a kind of 
radical self-renewal. 
Our example begins early on a Saturday evening in May, when the teacher is 
driving back home after having dropped his two young daughters off at their 
mother's place. On his way home through the country lanes he stops at the 
foot of a hill, parks his car, and begins to walk up the hill through the woods, 
to the top from where he will be able to see far across the country side, 
towards the sea. While he is walking through the woods, he thinks about a 
pupil who he has been having difficulties with. This pupil, who is in his year 
nine group, has been coming to the rehearsals of the play he is putting up for 
the end of year. Though the pupil appears to be keen to be part of the play, he 
has also been disruptive, struggling to pay attention and failing to learn his 
lines. He seems to have difficulties at home and often appears poorly rested. 
Whereas normally the teacher would be quick to act in such a situation and be 
decisive about it, he has found that there is something in this boy that is 
making him feel uncertain about the approach to take. Somehow he feels 
incapable of reaching the boy while, at the same time, he would really like to 
be able to reach him, producing that particular combination of affection and 
frustration that marks some teacher-student relationships. As he is walking up 
the hill, he initially thinks through the whole situation with the student again: 
has he used the right kind of approach, said the right things, been strict 
enough, been understanding enough? Should he set targets or should he rather 
allow the student to decide? Is he looking at it in the right way? And so on. 
Then it strikes him that the way he feels about this situation is very much one 
of him being the problem solver and the situation with the student 
representing a problem. He feels himself to have created a world around him in 
which he appears as someone who is there to solve problems and that, as part 
8 How this is different from other critical approaches that involve the whole person, such as 
reflexivity (Moore, 2012, p. 124) will be explained in Section 3.6.1 and again Section 7.1.2. 
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of that world, the situations he finds himself in are also approached as 
problems. It is as if he always moves in a certain kind of world, where his 
relationships to things are that of problem solving. This realization brings him 
back to how he used to feel as a young man at home and in relation to his 
parents and siblings, and it seems that it was then that he became a "problem 
solver". But now he feels how this way of being is just one of many possible 
ways and how liberating it is to just let it be, to allow it to subside, even as this 
brings up certain feelings of sadness and pain from his younger days, because 
it brings back some of the feelings that first set him on the road to becoming a 
"problem solver". 
And, as his mind returns to the troublesome pupil, he becomes aware of the 
way he has structured his relationship with the pupil along certain lines that 
now begin to appear him as arbitrary. He has, in certain ways identified with 
the student, for he too had been in many ways a troublesome youth, insecure 
and withdrawn yet wanting to come out and make contact with people, to 
express himself. But then he also feels that the student is different from him in 
certain ways that appear almost unbridgeable: he seems a bit of a "hot-house 
flower", lacking in drive and always talking with the girls in a way that seems 
effeminate. But at this point he realizes that those likes and dislikes have stood 
in the way of seeing the pupil as he really is. Those details about how he does 
and does not identify and understand the pupil now strike him as a web of 
reactions he has allowed himself to get tangled up in, where, really there is a 
much more direct and dispassionate way of relating to the pupil. And the ways 
in which he had hitherto structured his relationship with the pupil simply fall 
away, leaving behind a sense of connection with the student which is not 
attributable to any particular traits, but which is as deep as it is wordless. 
Again he returns to the question of how to approach the situation with the 
student. His mood is different now, because the heaviness of having to solve a 
problem has lifted, and he feels much freer in relation to the student now, as 
there are no longer the likes and dislikes he has to navigate, in order to find a 
position from which to approach the student. As ideas emerge of how to 
approach the situation - such as taking the boy aside after the next rehearsal 
for a chat -, these ideas take on a different quality. They are no longer 
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envisaged as acts that may cause a change in the situation, as strategies and 
interventions, but merely as ideas arising in response to a situation that can 
itself never be captured in terms of ideas, strategies and planned interventions. 
The situation is clearly there, one where, in the context of a drama project, a 
troublesome youth is struggling to come to terms with certain things, and yet 
the teacher finds he cannot define the situation any further without violating 
the nature of the situation. He has to let the situation be in some way, even as 
ideas of how to deal with it come and go. 
In a strange way the teacher now feels he is more in touch with the situation 
than ever before, and yet, he has let go almost completely of the way he had 
been connected to the situation before: he no longer feels bound to the 
situation as a problem that he is called on to solve; he no longer identifies with 
the boy in the way he did before; he no longer tries to decide on to how to 
handle the situation in advance. The situation is there for him in a more 
immediate way than ever before and it is as if all the ways in which he had 
previously invested in the situation had been there only to stand between him 
and the situation itself. Strangely enough, this feeling of direct connection is 
also one of emptiness, of not having anything to be certain about and feel 
secure in, of not being able to feel good about and count as an actual or 
potential future achievement. 
As this feeling of emptiness becomes stronger, the woods around the teacher, 
the evening sun shining through the branches, the birds singing and the sand 
under his feet all come to his attention in an immediate way. There is a feeling 
of connection to all the living things around him that is so direct it does not 
appear to go through any of the senses. What is more, the things he 
experiences around him, the flowers and the trees, the wind and the bees, all 
appear as within the space of his awareness. It is as if there is simply the 
awareness of the woods, the sun and the sky and that there is no separate self 
that has to come out of its enclosure in order to connect with the woods, the 
sun and the sky. It is all simply there, just as his body is there walking, and 
just as the thoughts he has are there, arising in the same space of awareness 
within which the things around him arise. 
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Then he reaches the top of the hill and for some time just stands there, 
overlooking the country side all the way towards the sea. There is, for him, a 
vast space of awareness within which all the things he sees and hears and feels 
and thinks arise and subside again. Everything is in motion, because he does 
not latch on to any particular thing he sees, hears, feels or considers. And he 
feels connected to every living thing he sees and to the ones he does not see 
but senses, through the ideas he has of them. 
By now he has left behind thoughts about the troublesome pupil. Now 
thoughts about his two daughters and his ex-wife arise in the form of images 
and feelings, some pleasant others painful. And they seem to arise out of the 
same emptiness that remained after he had let go of all the ways in which he 
had invested in the situation with the pupil in his drama class. The whole 
experience has made him see things anew, but not "anew" in the sense of 
having come upon a new perspective from which to approach things, but, 
rather, in the sense that his whole way of being was in a constant state of 
renewal, where it was impossible to tell how he would approach future 
situations, because he realized that he would have to be free of plans and 
strategies now, in order for him to be able to truly meet these situations as and 
when they would arise. 
2.2 The metaphysics of current theories of learning 
I will now turn to different theoretical accounts of learning to see how their 
formal characteristics, their metaphysics, relate to the example of learning to 
be authentic I considered above. Some of these accounts, like those of Piaget, 
and Vygotsky, have been far more influential in education than others, for 
example, Hebbian learning. Still, they are treated as equal in the following 
discussion, because what is at stake is the meaning of learning in general as we 
find it in our society. 
In a recent survey of theories of learning Judith Ireson writes that "there is no 
single unifying framework" for learning (Ireson, 2008, p. 28). This sentiment is 
echoed in the philosophical literature about learning. Thus, in his book The 
Philosophy of Human Learning (1998) Winch discusses philosophical issues to 
do with learning, but expressly disavows any attempt at what he calls "grand 
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theory building" (Winch, 1998, p. ix); he does not attempt to arrive at one, 
overall concept of learning, even if it "might be inferred from  the book] that 
Winch views 'learning' as a family resemblance concept" (Hager, 2005a, p. 
660). Paul Hager's position is more radical, as he writes that learning is merely 
a label, that "it seems plausible to view learning as a conceptual and linguistic 
construction, one that is widely used in many societies and cultures, but with 
very different meanings, which are at least partly contradictory and contested. 
Put differently, there is no external, reified entity that is 'learning— (Hager, 
2008, p. 682). 
Regardless whether there is a grand theory of learning waiting to be 
discovered, whether the concept of learning is based on family resemblance or, 
indeed, whether it is only a label we use for our convenience, it can be argued 
that there are a number of metaphysical assumptions which the major theories 
of learning have in common. What I will do is set out what I believe are some 
of these metaphysical assumptions and show how they are incompatible with a 
notion of learning to be authentic. As a general indication of the metaphysical 
assumptions that are held by some of the main theories of learning, we could 
say that learning is generally conceptualized as a process of growth, leading to 
increased integration, differentiation and rigidity, one that involves a dialectic 
between the existing and a possible state of the learner, and that always has an object. 
2.2.1 Learning is a process of growth, leading to increased 
integration, differentiation, and rigidity 
The principle of association is that one thing calls up the other thing. In 
everyday language we speak of associating one thing with another, as when we 
associate the smell of pipe tobacco with a particular person or when we 
associate a particular song with a week of clubbing on Ibiza. Thus, when we 
smell pipe tobacco, the memory of that person may be evoked, we may "see" 
the person, or "hear" their voice, feel emotions we used to feel in the presence 
of that person, or think about something else related to the person, like their 
wife, who doesn't like him to smoke. This kind of associative memory can be 
said to be the co-occurrence of two experiences, one of which is actual (the 
smell of tobacco) and one of which is remembered (something that in the past 
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co-occurred with smelling the tobacco). But there can also be an association 
between two experiences that are remembered, as when the smell of tobacco 
sets one off on a "stream of consciousness" series of associated memories. 
Likewise, when, back at work in the office, we hear the song we danced to 
every night for a week on Ibiza, we may "spontaneously" begin to move our 
body - before checking the urge to get up and dance. This is essentially the 
same mechanism as we find in the association between two stimuli, except that 
in this case the association is between a stimulus and a movement, a behaviour, 
an action, rather than a perceptual memory, such as that of a smell or a sound. 
The association can be simple, when a stimulus evokes initially only one 
association, for example when hearing a particular name on the radio evokes 
the memory of the person one knows with the same name or when hearing the 
name of one's former teacher makes one sit up straight without even thinking 
about it. The association can also be complex, when the stimulus evokes a 
whole network of memories that are interlinked, for example when the smell of 
something one used to smell in one's youth "takes one back to one's childhood" 
or when a doctor who is on emergency call is woken up at night by the phone 
ringing and is immediately ready to do everything involved in getting up, 
grabbing the necessary equipment, getting the car out of the garage, and so 
on. 
We find the principle of association in neuro-scientific accounts of learning. 
"Whenever one cell (A) repeatedly takes part in the firing of another (B), 'some 
growth process or metabolic change takes place in one or both cells' such that 
the efficiency of the first cell in firing the second is increased" (Fuster, 2003, p. 
42). This kind of learning is often called Hebbian learning, after the 
neuroscientist, Donald Hebb. "The basic tenet of Hebbian learning in neural 
networks is that 'units that fire together, wire together— (Manukata and 
Pfaffly, 2004, p. 141). Thus once a set of neurons has "fired", been active, 
together, they are much more likely to "fire" together again in the future. This 
"firing together" can spread so that one group of neurons "fires" together with 
another group in the way that two experiences, each involving the "firing" of 
many neurons, are likely to occur together. This "firing together" may also 
involve a small, local, group of neurons setting off many large groups of 
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neurons, as in a chain reaction, as when a small detail of something is 
experienced which evokes a world of association — like Proust and his 
Madeleine in The Remembrance of Things Past. 
We also find the principle of association in behaviourist accounts of learning. 
In Behaviourist theories of learning the two main mechanisms, which in the 
natural world always work together, rely on association to work. On the one 
hand, there is the behaviour of the organism "as if it learns to associate" a 
stimulus (S) with a biologically significant event (S*). The paradigmatic case of 
this "S-S* learning" is that of Pavlov's dog, who behaved as if he associated the 
sound of the bell (the stimulus, S) with food (the biologically significant event, 
S*). On the other hand, there is the behaviour of the organism "as if it has 
associated" a behaviour or response (R) with a biologically significant event 
(S*). Here the case that exemplifies this R-S* learning is that of Skinner's box, 
where the rat behaved as if it associated pressing the lever (the response, R) 
with the food pellet (the biologically significant event, S*) (Bouton, 2007, p. 
28). In reality the two mechanisms are "almost inseparable", as every time a 
biologically significant stimulus (S*), like food, is associated with behaviour 
(R) it can also be associated with stimuli (S) that are present as well. And this 
goes the other way round as well, as the presence of a stimulus (S) can be 
associated with a biologically significant stimulus (S*), as well as with a 
response (R) (Bouton, 2007, p. 29). 
Piaget appears to subsume the issue of association under that of assimilation. 
"The dog that salivates at the sight of food will not salivate in this way at the 
sound of a bell unless he assimilates it ... to the schema of this action [of 
salivation]" (Piaget, 2001, p. 107). Yet such a schema is itself a "structure or 
organization of actions as they are transferred or generalized by repetition in 
similar or analogous situations" (Cited in Murray Thomas, 2005, p. 192). That 
is, the schema is what in the neurological account would be an associative 
structure. For Piaget, something that fits into an existing scheme is 
assimilated, whereas something that does not fit is responded to by the scheme 
accommodating the new input. 
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Closely linked with association is habit. If habit consists in doing the same 
thing again and again, this doing again and again always occurs in certain 
situations and certain temporal contexts. "We always have coffee in Geek 
Street" means that we always have coffee there when we are in town, which, 
put in terms of association, means that going to town and having coffee are 
associated with Geek Street. Similarly, "we always go to the computer shop 
before having coffee in Geek Street" can be seen as a temporal association 
between arriving in town and before we have coffee. Thus, after having had 
good a browse through the memory stick section, stepping out of the computer 
shop, the body may, quite of its own accord, turn into the direction of Geek 
Street and at the same time all sorts of associations with coffee may be called 
up: the beginnings of withdrawal symptoms linked with the expectation of the 
coffee buzz, the image of the grumpy woman behind the till at the coffee shop, 
the smell of pastries, and so on. 
Apart from association and habit, the other most basic element we find in 
theories of learning is that of valence: "emotional force or significance", 
especially "the extent to which an individual is attracted or repelled by an 
object, an event, or person" (SOED, 2007). In Behaviourism valence is 
represented by the biologically significant stimulus that motivates the 
behaviour: if there is no biologically significant stimulus at some point there is, 
according to Behaviourist theory, no motivation and without motivation there 
is no behaviour. But, as the quote by Paul Hagar at the beginning of the 
chapter indicated, in our "emerging understanding of learning" all human 
learning includes "conative and affective capacities" (Hager, 2005b, p. 662). A 
significant stimulus for a human being may be food, but also appreciation, 
sympathy, status, the resolution of inner conflict, the relief of discomfort, and 
so on. Valence is linked with reward and punishment learning: this is what Van 
Geert calls the law of contingent effect which "states that if a behaviour is immediately 
followed by a positive effect, or reward, that behaviour is likely to occur more 
frequently in the future" (Van Geert, 2000, p. 68). 
The accounts of learning we are looking at can all be said to see learning as a 
process of growth. If we take Paul Van Geert's reading of Piaget and 
Vygotsky, "the theories of Piaget and Vygotsky] agree on the principle of 
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developmental order: behaviours, actions, problems, tasks, and experiences (or 
whatever else constitutes the units of analysis) can be ordered along a 
developmental scale in terms of less or more developmentally advanced levels" 
(Van Geert, 1998, p. 5). Throughout development there is a process of growth, 
not only with respect to the knowledge we have about more and more things, 
but also with respect to our "conative and affective capacities as well as other 
abilities and learned capacities such as bodily know-how, skills of all kinds, and 
so on" (Hager, 2005b, p. 662). That is, as we develop, there is less and less in 
life that we have not acquired knowledge about, an attitude or feelings 
towards, a way of acting towards, a way of being towards. 
This development is a process towards increased integration and 
differentiation. Marton and Booth write that "development can be seen as 
continuous differentiation and integration of the experienced world", where 
differentiation is brought about by "separation" and integration is brought 
about by "simultaneity" (association) (Marton and Booth, 1997, p. 138). Indeed, 
high levels of integrated and differentiated knowledge in a certain domain is 
often taken as the definition of expertise. 
These two processes can also be seen at work in neurological, Hebbian, 
accounts of learning. On the one hand, there is increased "simultaneity" or 
association, where, as a result of certain input "Hebbian learning would 
increase the connections to Ea certain] unit from relevant sending units, so the 
unit would become increasingly responsive to this correlation". On the other 
hand there would be "separation", where "Hebbian learning would decrease the 
connections to this [same] unit from irrelevant sending units, so the unit 
would become less responsive to other correlations in the environment". Thus 
a certain unit (let's say a group of neurons) would become especially 
responsive to input from certain units and unresponsive to input from other 
units. What is more, "[t]hese other units could then tune their weights to 
respond to other correlations in the environment" (Manukata and Pfaffly, 
2004, pp. 142-143). That is, as the first unit specializes in receiving input from 
certain units, the units that are ignored by this first unit may connect with 
other units. "In this way, Hebbian models can self-organize so that units 
42 
specialize in representing distinct statistical regularities in the environment" 
(Manukata and Pfaffly, 2004, pp. 142-143). 
But "Ea]s connections change to strengthen certain neural responses to 
stimuli, this can reduce the possibility of other responses, which can impair 
learning" (Manukata and Pfaffly, 2004, p. 144). They give the example of 
Japanese language speakers who have learned, correctly, in their native 
language to hear the /1/ and the /r/ as the same sound, which they continue to 
do when learning English, where this is incorrect, a situation which is only 
remedied by them learning to hear the difference on the basis of exaggerated 
examples, which are made less exaggerated over time, to the point where they 
can hear the difference between the /1/ and the In in natural speech. This 
example is used to explain the existence of critical periods in learning, but it is 
equally relevant in arguing that there is a decreasing amount of things for 
which the person does not already have a scheme to assimilate it into. 
If there are increasingly fewer things that an individual does not already have 
a schema for, that they cannot somehow integrate into their view of things and 
ways of dealing with things, this means that over time the individual becomes 
more rigid in their ways of seeing and doing things. This accords with the 
experience of many people who have seen older people become more set in 
their ways; it is a case of "old habits dying hard", of "not teaching an old dog 
new tricks". 
These processes of growth, integration and differentiation can, according to 
some theorists, be explained purely in terms of the self-organization of the 
elements of association, habit and valence discussed above. Thus Paul Van 
Geert writes that "development is possible ... [as] neural nets of the adaptive 
resonance type can construct higher levels of complexity without being issued 
with new resources or contents by an external source. This demonstration of 
the possibility of increasing complexity through self-organization is of central 
importance to any general theory of development" (Van Geert, 1998, p. 5). But, 
regardless what the correct explanation is behind these processes, they are 
shared by most, if not all the theoretical accounts of learning. 
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In the main theories of learning self-renewal happens when the individual re-
organizes in the face of a situation that cannot be assimilated, that they do not 
have a satisfactory response to, that cannot be integrated in the existing ways 
of being of the individual. The response to this inability to assimilate the 
experience would be for the individual to re-organize (to accommodate, 
differentiate, adapt). This could be said to amount to a shift in perspective, in 
approach or attitude, where, staying with our example, the teacher would, say, 
cease to experience the situation as a problem and begin to see it as something 
to accept without feeling the need to resolve it. But this is not what happened 
in our example, where the teacher remains open to the situation, neither 
accepting the situation nor wanting to solve it. There is, therefore, no mere re-
organization, but rather, a dissolution of an existing organization without 
replacing it with another one. 
It could, of course, be argued that what is experienced as a dissolution of an 
existing way of organizing experience is, in effect, just another re-
organization. Other than this being perhaps true in a purely formal way (every 
change being an instance of re-organization), there is a real phenomenological 
difference between the two in that there is an experiential difference between, 
on the one hand, having a perspective, an approach and taking a stance, and, on 
the other hand, letting the situation be as it is. If this is then combined with 
the experience of being in more direct contact with the situation now that one 
has ceased to grasp it in any particular way, we find that there is an event that, 
though it constitutes a real change in the individual, is not easily explained by 
the theories of learning I am considering. This is possibly because the accounts 
have focussed on the re-organization and growth of existing structures rather 
than their dissolution — which may itself be because the notion of being in 
contact with a situation without there being a structure that mediates that 
contact is unintelligible in these accounts. 
In the chapters following this one, we will see how an account of change that is 
different from the ones that follow out of the conventional theories of learning 
can be said to represent radical self-renewal rather than a modification of 
existing structures, because it is based in the dissolution of existing structures. 
As part of this account it will be argued that the notion of being in contact 
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with a particular situation without there being a structure that mediates the 
contact is indeed intelligible. At this point all we can do is raise questions 
concerning the validity of the explanations these conventional theories of 
learning can give for an event of radical change, such as we have encountered 
in our example. 
2.2.2 Learning involves a dialectic between existing and possible 
structures in the learner 
In the previous section we saw how, according to the main theories of 
learning, there is growth, as well as increasing integration, differentiation and 
rigidity in our ways of being (our knowledge, will, feelings, movements, skills, 
and so on). In this section I will take this point further by showing how the 
main theories of learning all conceive learning as involving a dialectic between 
existing and possible structures. The point I want to make in this section is 
that, according to the theoretical accounts of learning, all learning is 
inescapably linked to previous learning, making it again more unlikely for an 
individual to learn something that does not build on and follow naturally from 
existing structures. 
Paul Van Geert discusses this aspect of the continuity between existing and 
possible structures in the learner at some length. He explains how, in models 
of neurological learning, when computer models of neurological networks are 
given tasks to be learned "[t]he learning system obtains information [about 
what needs to be learned] in terms of its own current learning state by making 
errors. The errors lead to updating the connection weights, which eventually 
reduce the distance between the current state of the system (its actual state) 
and the properties exemplified by [what needs to be learned] (the potential 
state)" (Van Geert, 1998, p. 5). That is, not only do the networks begin the 
learning process with their actual state, they also "understand" the information 
that is given to them "in terms of their current learning state". 
This is perhaps more easily understood in terms of yet another theoretical 
approach to learning, information-processing theory, which understands 
learning in terms of the application of rules to information that comes into the 
system — where the system is usually understood in analogy with a computer. 
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This approach "makes a distinction between rules or strategies on the one 
hand and the information resulting from applying those strategies on the 
other. The resulting information is then integrated in a way that either 
consolidates or modifies the available rules and strategy sets" (Van Geert, 
1998, p. 5). Again, what we see is that the system itself collects (selects) the 
information it uses (by applying rules to input), and that, as a result of the 
information which it has collected and the way it has processed this 
information, the very strategies of both collecting and processing in formation 
are modified. 
In terms of Piaget's and Vygotsky's theories, as Van Geert understands them, 
"there exists a fundamental dialectic between a primarily subject- and a 
primarily object-driven force, which constitutes the motor behind the 
developmental process. This dialectic involves a tension between a 
consolidated, current level [...] and a potential, future level of development". 
What is perhaps most important in this for our discussion is that the 
"potential, future level of development" is "still confined by the current state of 
the subject" (Van Geert, 1998, p. 5). That is, not only is the response to the 
thing in the environment based in the current state of the individual, the way 
the thing in the environment is understood is also based in the current state of the 
individual. 
So we can see that there is an inevitably conservative force in our learning 
about things. And we can easily see how understanding and responding to a 
current situation being inextricably linked to the individual's current take on 
the situation can have deleterious consequences, for example, in human 
relationships. One only needs to think of all the long-standing conflicts 
between individuals or groups of people where, inevitably new occurrences are 
understood in terms of current understanding. It is likely that, in such cases, 
prejudices get "confirmed" again and again. This is especially likely to happen 
between people of different cultures and traditions (say, in Britain, white 
teachers and pupils from ethnic minorities), where the differences in values and 
in the interpretation of actions leave a lot of space for such "confirmation" of 
prejudice. 
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Note that a shift in perspective, approach, or stance may not really be an 
option here, as, to remain with our current example, the perspective of the 
pupils from the ethnic minority may well be so alien to the white teachers as to 
be inaccessible. A shift to a kind of meta-perspective (as in "I need to suspend 
my prejudices and keep in mind that the pupils see the world very differently 
from me") may be a first good step, but would need to be followed by a gradual 
coming to understand the pupils' perspective, and this could ultimately result 
in a kind of super-perspective in which both cultural perspectives are 
accommodated, probably containing a fair amount of internal tension (for 
example, around an issue such as the role of women in society). 
I am, however, not looking for a gradual integration of two perspectives, but 
for the actual dissolution of the current perspective. What was suggested by 
the example of the teacher thinking about the troublesome pupil is that there 
could still be a contact with the situation, a relationship with the pupil, which 
is not the based in the current state of the teacher. Thus the example reported 
how the ways in which the teacher had hitherto structured his relationship 
with the pupil simply fell away, as a result of which there was a new-found 
contact with the situation. What is implied is that the new way of relating to 
the situation concerning the pupil was not a modification of the existing state 
of the teacher as he was previously (e.g. slightly put off by the pupil's 
effeminate way of behaving), but emerged only as a result of the previous state 
dissolving. One could aver that the openness resulting from the dissolution 
becomes the new "current state" of the teacher and that, therefore, there is 
continuity after all. This is no doubt true in a formal sense, but it is also easily 
seen that, provided the dissolution is complete enough, there is no continuity 
between the previous state that was dissolved and the one that arose after the 
dissolution — and it is this kind of discontinuity that is the salient one in the 
context of the current discussion. 
The possibility of a response which is not a modification of one's current state 
may sound unintelligible in the context of learning, because we very much see 
learning as involving the modification of an existing entity, so that, even if we 
were inclined to grant the possibility of "a response which is not based on one's 
current state" as a kind of extreme spontaneity, a creativity ab nihil, an act of 
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divine inspiration, we would probably be reluctant to call such an event 
learning. But, as we will see later (See section 3.2.1), there is a way of 
conceiving of this possibility that is not incoherent, if we allow for there be 
contact with a situation even after the dissolution of existing structures and, as 
we will see in Chapter 7, if we understand any kind of perspective, approach or 
stance itself to be processal in nature. 
2.2.3 Learning has an intentional object 
Paul Hager reports how Hirst and Peters proposed that one of "the two 
necessary conditions for learning" is "that it has an object" (Hager, 2005b, p. 
651) (we will encounter Hirst and Peter's second necessary condition shortly). 
This is such an "obvious" aspect of learning that many theorists of learning do 
not appear to make it explicit: whenever we learn something we are engaging 
with something (a thing, a state of affairs, a person, an idea) and as a result of 
the learning we acquire a feeling towards, knowledge of, an attitude towards, a 
way of acting on of achieving something. I will contrast this with the possibility 
that learning occurs in such a way that it is not in relation to any specific 
intentional object. 
Marton and Booth, taking a phenomenological approach to learning, 
presuppose the intentional structure of consciousness in their discussion of 
learning. They write that "The verb 'to learn' has to have an object" (Marton 
and Booth, 1997, p. 84). This can be understood as having two moments or 
aspects, both of which stem from the assumption, taken from Bretano that all 
"psychic" (what we would nowadays call psychological) events have an 
intentional structure in that they are about something, something apart from 
themselves. This is sometimes called the transcendental structure of psychic 
life, where the term transcendental means referring to something other than the 
organism itself. Thus, Marton and Booth cite Bretano: "No hearing without 
something being heard, no believing without something believed, no hoping 
without something hoped, no striving without something striven for, no joy 
without something we are joyous about, etc." (Marton and Booth, 1997, p. 84). 
Within this notion of intentionality, Marton and Booth distinguish two 
different ways in which learning has an object. First, there is what the learner 
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is trying to do when they are learning (Marton and Booth's study is about 
when learners are intentionally setting out to learn something), stemming 
from the fact "that people have distinctly different ways of understanding [...] 
what learning is" (Marton and Booth, 1997, p. 47). In behaviourist terms the 
object would be the stimuli, both unconditioned and conditioned, as they are 
initially responded to. In neuro-scientific accounts of learning the learning 
object would be seen in terms of what neural networks are activated initially in 
relation to something, before the actual experience modifies the tendency of 
the organism to respond. We can see how this is similar to Piaget's notion of 
assimilation, where the object towards which the learner acts is taken in a 
certain way, as a certain kind of object. We can also see how this is similar to 
Vygotsky's current stage of development, where the learner has a current way 
of taking an object (Van Geert, 2000). 
Second, there is the notion that learning has a "direct object ... the content that 
is being learned" (Marton and Booth, 1997, p. 84). In behaviourist terms this is 
the tendency of the organism to associate stimuli with other stimuli or with 
responses after this pattern of association has been modified as a result of 
experience. In neuro-scientific terms this is the way neural networks are being 
activated in relation to something, after their activation patterns have been 
modified by experience. This is Piaget's accommodation and Vygotsky's higher 
level of development, as it has been reached with the help of a more competent 
other. This direct object of learning also corresponds with the second 
"necessary conditions for learning" as proposed by Hirst and Peters, namely, 
"that some standard of achievement has been met" (Hager, 2005b, p. 651), 
where Hirst and Peters introduce the normative element that is implicit in the 
other accounts of learning mentioned here. 
Thus there are two moments to a learning object, first, the way it is taken at 
the beginning of the process and, second, the way it is taken at the end of the 
process. Or, to put it in a more formal way, one that better reflects the ongoing 
character of the learning process: the way the object is taken at ti and at t2, 
where ti is the earlier point in time and t2 the later one. These two aspects of 
the object of learning give us the dialectic between the existing and possible 
structures discussed in the previous section. They give us the temporal 
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dimension of learning as a process from one state of being to another. They 
also tell us that the object of learning is per definition in a state of flux, as the 
way the object is experienced is continuously changing. Ultimately the notion 
of learning having an intentional object is the consequence of seeing the 
psychic (the mental) as necessarily intentional, and it is this notion that will 
get challenged in this thesis. 
Note that in suggesting that there may be learning that does not happen in 
relation to an intentional object I do not dispute that thinking, perceiving and 
acting are intentional in nature. What it suggests is that there may be a 
process of learning that occurs, as it were, at right-angles from the intentional 
relationship. The teacher in our example, walking up the hill and worrying 
about the pupil, suddenly finds that "the things he finds around him all appear 
as within the space of his awareness", which means that what has changed is 
not so much the things (the flowers and the trees, the wind and the bees) or 
even his relationship with them, but the space in which they appear, as now 
they do not appear to him as "outside of him" but as within the space of his 
awareness. 
The process that led to this change is not one that occurred in relation to the 
objects of his intentional experience but one that occurred to the way in which 
any objects of experience appeared to him. Such a change, as it is not a change 
in the appearance of any specific object or class of objects, cannot be the result 
of a change in the relationship to the object. Indeed, apart from the fact that all 
objects now appear in a different space of awareness, his relationship with 
individual objects may well have remained essentially unchanged (liking the 
flowers and afraid of the bees, for example). We can, therefore, say that, since 
the main theories of learning tend to conceive of learning as necessarily having 
an intentional object, they cannot account for the kind of learning that was 
exemplified in the illustration at the beginning of this chapter. 
With this last example we can conclude that the examples discussed in this 
chapter have given us reason to believe that a learning to be authentic will have 
to be conceived of in terms quite different from those used in the conventional 
theories of learning. It was argued that the presupposition that learning is a 
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process of growth, increased integration and differentiation, towards increased 
rigidity goes counter to any experience where there is radical self-renewal that 
is based in the dissolution of existing structures in the learner. It was further 
argued that the notion that learning is always a modification of the existing 
way of being of the learner is counter to a new way of relating to something 
that comes after there has been a dissolution of any previous ways of relating 
to it. We then looked at an aspect of the structure of the process of learning, 
which, in the theories we discussed always includes an object of learning, and 
it was argued that the pre-supposition precluded the possibility of a learning 
that resulted in a change in the very structure of experience itself. In short, 
our current theories of learning cannot provide us with an account of learning 
to be authentic, so long as the presuppositions that have been discussed in this 
chapter remain in place. 
2.2.4 Learning as formative of much of existence 
One aspect of current understanding of learning as it is found in the influential 
theories of learning we are looking at in this chapter is that it is the whole 
person who learns. It is instructive to look at this aspect of learning before we 
look at Heidegger's notion of authenticity. Thus, Peter Jarvis, writing within 
the field of adult education, defines human learning as "the combination of 
processes whereby the whole person - body (genetic, physical and biological) 
and mind (knowledge, skills, attitudes, values, emotions, beliefs and senses) 
experiences a social situation, the perceived content of which is then 
transformed cognitively, emotively or practically (or through any 
combination) and integrated into the person's individual biography resulting in 
a changed (or more experienced) person" (Jarvis, 2006, p. 13). 
Though there are theorists who believe that learning concerns primarily the 
acquisition of knowledge and skills, such as D. W. Hamlyn who writes that 
learning is the "acquisition of a form of knowledge or ability :skill: through 
the use of experience" (Hamlyn, 2005), there is a clear trend towards a more 
holistic view of learning. Thus Paul Hager writes about an "emerging 
understanding of learning" where learning "includes not just propositional 
understanding, but cognitive, conative and affective capacities as well as other 
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abilities and learned capacities such as bodily know-how, skills of all kinds, and 
so on" (Hager, 2005b, p. 662). 
The importance of the idea that learning involves the whole person is twofold. 
On the one hand, it is, as Jarvis puts it "the whole person ... experiences a ... 
situation", which means that in principle the whole person is involved in any 
learning event. That is, even the simplest feat of memorization involves 
physical, social and emotional aspects as well as cognitive ones, even if, say, 
the emotional aspect is so marginal as to make no noticeable impact on the 
outcome. On the other hand, the involvement of the whole person means that 
it is not just "propositional understanding" but things to do with the will, 
emotions, practical skills, and so on, that are affected by learning. That is, 
what motivates us, how we feel about things, how we move and act, are all 
shaped as a result of learning. 
What is more, many theorists of learning would nowadays contend that 
"learning and development are inseparable" (Ireson, 2008, p. 14). This means 
that from the day we are born, even during gestation, we are learning, and that 
"learning processes share all of the complexity, organization, structure, and 
internal dynamics once exclusively attributed to development" (Kuhn, 1995, 
cited in Ireson 2008, p. 14). Recent discoveries that "maturational changes can 
be triggered by learning mechanisms" (Manukata & Pfaffly, 2004, p. 145, 
emphasis added) only help to reinforce the notion that learning and 
development are inseparable. 
This is not to deny that some things may be innate, such as the tendency in 
babies to visually track moving objects, or to be more interested in human 
faces than inanimate objects. What it means is that the development of the 
innate beginnings of the person is a process of learning, and that therefore the 
person as such, apart from their innate reflexes, such as blinking at flashes of 
light, is itself largely the result of learning. That is, there is not much in who 
we are as individual human beings that is not affected, shaped, by learning. We 
are the result of an on-going process of learning, a process that began as soon 
as we started to exist, that involved all the different aspects of our being, and 
that is continually integrating all the different aspects of the process. 
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This is important in the context of this investigation, because, as I argued 
earlier, the process of becoming authentic involves a dissolution of existing 
structures in the learner. If, as is suggested in this section, these existing 
structures are, by and large, the result of previous learning (in the 
conventional sense as described in the main accounts of learning), this means 
that the process of becoming authentic consists, to a large extent in the 
reversal of the learning that has occurred before. Seen in this way, learning as 
growth and modification and the dissolution of previous learning that is part of 
learning to be authentic may well be two aspects of the same process. 
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3 Heidegger's notion of becoming 
authentic 
3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter I argued that the presuppositions that learning is a 
process of growth, of increased integration, differentiation and rigidity raises 
questions about the possibility of radical self-renewal on the part of the 
individual. I argued that the notion that learning is always a modification of 
the existing way of being of the learner is counter to the possibility of a 
response which is not based on one's current state. I argued that the notion of 
learning as always involving an intentional object of learning made impossible 
any notion of a learning that involved a change in the very structure of 
experience. In other words, the metaphysical assumptions made in the 
conventional theories of learning, which take learning as a process of 
modification and growth seem to rule out the possibility of a kind of learning 
that is different enough to allow for learning in relation to life and living beings 
in the way I said was necessary in the introduction. 
In this chapter I will take up Heidegger's notion of authenticity and begin to 
consider how the process of becoming authentic could do duty as the kind of 
learning to be authentic I said in the introduction was called for. That is, such a 
learning to be authentic would have to allow for the individual to learn in 
relation to life and living beings in such a way that the entities involved were 
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not taken as either practical or theoretical entities. Indeed, learning to be 
authentic would have to lead to a sense for the being of the entities themselves. 
I will argue in this chapter that Heidegger's notion of the individual, Dasein, 
allows for an engagement with things in a way that is prior to these entities to 
be taken as practical, theoretical or otherwise. I will also argue that different 
philosophers of education have indicated that authentic existence is a mode of 
being that refers to the individual Dasein both as it really is and as who it can 
possibly become as a result of personal flourishing, and that this happens in a 
process of "dying and rebirth", a kind of radical self-renewal I said earlier was 
necessary in relation to learning about life and living beings. 
I will also argue that the notion of authenticity is distinct from that of 
autonomy, as it has been found in education, where authenticity appears to be 
the more fundamental concept. We will see how authenticity involves a notion 
of truth that is more fundamental than a correspondence notion of truth and 
that this entails changes in the way we conceive of the way we assess the 
validity of a claim to authenticity. Finally, I will consider three 
characterizations of the process of becoming authentic that can be found in 
Heidegger's writings and see how these are understood differently, depending 
on whether they are taken as referring to processes that occur at a practical or 
theoretical level or processes that occur at the level of the a priori, the level 
before the being of the entity has been decided on. 
These considerations of different aspects of Heidegger's account of 
authenticity will have given us a further sense of the kind of learning I am 
after in this thesis. They will also have raised questions about Heidegger's 
notion of authenticity itself, notably ones relating to the way he envisages the 
interpersonal and collective dimension of human existence. All this will be 
further developed in the following three chapters, which take up Heidegger's 
description of the process of becoming authentic for each of the three main 
aspects of the human being as he portrays it (understanding, attunement, and 
being-with) and take these three accounts beyond what can be found in 
Heidegger's writings, to establish the nature of the process of becoming 
authentic in such a way that this process can be seen to consist of learning to be 
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authentic. In the last chapter of the thesis an attempt will then be made to 
generalize from the way in which the three aspects of the human being have 
been seen to become authentic to produce an overall definition of learning to be 
authentic and to consider how learning as modification and growth can be 
integrated with learning to be authentic to produce what can be called authentic 
learning. 
3.2 The structure of Dasein 
3.2.1 Dasein as openness 
At the most basic level, Dasein is thought of as an empty space, an openness 
where being and beings can appear. Sometimes Heidegger uses for this the 
term "clearing", as in a clearing in the forest, an empty space among the 
otherwise dense growth of trees and shrubs. Another way of putting this is to 
say that Dasein is being-in-the-world. This means that Dasein is worldly 
existence, that it is its engagement with the entities it finds in the world, and 
that there is nothing substantial (like a soul) that exists as something internal 
that then needs to reach out to (transcend to) the things that are external to it. 
Rather, Dasein is the very process of transcendence, of standing in relationship 
to the entities it encounters. This transcendence in itself is nothing but 
openness. 
In the clearing of this openness the processes arise that give us the actual 
manifestation of the individual Dasein: understanding (Verstehen), attunement 
(Befindlichkeit) and being-with (Mitsein). These are the three ways in which 
Dasein finds itself in the world. Understanding is what could be called the 
action-perception aspect of being-in-the-world and it includes more or less 
everything we would classify as knowledge and skills. Attunement indicates the 
way in which being-in-the-world is coloured by emotion and mood. And being-
with is the dimension of being-in-the-world that is connected to other living 
creatures and makes communication possible. Ultimately, understanding, 
attunement and being-with constitute a unity; they are separated only as a way 
of gaining analytical clarity. One way of looking at these three processes is to 
see them as faculties, as inherent powers or properties that become abilities 
and competences as they are developed. 
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In this openness things are disclosed, they enter into experience, they appear 
in Dasein's awareness. But things are disclosed in different ways, as practical 
entities (what Heidegger calls the ready-to-hand), as theoretical entities (what 
Heidegger calls the present-at-hand), or as entities belonging to what I have 
been calling "the human domain" (which Heidegger calls entities with the 
nature of Dasein or existence). If something is disclosed as ready-to-hand, it is 
disclosed as a practical entity, something we interact with, handle, manipulate, 
the way we do objects we find in our practical dealing with things: objects of 
use and pieces of equipment are ready-to-hand entities. If something is 
disclosed as present-at-hand, it is disclosed as a theoretical entity, something 
that has an essence and characteristics (qualities and relations), and we relate 
to it in the way we relate to theoretical ideas. 
Inauthentic Dasein tends to disclose itself as either ready-to-hand or present-
at-hand, and this is where, according to Heidegger, it goes wrong, because 
Dasein itself is neither something ready-to-hand or present-at-hand, but rather 
something with the nature of Dasein itself, of "being-in-the-world", of 
"existence". The main change from inauthentic to authentic existence consists 
in Dasein learning to take itself as an entity with the nature of Dasein, as 
openness, transcendence, a finite process, being-with, and so on. What is more, 
when Dasein discloses itself as an entity with the nature of Dasein it also 
discloses the entities it encounters in the world in the right way (practical or 
theoretical entities but, more importantly, also other entities with the nature of 
Dasein). The disclosure of the being of an entity, therefore, has to occur at a 
level that is prior to Dasein taking a stand on whether something is a practical 
or theoretical entity or an entity with the nature of Dasein. 
In other words, Dasein's openness itself is not inert but can, in its own way, 
engage with the entities Dasein encounters in the world. Heidegger refers to 
this emptiness as "a structure which makes possible for it being-fulfilled by 
certain goods of the life-world" (Heidegger, 2004., p. 250). Thus the openness 
is not like an empty page but consists in the "essential openness to values and 
primary love of meaning of the personally existing being" (Heidegger, 2004., p. 
250). In the context of this thesis this does not require a radical sense of being 
receptive all the way down in a way that could easily become unintelligible, 
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but what is needed is a notion of openness that allows for actual ways of 
understanding, attunement and being-with to subside, while the possibility of 
understanding, of being affected, and of communicating remains. 
As we will see later in the thesis, the notion of authenticity implies that any 
actual ways of understanding, being emotionally affected and communicating 
subside, opening up the possibility of Dasein engaging with entities in a way 
that is prior to any such actual ways. This can be thought of in terms of Dasein 
becoming empty of any prepared responses or, indeed, of any learned 
responses. But this does not mean that in this state the nervous system, sense 
perception, or any innate responses to environmental events (such as ducking 
when a large object flies towards one) cease to operate. Rather, the concepts of 
openness and emptiness are, in this context, phenomenological: the experience is 
one of there being no specific understanding, being affected or communication. 
For example, the experience is one of listening to someone talk without 
inwardly responding (in terms of agreeing or disagreeing, liking or disliking) 
to what they are saying. This is then experienced as an act of listening in 
complete inner and outer silence, even as one is possibly moved by what is 
being said, is able to remember what was said later on, is able to respond 
intelligently after one has stopped listening. 
A considerable part of this thesis will be dedicated to making intelligible 
exactly what the nature of this kind of experience is, given that a short 
description, such as the one offered here, is open to interpretation, for example, 
with respect to whether the "inner silence" is superficial, leaving all kinds of 
subconscious reaction processes in place, or so complete that there is no 
thinking going on in the listener whatsoever and, therefore, no possibility of 
subsequent response. A way of conceiving of the possibility of existing ways of 
understanding, attunement, and being-with falling silent (dissolving) in such a 
way that it is possible for them to be later re-activated (being re-constituted) 
will be discussed in Chapter 7. 
3.2.2 The tripartite structure of Dasein 
The tripartite structure of action-perception (understanding), being 
emotionally affected (attunement), and communicating (being-with) occurs 
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within the openness that is fundamental to Dasein. Understanding involves 
both our practical know-how of coping with things and our theoretical 
knowledge of it. Heidegger's word "understanding" is to be understood in the 
sense that whenever we engage with an entity, when we perceive it or act in 
relation to it, we have an understanding of what the entity is and we gain 
further understanding of the entity in relating to it practically and 
theoretically. This way of conceiving of action and perception is in many ways 
in line with the main theories of learning I considered in the previous chapter, 
in so far as these are not representationalist, because Heidegger's idea is not 
that there is in the individual somewhere a representation which is modified as 
a result of perception and which serves as a basis for action. We will look at 
understanding in depth in Chapter 4. 
The aspect of "attunement" is the basic emotional way of being we have at any 
given point in time, where this emotional way of being discloses both the 
world and ourselves in a certain way — much like the mood that may disclose 
the student's world as a dreary place and himself as a failure, if he has just 
failed his exam or, conversely, the world as a beautiful place and himself as the 
beneficiary of good fortune, if the girl he is in love with has just reciprocated 
his feelings. This, attunement as mood is, for Heidegger, the basis for emotions 
that are directed towards a certain object (a person we are angry with or a 
flower we feel tenderness towards), in that even emotions that are clearly 
directed towards an entity have the structure of disclosing both oneself and the 
entity in a certain way (the person as annoying and oneself as irritated) in a 
way that the two are not separate (one cannot emotionally experience a person 
as annoying without feeling something like irritation). Importantly, mood is 
something that arises or comes over one, in that we do not experience them as 
originating from a certain particular place (in the way perceptions and actions 
do) or as directed towards a certain particular place (as perceptions and actions 
also do), but as colouring the whole of experience, even if, as we saw, it may 
also involve a directional (understanding) aspect. I will discuss attunement in 
depth in Chapter 5. 
Heidegger takes "being-with" as constitutive of Dasein just as much as 
understanding and attunement. This is perhaps unusual in western thinking, 
59 
with its emphasis on the individual as the ultimate unit of analysis, because the 
being-with dimension is part of Dasein, being-in-the-world, itself. "Being-with 
belongs to [Dasein], which in every case maintains itself in some definite way 
of concernful Being-with-one-another" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 204). That is, 
rather than saying that the individual is primarily an independent entity which 
only secondarily finds itself in relation to other individuals, Heidegger is 
saying that being-with-one-another belongs to the very essence of the 
individual. One could say that the individual is part of the social world they 
belong to in just as fundamental a way as it is understanding and attune ment. 
As such, Heidegger, unusually perhaps, does not base communication in 
action-perception (as when messages are transferred from one to the other) but 
in a prior being-connected of human beings and other living creatures. I will 
look at being-with in depth in Chapter 6. 
For all three Heidegger has an authentic modes: authentic understanding means 
that Dasein understands itself in terms of itself rather than the things it finds 
in the world; authentic attunement means that Dasein has a certain affective 
stance in life, one which does not identify itself with things in the world and 
yet maintains a nearness to these things; authentic being-with means having 
direct, wordless, communication with others. As we saw earlier, the notion of 
authenticity implies that any actual ways of understanding, being emotionally 
affected and communicating subside, opening up the possibility of Dasein 
engaging with entities in a way that is prior to any such actual ways. We could 
say that authenticity is the possibility of existing as pure openness where any 
actual ways of being in the world have fallen silent, but where one is still 
relating to things, to practical and theoretical entities, but also to oneself, 
others, nature, life as a whole. As such, we can begin to see how authenticity 
may be a candidate for the kind of "sense for entities in themselves" or 
9Thus Heidegger writes, using a terminology it would take too far to explicate here, that 
"resoluteness" [we would say authenticity] is "constituted by anxiety as attunement, by 
understanding as a projection of oneself upon one's ownmost being-guilty, and by discourse 
[communication] as reticence" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 343). 
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"understanding of the being of entities" I said in Chapter 1 would be necessary 
for an individual to be able to learn in the domain of life and living beings. 
3.3 Authenticity in philosophy of education 
3.3.1 Authenticity as compatible with learning to be authentic 
A first understanding of what the notion of authenticity means in the context 
of education can be gained by looking at the dual aspect of the term as 
referring to both a reality that has been hidden and a potential that may yet be 
realised. "Authentic" is the translation of the German "eigentlich", which is a 
concept with its roots in "what one really is" and its branches in "what one is 
in potential". On the one hand "eigentlich" simply means "really" or "in 
reality", as in, for example, "he's not really a trainee teacher; he's really an 
Ofsted inspector in disguise". On the other hand, "eigentlich" refers to a 
possibility rather than an actuality, the possibility of realising one's true 
potential of being "who one really is". One way of putting this double movement 
of "becoming who one already is in reality" and of "becoming one's true self" is to 
say, as Heidegger does, "Become what you are!" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 186). This 
at first sight paradoxical statement is explained by Ian Thomson: "I can indeed 
become who I am if the who I am now is not my own self (a self I have made my 
own), but merely a borrowed self, a self-understanding appropriated piecemeal 
from 'everyone and no one" (Thomson, 2004, p. 448). In this way, becoming 
authentic as becoming who one is is a movement from being an inauthentic to 
an authentic self. 
In the context of education this notion of "becoming who one is" can be taken 
to be either contrary to conventional educational practice or in line with 
conventional educational values. IlanGur-Ze'ev, for example, calls for a 
"counter education", setting authenticity up as contrary to current notions of 
education, which, he believes, alienate the individual from themselves. This 
critique of education is, of course, a familiar one that resonates with many of 
what are sometimes called critical pedagogies (See, for example, Freire, 
1970/1996), that see the task of counter education as one of liberating the 
individual from the socialisation that normally occurs in education, because, to 
cite Gur-Ze'ev, "Then, and only then ... will the overcoming of the given be 
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possible and truth as uncovering realize itself" (Gur-Ze'ev, 2002, p. 71). 
Bonnett (2002), on the other hand, while not denying the need for a certain 
amount of resistance against established educational practices, argues that the 
notion of "personal authenticity" is one that resonates with the central value in 
a liberal society of allowing individuals to be who they are and to enjoy an 
education that is personally meaningful. That is, "in characterizing some 
central components of what might be meant by 'human integrity', personal 
authenticity] provides a view of personhood and therefore, in a liberal 
tradition, a view of what must be respected and developed in the treatment of 
young people during their education" (Bonnett, 2002, p. 230). 
This possibility of interpreting the process of "becoming who one is" as both 
counter to and in line with much of the thinking that underlies education as it 
currently exists in the western world reflects some of the deep inner tensions 
within education, notably that of education as, on the one hand, allowing the 
individual to flourish in their own right and as, on the other hand, socialising the 
individual into certain practices and according to values that are given by the 
culture the individual grows up in. As we will see towards the end of this chapter, 
the solution suggested by most of the philosophers of education who have 
written about authenticity is that of a double movement, of "turning away" from 
the movement of socialisation and of "turning back" towards the culture one is 
situated in, but doing so in a different, authentic, way. Importantly for the 
question of learning to be authentic as a species of learning to be authentic, this 
means that the question becomes one of what the learning is that allows one to 
both "turn away" and "turn back". 
Several philosophers of education have written about Heidegger's notion of 
authenticity as a valuable one for education. With the exception of Michael 
Bonnett's account of "poietic thinking" in his Education as a Form of the Poetic: 
A Heideggeri an Approach to Learning and the Teacher-Pupil Relationship (2002), 
which I will look at in some detail later in the chapter, none of these accounts 
have set out to describe the process of becoming authentic itself in terms of 
learning. They have mostly been occupied with setting out a view on the 
nature of authenticity and making the case for authenticity in education, where 
authenticity may refer to either an educational aim or to a quality of the 
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learning process. As my interest is in the process of becoming authentic, I will 
not discuss in detail the arguments for making authenticity central to 
educational practice here, but merely reiterate some of what was said in those 
accounts. 
As we saw in Chapter 1, we already find the call for putting authenticity in a 
Heideggerian sense at the heart of education in the writings of Donald 
Vandenberg who, in the early 1970s, made a case for making the Heideggerian 
concept of authenticity central in philosophy of education. Vandenberg wrote 
in Being and Education: An Essay in Existential Phenomenology that "the role of 
philosophy of education should be to raise the question of the being of children 
and youth that they might respond to the call of being and become who they 
can authentically become" (Vandenberg, 1971, p. 11). Some of the essential 
elements of authenticity that Vandenberg identified were self-awareness and a 
sense of ownership over who one is as a person. That is, the role of philosophy 
of education is, according to Vandenberg, first, "to waken people who are 
becoming teachers to awareness of their own being, thence to enable them to 
choose who they will be in their subsequent encounters with pupils" and, 
second, "to enable their pupils to choose for themselves who they will be" 
(Vandenberg, 1971, p. 10). The stress is, with Vandenberg, on the passive and 
active aspects of self-understanding, where having a true awareness of who one 
is allows one to "choose" who one will be (where the word "choose" has to be 
taken with caution, as it is not meant to refer to a choice between options that 
are at hand). 
More recently, Ilan Gur-Ze'ev has taken up Vandenberg's the call for an 
education that promotes authenticity, self-awareness and self-realization. As 
we saw earlier, Gur-Ze'ev calls for a "counter education", an education that is 
to counter the effects of "normalizing education", the socialization that brings 
about this inauthentic self-understanding, what Heidegger calls the 
understanding oneself from out of "das Man"10. As we will see in more detail 
later, "das Man" is Heidegger's term for an understanding (both of things in 
i° I will be using the original "das Man" throughout the thesis, though most philosophers 
writing in English have used either "the they" or "the one". 
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the world and of oneself) that is neither one's own understanding (as it is one 
that one has been socialised into), nor an understanding that is true to the 
being of all the things it tries to understand (notably those belonging to what I 
have been calling life and living beings), but one in which one understands 
oneself as an object rather than that which one is in oneself. Thus, this 
"normalizing education", according to Gur-Ze'ev, constitutes a kind of violent 
imposition of a thing-like identity on the learner, in that it "produces the 
human subject as some-thing that prevents her from becoming some-one, a 
true subject" (Gur-Ze'ev, 2002, p. 66). As with Vandenberg, we find that 
understanding oneself in a certain way and being in a certain way are 
inextricably linked. 
Gur-Ze'ev also identifies the way that education tends to frame our 
relationship to the world on an emotional level and the way it motivates the 
learner to conform. With this he brings in an important affective element into 
the question of what it means to be authentic. Thus, he writes that, to be 
authentic, "the human subject must [...] resist the threats and temptations of 
security, pleasure, and success offered by [das Man], by society" (Gur-Ze'ev, 
2002, p. 71). This emotive or affective aspect, as we saw earlier, stems from 
Heidegger's notion of "attunement", the way we find ourselves located 
emotionally in the world. 
Michael Bonnett identifies a further aspect of authenticity, when he writes that 
it is the "openness to things themselves" which Heidegger has identified as a 
fundamental aspect of Dasein that plays an essential part in its being and 
becoming authentic. In relation to this fundamental openness Bonnett uses the 
phrase thinking as poiesis (bringing forth), which is a form of "thinking as 
engagement with things which is both personal in its commitment and 
transporting through its openness to things themselves" (Bonnett, 2002, p. 
238). What is more, this thinking has its own rigour, which "requires constant 
and close attention to the signs which are its way, to a sense of that which is as 
yet withdrawn, not yet manifest. It requires a genuine listening to that which 
calls to be thought in the evolving situation" (Bonnett, 2002, p. 239). It is this 
aspect of listening that introduces a communicative dimension to authenticity, 
where one's "understanding of being" is not a construction of the mind, but 
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rather something that is informed, as a result of one's fundamental "openness 
to things themselves". Thus it is in this poietic (authentic) thinking, Bonnett 
argues, that "contingency and the many-sidedness of things is recognized and 
the non-human powers involved in the arising of things is sensed and 
responded to" (Bonnett, 2002, p. 238). 
So far we have seen that, for the philosophers of education cited, becoming 
authentic involves a true understanding of who one really is (both in the way 
one "looks at" oneself and in the way one acts), a certain way of being located 
emotionally in the world, and a way of being open to things themselves. We 
can, therefore, see an emerging correspondence between the notion of 
authenticity and learning to be authentic, where there is radical self-renewal (in 
becoming who one really is), where the change in the structure of experience 
resonates with a change in one's way of being emotionally located in the world 
(though this will only become really clear in Chapter 5), and where one is open 
to the being of entities, in the sense of "having a sense for" the entity itself. 
3.3.2 Becoming authentic as "turning away from the world" and 
"turning back" 
I will now consider how the philosophers of education who have considered the 
process of disclosing oneself to oneself as one really is have looked at this 
process. They have all characterised it, albeit in different terminologies, as one 
of "turning away from the world" and "turning back". Iain Thomson takes up 
the idea of authenticity as involving self-realization in his Heidegger's 
Perfectionist Philosophy of Education in Being and Time (Thomson, 2004), 
where he turns to Heidegger's Being and Time (Heidegger, 1962) to answer the 
question "How do we become what we are?". He writes that "The goal of this 
educational odyssey of  becoming what we are] remains simple but 
revolutionary: To bring us full circle back to ourselves, by first turning us away 
from the world in which we are most immediately immersed and then turning us 
back to this world in a more reflexive way" (Thomson, 2004, p. 457). 
To make intelligible the idea of becoming what one (already) is Thomson uses 
Thomas Hurka's account of perfectionist ethics, to argue that in Being and 
Time Heidegger (a) had the idea that there is something distinctive and unique 
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about human beings, that (b) our "greatest fulfilment or flourishing follows 
from the cultivation and development (hence the perfection) of these 
significantly distinctive skills or capacities", and that (c) there is a link between 
these two in that we are either, by nature, naturally disposed to reach this 
fulfilment or flourishing, or that we need to struggle for it, as it is against our 
nature (Thomson, 2004, pp. 440-442). 
Thus, according to Thomson, "Heidegger singles out Dasein as the unique 
possessor of an understanding of being". Another way of putting this 
understanding of being is to say that Dasein can disclose an entity as either a 
practical (ready-to-hand) one, a theoretical (present-at-hand) one, or an entity 
with the nature of Dasein itself. Here we encounter the notion of having an 
understanding of the being of entities (a sense for entities as they are in 
themselves) I discussed in Chapter 1. Then I said that not only did the 
individual need a way of learning about entities in the human domain, they 
also need a way of deciding whether the entity they are dealing with is indeed 
such an entity or a practical or theoretical one. 
In perfectionist terms, we could say that (a) what is, according to Thomson, 
distinctive and unique about Dasein it its understanding of being. The 
flourishing that comes from the cultivation of this distinct and unique 
understanding of being is (b) conceived of "in terms of an embodied stand —
'authenticity' — that each of us is capable of taking on our own being". In other 
words, it is in the mode of authenticity that our understanding of being 
becomes "our own" and that we come to see ourselves and the entities we 
encounter in the world as they really are. And (c) the link between this 
understanding of being and the "embodied stand of authenticity" is 
"[a]uthenticity's double movement of death and rebirth [which] is a 
movement in which we turn away from the world, recover ourselves, and then 
turn back to the world, a world we now see anew, with eyes that have been 
opened" (Thomson, 2004, p. 443). 
We find this same movement of "turning away from the world" and "turning 
back" with Bonnett, who frames this movement in terms of both an active and 
a passive element to authentic learning. Authentic learning (and I would add, 
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learning to be authentic) is active in the sense that "[p]ersonal authenticity is 
an achievement", in that "[w]e have to extricate ourselves from the frame of 
mind that constitutes [das Man: and which proximally and for the most part 
conditions our perceptions" (Bonnett, 2002, p. 232). The "rebirth" for Bonnett, 
citing Charles Taylor, happens against a "horizon of significance ... a valuation 
system of a historically grown community — the authoritative principles, rules, 
values, and norms that are expressive of the socially prevalent conception of 
the good life" (Bonnett, 2002, p. 233). 
Thus, the "understanding of being" that Thomson identified is, according to 
Bonnett, brought to "perfection" only in "openness to things themselves". Ilan 
Gur-Ze'ev refers to this openness as an "unveiling as lettings-things-bell" and 
contrasts it with the "normal violence directed at imposing realities and 
meanings" (Gur-Ze'ev, 2002, p. 71). The "turning away from the world" is thus 
a turning away from the world as handed down to us through das Man, 
through "normalizing education", a world whose "realities and meanings" are 
imposed, projected onto the world, taken over in an inauthentic way by the 
individual from society. Gur-Ze'ev contrasts this inauthentic way of knowing 
the world with "transcendence ... in which Being, which is normally veiled and 
exiled, reveals itself" (Gur-Ze'ev, 2002, p. 71). 
The moment of "rebirth" or "turning back" is when one returns to the 
resources of one's cultural tradition to appropriate them in a way that is 
authentic. As Michael Bonnet writes, there is an important passive element to 
authentic learning with the existence of a "superordinate cultural normative 
framework [which] directs the focus of discussion away from the notion of the 
authentic individual as somehow operating in splendid isolation from the real 
world and places it instead on the quality of his or her relationship with the 
world" (Bonnett, 2002, p. 233). The individual can only be authentic in a 
human society, which necessarily involves things like language, culturally 
sanctioned knowledge and ways of doing things, and so on. This "return" to 
11 "Letting things be" is a term used by the later Heideggerian, Gelassenheit, which refers to 
the ability to let things present themselves to consciousness "as they are" and which 
ultimately derives from the medieval Christian mystic Meister Eckhart, an indication of the 
religious connotations Heidegger sought to convey. 
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das Man is inescapable, but if it is done in an authentic way, it is done in a way 
that is open to the being of entities, both of oneself and of entities other than 
oneself. In Chapter 7 I will look at what this "return" may look at in some 
detail. 
The language surrounding authenticity is often dramatic, with words like 
death, guilt, and anxiety. This is so, because the process of becoming authentic 
involves the whole person, the totality of one's life, all the way down to one's 
deepest feelings, one's most fundamentally held beliefs, and one's most basic 
ways of being in the world. To put it differently, giving up what is given to us 
through das Man involves giving up much if not most of the person we are. It 
is for this reason that authenticity involves a moment that is often 
characterised as a kind of "dying". It is for this same reason that the moment of 
"rebirth" necessitates a return to these culturally given ways of seeing and 
doing things, as they are simply the "currency" in which human life is 
transacted. 
To sum up, Heidegger's notion of authenticity has been discussed by a number 
of recent philosophers of education. In so far as the process of becoming 
authentic has been described by these philosophers of education, it has been 
characterized as a kind of "death and rebirth", a "turning away from the world" 
and a "turning back" in such a way that one gains an authentic (genuine as well 
as one's own) understanding of one's own existence as well as that of the 
entities one encounters in the world. This is a double movement of both 
becoming who one really is and reaching one's full potential as a human being. 
It is a process in which one goes from having adopted the ways of seeing and 
doing things of the society one grew up in, Heidegger's das Man, through a 
kind of existential death in which one finds openness to the things themselves 
and to "who one really is", to adopting anew those ways of seeing and doing 
things that are given in one's cultural tradition that one decides are worthy of 
adoption, in the full awareness of the limitations involved. 
8.4 Becoming authentic as bringing oneself back from das Man 
I will now briefly look at Heidegger's notion of becoming authentic as 
"bringing oneself back from lostness in das Man" (Heidegger, 1962, pp. 312- 
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313) and consider two criticisms levelled at it. The notion of "bringing oneself 
back from lostness in das Man" (Heidegger, 1962, pp. 312-313) is one of the 
ways in which Heidegger characterised the process of becoming authentic in 
Being and Time, where he writes that the process of Dasein's ensnaring itself in 
inauthenticity "can be reversed only if Dasein specifically brings itself back to 
itself from the lostness in das Man" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 312, translation 
modified). One way of understanding the notion of "bringing oneself back from 
lostness in das Man" is as the moment of "turning away from the world", before 
one "turns back" to the world in such a way that one no longer gets lost in das 
Man, but is able to appropriate the recourses of one's culture in an authentic 
way. Also, for Heidegger, "bringing oneself back from lostness in das Man" 
involves a renewal of one's "understanding of being", especially the being of 
oneself, where this process occurs at the level of the a priori. 
Das Man is, among other things, Heidegger's notion of the individual's 
inauthentic self-understanding, a self-understanding that is inauthentic in the 
sense of not being their own understanding, but rather a self-understanding 
that one has been socialised into, where the individual "understands itself in 
terms of the possibilities of existence that 'circulate' in the contemporary 
`average' public way of interpreting [the individual]" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 
435). "Bringing oneself back from lostness in das Man" becomes synonymous 
with being authentic in the sense of being true to oneself, to one's own 
understanding of things and especially of oneself. The plausibility of this 
aspect of authenticity will be discussed in the next section. 
What is more, inauthentic self-understanding is not only a self-understanding 
that has been adopted without the individual having really come to that 
understanding for themselves, it is also an understanding that does not 
understand the individual in terms of itself. That is to say, inauthentic self-
understanding understands itself in terms of entities, objects, and roles it first 
finds in the world around itself rather than in terms of itself. Because our 
attention, our concern, is, in the first instance, directed towards the world in 
which we live, we create and may even be born with a conceptual apparatus 
that has been developed (through evolution and learning) with an eye on 
making sense of and coping in the world we inhabit. We perceive objects, 
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causal events, patterns of similarity and difference in the world around us. We 
interact with the things and situations we meet in the world. We abstract from 
particulars, we reason, predict, and generalise from the things and situations 
we find in the world. And then we understand ourselves through the same 
conceptual apparatus we developed for dealing with the world we find 
ourselves in. In short, we understand ourselves as practical or theoretical 
entities. 
We find something similar in the objection we may have to someone 
understanding another person as an object for manipulation (as when the 
person is "used" for some purpose), an abstraction (as when the person is 
treated as "a number"), or a role (as when the person is identified with their 
role and not seen as "a person"). In such cases the Kantian notion of the 
individual being "an end in itself' is sometimes mooted, to indicate that an 
individual can only be understood truly in its own terms and not in reference 
to something else. What Heidegger has done is take this notion of the person 
needing to be understood as an end in itself and given it its own ontological 
category, that of entities with the nature of Dasein, also called existence. "To 
be inauthentic means [according to Heidegger] to objectify oneself as a 
continuing ego-subject, thereby concealing the fact that one is really openness 
or emptiness. To be authentic means resolving to accept the openness which, 
paradoxically, one already is" (Crowe, 2006, p. 164). 
One shortcoming in Heidegger's account of das Man is, I believe, that he fails 
to appreciate how, in order for Dasein to understand itself in terms of itself, it 
cannot rely on an understanding of itself from its own past experience. Dasein 
needs to forego understanding present situations in terms of the past, if it is to 
be able to adequately meet a situation it finds itself in in the present. This is 
not a point that is stressed very much in Heidegger's writings (though he 
gives other reasons for Dasein's understanding of a situation requiring a basic 
openness of mind), but it occurs often enough to make one want to add it as a 
third aspect of "bringing oneself back from lostness in das Man". That is, 
encountering oneself from out of an understanding one recalls from past 
experience can be seen as being based in das Man, by virtue of the structure of 
recollection being one of a subject recalling an object, which then recalls 
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Dasein as either a theoretical or practical entity and thus inauthentically. We 
will encounter a number of examples where this aspect of das Man is 
important. 
In sum, "bringing oneself back from lostness in das Man involves three, related 
aspects. First there is the movement of refraining from understanding oneself 
and the things one encounters from out the ways of understanding that have 
been handed down to one through tradition and as part of being socialised into 
a certain culture. This movement involves an understanding that, in order to 
function in the society one is in, one will eventually have to return to these 
ways of understanding things that have been handed down through tradition, 
but one will do so in a different way. Second, there is the movement towards 
understanding oneself in terms of oneself and not in terms of the things one 
finds in the world (in terms of practical or theoretical entities). Third, it has 
been suggested that we should add a movement towards not understanding 
things and oneself from out of a past understanding one may have acquired 
through previous engagement with the thing. 
3.4.1 Dreyfus: Das Man is unintelligible 
One critique of Heidegger's notion of das Man comes from Dreyfus, who writes 
that Heidegger's account of being-with and das Man leaves us with a 
contradiction: "on the one hand, he argues that we are ontologically being-
with-others [see Section 3.2.1.2], and on the other, he argues that Dasein is 
mine, that my being is my responsibility, that to assume it authentically, I 
must sever my ties with das Man and most importantly, that I die alone" 
(Sorial, 2005, p. 95). "This leads Dreyfus to conclude that Heidegger's account 
of das Man and self-ownership is 'incoherent,' confused' and 
'incomprehensible" (Cited in Sorial, 2005, p. 71). 
In what follows I will briefly argue that we can rescue Heidegger's account of 
das Man and mineness if we understand das Man as a moment in Dasein's 
intentional being-in-the-world rather than a structural part of it, when we 
understand the notion of mineness as non-reflective, and when we 
acknowledge that for a fully satisfactory account of the relationship between 
the collective and the individual we will need to revisit Heidegger's account of 
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authentic being-with. This will not only defuse Dreyfus' criticism but also 
bring into focus aspects of authenticity that will become central in our account 
of learning to be authentic, namely, the way das Man and authentic 
understanding are related, the non-reflective nature of Dasein's self-awareness, 
and the importance of a modified notion of being-with. 
According to Sorial, Dreyfus's complaint is that, though Das Man "describes 
the ontological structures of Dasein", Heidegger "repeatedly characterises 
these structures in negative and disparaging terms (inauthenticity in the 
pejorative sense)". Dreyfus believes that, "[i]f these structures are inauthentic, 
then the implication is that they need to be overcome. However, if they are 
part of Dasein's fundamental structure, then the overcoming of these 
inauthentic structures is rendered impossible" (Dreyfus 1991: 226-9, cited in: 
Sorial, 2005, p. 76). So the complaint is that Heidegger claims that das Man is 
both part of Dasein's fundamental structure and something that needs to be 
overcome. 
The first thing to be clear about, if one is to understand Heidegger correctly, is 
that the experience of mineness needs to be understood as a non-reflective 
experience. As Heidegger writes: "The self is there for the Dasein itself without 
reflection and without inner perception, before all reflection" (Heidegger, 1982, 
p. 159). This non-reflectivity needs to be contrasted with a reflective (present-
at-hand) experience of mineness, where something (in this case the collective 
dimension of das Man and being-with) is perceived as either belonging to one 
or not belonging to Dasein. 
From the reflective perspective it is, indeed, incoherent how das Man can be 
both essentially part of Dasein and apart from it, after all, either y belongs to x 
or y does not belong to x, but y cannot both belong and not belong to x. In the 
case of a non-reflective experience, however, one can have ownership of 
something that one nevertheless feels is not oneself in an authentic way, for 
example when one behaves in a certain way and then comments on it later, 
saying that "one was not quite oneself at the time". Indeed, one may well have 
felt at the time that "one was not oneself', without necessarily going as far as 
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disowning the behaviour as one would in an episode of dissociative mental 
illness, when one may have the reflective experience one's being was taken over. 
We can, therefore, see that understanding the experience of mineness as a non-
reflective one, affords shades of meaning that are excluded from a reflective 
experience of mineness, making it possible for an individual that some way of 
being is both theirs and not theirs. It should be noted that the quality of 
mineness is there both in the moment of inauthenticity (when Dasein is lost in das 
Man) and in the moment of authenticity, when the processes that constitute das 
Man have (temporarily) abated. The issue is, therefore, not one of Dasein either 
experiencing mineness or being lost in das Man, but rather one of authentic or 
inauthentic mineness, where, in the case of authentic mineness, das Man has abated, 
or to use Heidegger's terminology, Dasein has been brought back from lostness in 
das Man. 
But, one might object, as Dreyfus no doubt would at this point, there is no 
significance or intelligibility apart from das Man, so it still makes no sense to 
talk about Dasein apart from das Man. That is, "Dreyfus interprets das Man as 
constituting the horizon of meaning within which a community interprets 
itself. He writes: `all significance and intelligibility is the product of the one 
[das Many and that it is 'the ultimate reality' the 'end of the line of 
explanations of intelligibility'"(Sorial, 2005, p. 71). But what Dreyfus seems to 
ignore is that for Heidegger it is not the case that, when das Man has abated 
and Dasein is authentic, its relationship with the things and people it finds in 
the world has ceased to exist. It is just that at that point that relationship has 
no specific shape in terms of actual actions, perceptions, responses, verbal 
expressions, and so on. I looked at this notion of a relationship (of 
understanding, attunement or being-with) prior to any concrete, actual 
relationship in Section 3.2.1, where we saw it was one of the fundamental 
presuppositions in Heidegger's philosophy. 
What is more, I also stressed, when I discussed what Bonnett and Cuypers 
wrote about "horizons of significance" (Section 3.5.2), that the moment of 
liberation from das Man is indeed just that, a moment, because, in order for 
Dasein to function in any way in the world it will have no choice but to return 
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to das Man, in that all specific, actual ways of acting or understanding things 
are part of das Man. And I will return to this issue in Chapter 7, when we look 
at the possibility of Dasein returning to das Man in a way that remains under 
the guidance of the openness to the being of things that characterizes authentic 
existence. 
There is, however, hidden in the confusion surrounding mineness and das Man, an 
unresolved issue in Heidegger's notion of authenticity. This becomes clearer when 
I reformulate Dreyfus's apparent contradiction between Dasein being structurally 
co-constituted by das Man, while needing to regain a sense of mineness in 
authenticity, into a contradiction between Dasein being structurally co-constituted 
by being-with, while needing to become individualized in authenticity. That is, 
being-with is presented by Heidegger as a structural part of Dasein (and not 
merely a mode it may or may not have), when his account of authenticity 
emphasizes the need for Dasein to become individualized (vereinzelt). What is more, 
Heidegger's account of authentic being-with has, as we will see later, not been 
worked out in a satisfactory way. I will return to this question later (Sections 5.3.4 
& 6.1.2.1). 
3.4.2 Singular being and multiple clearings 
It has been said that authentic Dasein, as it has been "brought back from 
lostness in das Man" has access to the being of entities and, indeed, as will 
become clear in the next chapter, an understanding of being itself (as 
temporality). It has also been said that Dasein is essentially "a clearing", 
openness, which means that the being of entities and being itself have to 
somehow manifest in that openness, if Dasein is to have an understanding of 
being. What is more, Dasein has been said to have the quality of mineness, 
which implies that it is individualized, that each Dasein has its own individual 
"clearing", especially in the authentic mode (though I also said that there was 
an, as yet, unspecified way in which even authentic Dasein had an 
interpersonal, being-with dimension, which I will look at in depth in Chapter 
6). The possible contradiction in all this is that of there being as many 
different individualized "clearings" as there are Daseins, whereas there is only 
one being. 
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Thus Theodore Schatzki discusses the objection, made by Frederick Olafson in 
the latter's Heidegger and the Philosophy of Mind (1987), that there is a 
contradiction between two aspects of Heidegger's notion of Dasein as a clearing 
where being manifests. On the one hand, being is, according to Olafson, taken to 
be single and unique, while, on the other hand, each individual Dasein is its 
own clearing. The possible contradiction, as it is brought up by Olafson, that 
Schatski discusses is that, while "the singularity and uniqueness of both being 
and reality require that there exists a single clearing in whose terms things are 
able to show themselves to people", there are in fact as many clearings as there 
are Daseins. And, "[i]f there were to exist a plurality of clearings, then, on this 
view, being 'would be essentially plural in character— (Schatzki, 1992, p. 87). 
This issue is relevant in the context of this thesis, because it throws into doubt 
the very notion that Dasein can be truly open to the being of entities. Schatzki 
writes that "what things can show themselves to any one of these people as 
being is governed by the particular space of possible ways of being understood 
by that individual" (Schatzki, 1992, p. 91). This implies that what being can 
show up is always determined by the individual Dasein, which means that 
there can be no true openness to the being of entities. In other words, because 
Heidegger takes as his starting point that we cannot have access to being other 
than through the clearings where it manifests, this raises the question as to 
how being can still be said to be singular and independent of the individual 
clearing, if it can only manifest in any of a number of clearings, all of which are 
different from each other. The salient point for us is the ultimate possibility of 
Dasein to be truly open to the being of entities. 
Schatzki does argue that the singularity of being is compatible with the 
multiplicity of clearings and does so by indicating that there is a commonality 
between the different clearings. That is, "the commonality of being [...] lies 
not in the existence of a single realm of being independent of and prior to any 
particular projection of it, but in a commonality that holds between a plurality 
of clearings concerning the specific ways of being in which things can manifest 
themselves" (Schatzki, 1992, p. 89). As there is a commonality between the 
ways things can manifest in the different clearings, there is, according to 
Schatzki, a commonality of being. This is, I believe, not the right way to 
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defend Heidegger's position, if only because it sacrifices the notion of "a single 
realm of being independent of and prior to any particular projection of it", 
something which I believe is incompatible with much of Heidegger's thinking, 
especially in so far as it seeks to connect with the religious domain. 
For Heidegger to be able to counter the charge that the notion of Dasein being 
the clearing in which being manifests is contradictory to the possibility of 
there being a singular and unique being we will need to look beyond the 
commonalities Dasein has in its understanding of being. First it is important 
to take seriously Heidegger's assertion that "the being of beings 'is' not itself a 
being" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 26), which immediately casts doubts on the 
validity of the demand that being be singular and unitary. The notion that 
Dasein's understanding of being needs to ultimately refer to one singular 
"being" is valid in so far as "being" is something substantive, some thing, a 
being, because otherwise the different understandings of being that are found 
in the clearings of the different Daseins could not be all said to be about the 
same thing, to be all about being, and therefore not even understanding of 
being at all. But all this changes as it becomes clear that being is itself not a 
being. 
Graham Priest explains that for Heidegger this means that "if being is not a 
being, it follows that one cannot say anything about it. For to say anything of 
the form 'Being is [so and soy would be to attribute to it being, and so make it 
a being, which it is not" (Priest, 2002, p. 240). We can see a clear similarity 
with Heidegger's notion of the present-at-hand (theoretical entities), and could 
paraphrase Priest in Heideggerian language by saying that to say something 
about being would be to make it something present-at-hand or ready-to-hand 
(to leave the third category of beings, those with the nature of Dasein aside for 
the time being). According to Priest, Heidegger was guided by the notion that 
one could only say things about objects (beings) but not about concepts like 
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being, because to say something of the form of "Being is ..." would be to treat 
it as an object (Priest, 2002, p. 240)12. 
Though this obviates the need to seek a correspondence between individual 
Daseins' understandings of being and being itself, it does not yet make 
Heidegger's position intelligible. If, on the one hand, he talks about Dase in's 
understanding of being and, on the other hand, he treats being itself as 
something that one cannot say anything about, there still remain two 
questions. The first being what being is, if it is not a being. The second 
question being what the understanding of being of Dasein is, if it is not an 
understanding in the sense of being able to say something about being without 
transgressing into the realm of the unsayable. 
Priest answers the first question by referring to Heidegger's What is 
Metaphysics?, where Heidegger cites Hegel's statement that "pure being and 
pure nothingness are [...] the same" (Heidegger, 1998b, p. 94). The structure 
of the argument Heidegger uses, according to Priest, is that 1) Being is what it 
is that makes beings be, 2) Nothing is what it is that makes beings be, 3) 
Hence, being is nothing. "The first premise is true per definition". The third 
part, the conclusion, "follows validly, assuming that nothing is a substantive 
here" (Heidegger, 1998b, p. 242). This means that it is the statement that 
"Nothing is what it is that makes beings be" requires discussion. 
Priest reconstructs the logic behind the assertion that "Nothing is what it is 
that makes beings be" in the following way. A "being is, and can only be, 
because it is not a nothing. It stands out, as it were, against nothingness. If 
there were no nothing, there could be no beings either" (Heidegger, 1998b, p. 
242). Further, "if nothing negates itself, it produces what it is not: something. 
Thus a being is exactly nothing nihilating13 itself. Being is, then, nothing 
operating on itself' (Heidegger, 1998b, p. 243). As Heidegger puts it in What is 
12 Note that later in his career, after the Kehre, Heidegger does look for ways to say 
intelligible things about being, by turning to poetic langue. At the time of Being and Time, 
however, he still held fast to the notion that nothing could be said about being. 
19 "Nihilating" is a translation of the German nichten, one of Heidegger's many neologisms. 
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Metaphysics?: "From the nothing all beings as beings come to be" (Heidegger, 
1998b, p. 95). 
The second question, what Dasein's understanding of being consists of, if it is 
not to transgress into the realm of the unsayable, is answered by Priest that in 
principle "one cannot say anything of nothing. To say anything, whether that 
it is something or other, or just that it is, or even to refer to it at all, is to treat 
it as an object, which it is not" (Priest, 2002, p. 241). But, Priest continues, 
"one can, according to Heidegger, have knowledge [of nothing] by 
acquaintance" (Priest, 2002, p. 242). As we will see later in this thesis, Dasein's 
encounter with nothingness (as nothingness in anxiety, as finitude in 
understanding, and as silence in being-with) is the key moment where 
authenticity occurs. 
The upshot of all this is that the different understandings of being that we find 
in the clearings of the different Daseins are all ultimately based in an 
acquaintance with the nothing. It is, therefore, not the commonalities between 
these different ways of understanding in the positive sense. The commonality 
lies in the acquaintance with nothingness, and this is the same nothingness 
that gets nihilated when a being comes into being. The idea, therefore, of 
authentic Dasein, as it has been brought back from lostness in das Man, is one 
of it returning to the openness which it is in essence and connecting with the 
nothingness from out of which beings may emerge. 
3.4.3 Confusion between socio-historical and ontological alienation 
Another criticism in relation to this idea of bringing oneself back from das 
Man, comes from Lambert Zuidervaart, who accuses Heidegger of wrongly 
taking a socio-historical situation for an ontological one. Zuidervaart writes 
that, in Heidegger's account, Dasein needs to withdraw from (as Zuidervaart 
puts it, "be alienated from") the world in order to become authentic: "To be 
authentic, Dasein must be triply alienated, alienated from everyday concerns, 
from the public world, and from public interpretations of everyday concerns. 
For Heidegger, this 'must' reflects not a historical condition but an ontological 
necessity" (Zuidervaart, 2007, p. 88). For Heidegger this withdrawal from the 
world is an "ontological necessity", that is, it is necessary for every Dasein, 
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regardless of time and place, if it is to become authentic, if it is to live the full, 
flourishing life it is, in principle, capable of living. But Zuidervaart claims that 
Heidegger's account is, in fact, specific to the socio-historical context that 
existed at the time and place of Heidegger's writing, and that it "turns a socio-
historical problem into an existential virtue" (Zuidervaart, 2007, pp. 88-89). 
Zuidervaart writes that "[w]hat Marx criticizes as societal ruptures — the 
alienation of workers from their labour, products, and fellow workers —
Heidegger celebrates as ontological clues to the most primordial truth of 
Dasein" (Zuidervaart, 2007, p. 89). And he adds that "[t]he very notion of an 
interior self whose authenticity resides in public withdrawal [...] is itself the 
philosophical expression of a modern cultural tendency whose social matrix 
lies in the development of a market economy, privatized family life, and a 
depoliticized middle class" (Zuidervaart, 2007, pp. 88-89). Not only does 
Zuidervaart claim that what Heidegger treats as an existential (ontological) 
issue is, in fact, a socio-historical one, he also, implicitly, accuses Heidegger of 
being complicit in maintaining the capitalist status quo, by positing a notion of 
authenticity that involves, essentially, a de-politicized withdrawal from the 
kind of public life that could make a change in the capitalist status quo 
possible. 
One way of countering the claim that Heidegger's notion of authenticity is 
specific to the socio-historical situation of western, industrialised, capitalist 
society is to point out the similarities between Heidegger's account and those 
from different times and geographical locations. John D. Caputo has written of 
the relationship between Heidegger's thought and that of the 14th century 
mystic Meister Eckhart. This book also contains a chapter called "Heidegger, 
Eckhart, and Zen Buddhism" (Caputo, 1986, pp. 203-217), where Caputo 
argues that there are not only striking similarities between the writings of 
Heidegger and Eckhart, but that this similarity extends to Zen Buddhism. 
Thus he writes that "once one turns to Zen, one does [...] find striking and 
revealing similarities to Heidegger" (Caputo, 1986, p. 204). What is more, 
"Meister Eckhart is frequently pointed to as a Christian mystic whose 
experience seems to be remarkable like Zen" (Caputo, 1986, p. 204). 
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The socio-historical situations within which Meister Eckhart's thinking and 
Zen originated were very different from the one Zuidervaart claims gave rise 
to Heidegger's thinking, and yet Meister Eckhart and Zen have very similar 
analyses of the individual's alienation. Economically both Meister Eckhart's 
world and the world of Zen were feudal and pre-industrial rather than 
capitalist and industrialized, with neither the privatized family life nor the 
depoliticized middle class Zuidervaart claims can be cited to explain the shape 
of Heidegger's account of authenticity. It seems, in sum, that Zuidervaart's 
charge that Heidegger's account of authenticity has its roots in the socio-
historical situation in which Heidegger lived turns out to be untenable, once 
one takes into account the similarities between Heidegger's account and those 
of Meister Eckhart and Zen Buddhism. 
3.5 Authenticity and autonomy 
It has been suggested (Section 3.3) that authenticity can be understood as a 
perfectionist ideal in education and, indeed, the main thrust of this thesis 
implies that it can. To begin bringing out in more detail what such a 
perfectionism based on authenticity involves, I will discuss the notion of 
autonomy as it has been used as a perfectionist ideal in education. In this I will 
draw on two discussions of the relationship between notions of autonomy and 
authenticity in Philosophy of Education, those of David Cooper (Cooper, 1983) 
and of Michael Bonnett and Stefan Cuypers (Bonnett and Cuypers, 2003). 
In these discussions three aspects of the notion of autonomy as it has been used 
in education, are criticised, where they refer mostly to the use of the concept of 
autonomy by R. S. Peters (1966) and R. F. Dearden (1972). Both Cooper and 
Bonnett and Cuypers maintain that rational autonomy, as it had hitherto been 
used in education, a) involves the use of critical rationality, b) involves choice, 
and c) involves choices that are the individual's own and not merely copied 
from others. An example of this kind of notion of autonomy is given by 
Bonnett and Cuypers, who cite R. F. Dearden writing that when a person is 
autonomous "the explanation of why he thinks and acts as he does [...] must 
include a reference to his own choices, deliberations, decisions, reflections, 
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judgements, plannings or reasonings" (Cited in Bonnett and Cuypers, 2003, p. 
327). 
I will begin by discussing some of Cooper's and Bonnett and Cuypers' 
objections to the use of this specific understanding of the concept of autonomy 
in education. Then I will argue that in all the above three areas the question of 
authenticity, as it is understood in this thesis, precedes that of autonomy. That 
is, the way that "an individual's access to reality" is conceptualised in 
autonomy is one that assumes a number of aspects of the way reality is 
accessed, all of which are possible ways of being within Heidegger's notion of 
authenticity, but by no means the only ones nor necessarily the most 
fundamental ones. As a result, I will have to conclude that the notion of 
rational autonomy is not able to answer the issues I am trying to address in 
this thesis. 
3.5.1 The notion of autonomy in education 
Cooper and Bonnett and Cuypers point out that in education, and specifically 
in the work of R. S. Peters (1966) and R. F. Dearden (1972), when autonomy is 
put forward as a desirable aspect of the individual, it is assumed that, in the 
relevant cases, the way to access reality involves critical rationality, choice and 
a sense of ownership. In phenomenological terms we could say that, when 
autonomy is put forward as desirable, a) the thing that is intended is thought 
to be best intended as the kind of thing critical rationality has a purchase on, 
where b) the individual's intentional stance towards the thing involves a choice 
concerning the thing, and where c) the individual is such that the individual 
can have ownership over the rational purchase and choice involved. 
This notion of autonomy is, for example, represented in the legal system in the 
western world, in that a person is, generally speaking, only legally accountable 
in so far as they display the aspects of autonomy mentioned above. This is not 
to say that an individual who cannot count as autonomous in this way cannot 
be legally prosecuted and incarcerated, as in the case of young children or the 
mentally ill. But in our society autonomy is connected with freedom, and only 
a person considered autonomous is eligible for the freedoms this society 
grants. But this freedom comes with certain responsibilities — such as that of 
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knowing and abiding by the law. But the question raised by Cooper and 
Bonnett and Cuypers is whether this notion of autonomy is equally appropriate 
in the context of education. That is, the notion of autonomy, as involving 
critical rationality, choice and ownership, becomes problematic for certain 
authors if it is taken either as the most basic way of being of a human being or 
as the one desired way of being of that human being. 
Autonomy becomes problematic in the context of education when the stance of 
critical rationality, involving choice and ownership, is taken to be the 
fundamental way in which human beings exist, thus reducing most if not all 
ways of being of the person to such a stance. This is the notion that "deep 
down" all our ways of being involve critical rationality, choice and ownership. 
On this reading, it would be a critical-rational choice for a person to react in a 
spontaneous way or to "lose themselves" while dancing at a pop concert. This 
idea has, I believe, prima facie difficulties concerning its plausibility. It seems 
self-contradictory to say that an act that is spontaneous or that involves 
"losing oneself" is an act that consists of making a critical-rational choice. 
Even to say that such an act is preceded by a critical-rational choice is, I 
believe problematic, as we think of spontaneity and "loosing oneself' as having 
a different origin than critical-rational choice: we tend to think of them as 
arising of their own accord and not as deliberate acts. It would, therefore, be 
difficult to argue that the critical rationality, involving choice and ownership, 
we find in the notion of autonomy is what we all are, deep down, in the basis of 
our being, and it not clear that any advocate of autonomy in education is 
currently making such claims. 
The notion of autonomy, as I will take it here, does not claim to represent the 
most fundamental way of being of the individual. It does, however, often claim 
to represent the individual's highest point of development. This becomes 
problematic when the critical rational stance is taken to be the one for persons 
to aspire to in all or most circumstances. Bonnet and Cuypers take up this 
point, as they write that in philosophy of education "rational autonomy ... is 
often set up as operating with a view of rationality that aspires to incorporate a 
wide range of 'other educational aims such as breadth of knowledge and 
understanding, and moral, social, and personal development, by conceiving 
82 
them as either forms of rationality or as highly rational enterprises" (Bonnett 
and Cuypers, 2003, p. 337). They mention as examples morality deriving from 
the rational principle of respect for others and emotions conceived as forms of 
cognition. This appears to put autonomy in the privileged position of being a, 
if not the necessary condition for such moral and emotional development. This 
is something that Bonnett and Cuypers dispute. 
Of course, not many people subscribe to the view that such rational autonomy 
is either the only or the only desirable way for a person to be. Most people 
would allow for the desirability of "uncritical" responses, for example in the 
emotional or the religious spheres of life, or the ability to be spontaneous or 
"lose oneself" while at a concert. Indeed, the ability to react in a spontaneous 
way to certain events is often seen as more appropriate than a response that is 
purely rational. In education, however, the emphasis has until recently been on 
the development of this kind of rational autonomy, though it must be said that 
more recent discussions about the aims of education have also emphasized 
emotional and other non-rational aspects (See, for example, DfES, 2003) 
For the present discussion the issue is not primarily one of whether critical-
rational choice is the most fundamental way a human being can be, but rather 
whether education should limit itself to teaching such critical-rational 
responses in all situations. This is Bonnett and Cuypers' charge, and we will 
see that there are good reasons to believe there are other ways of responding 
that should be part of education. In what follows I will take in turn the aspects 
of ownership, choice and critical rationality that are part of the notion of 
autonomy and consider the objections that have been made by Bonnett and 
Cuypers and Cooper. I will finish by looking at the Heideggerian notion of the 
different ways in which things can be revealed and the idea that what is 
revealed through the critical rationality that the notion of autonomy refers to 
is inherently limited. I will suggest that Heidegger's notion of authenticity 
includes but goes beyond such a notion of autonomy. 
3.5.2 An autonomous decision needs to be one's own 
Autonomy is usually thought to require that the choice and rational 
deliberation involved are the individual's own. And it is not this ownership as 
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such that Bonnett and Cuypers take issue with. Indeed, they stress that "there 
seems little value in breadth of knowledge that has no personal significance for 
the knower" (Bonnett and Cuypers, 2003, p. 337). What they object to is that, 
in their view, this notion of ownership is not made problematic enough in the 
discussions about autonomy we find, for example in R. S. Peters' work, in that, 
seemingly, "provided a thought occurs 'inside one's head', as it were, and has 
been assessed according to rational criteria, it is one's own" (Bonnett and 
Cuypers, 2003, p. 327). 
On the one hand, we find in the earlier writings of Michael Bonnett the charge 
that Peters's notion is not radical enough, in that Peters's ownership is an 
ownership of the public rationality we find in our traditions rather than of 
something truly one's own. Thus Bonnett writes that "[t]he development of 
mind for Peters [...] ultimately consists in the internalization of the standards 
of rationality where rationality itself [...] is seen as a phenomenon of social 
life. Thus reason even when it takes place in the individual's head is an 
internalization of public procedures" (Bonnett, 1986, p. 114). An example of 
this can be found when R. S. Peters writes about the person as an "individual 
centre of consciousness", whose "ideas and expectations ... are the product of 
the initiation of an individual into public traditions enshrined in the language, 
concepts, beliefs, and rules of a society" (Peters, 1966, pp. 48-49). 
As an alternative to such a social-rationalist position Bonnett suggests the 
possibility of the individual already being in contact with things prior to these 
public traditions. He makes reference to Heidegger's notion "of truth as 
revealing - an open dwelling with things prior to judgements of correctness", 
where "when we truly speak, judge, evaluate, we must in some sense already be 
with that of which we speak". And he adds that "it will be this prior dwelling 
with things and not public standards alone which allows for the possibility of 
genuine communication and human awareness" (Bonnett, 1986, pp. 117-119). 
This "prior dwelling with things" again reminds us of Heidegger's idea that it 
is possible to engage with things prior to any specific engagement with them 
as theoretical of practical entities (Section 3.2.1). This is, in turn, very much 
like the notion of having "a sense for entities as they are in themselves" which 
is the main focus of this thesis. 
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On the other hand, Bonnett and Cuypers object to a notion of ownership which 
ignores the fact, as they see it, that any understanding necessarily occurs in 
the context of a tradition, the social-cultural context of the individual, what 
they call "horizons of significance". They argue that, "Eaphough social 
dependence and conformism are usually regarded as incompatible with being 
true to oneself, [...] dependence on, and conformism with, other people's 
opinions and social frameworks are not so much impediments as they are 
constitutive contributions to living authentically" (Bonnett and Cuypers, 
2003, p. 335). They go on to write that "[a]1'1y conception of being true to 
oneself that staves off horizons of significance and dialogical relationships 
becomes fundamentally distorted or corrupt" (Bonnett and Cuypers, 2003, p. 
335). 
If it is true that the social relations in which the individual finds him or herself 
are in some way constitutive of them, if these social relations are not only 
thwhatat the individual engages in but are what makes up (not merely 
influences) the individual, the social relations themselves become, in some way 
the focus of education. This is a consequence Bonnett and Cuypers themselves 
do not spell out, but it does follow from their position. I will look at what such 
an education of the social relationship itself would look like when I discuss 
Heidegger's notion of being-with and how the communal dimension of being-
with becomes authentic in Chapter 6. 
I can, therefore, sum up this section on the idea that autonomy involves the 
reasoning one engages in, the beliefs and values one has, has to be "one's own" 
by stating that this notion of ownership, unproblematic though it may appear 
at first, raises at least two further questions. First, there is the question of the 
extent to which an individual can transcend their social and cultural context. 
Second, there is the question as to the ontological status of the social and 
cultural influences, and whether they are constitutive of the individual, in 
which case they themselves ought to become, in some ways, the object of the 
educational endeavour. 
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3.5.3 An autonomous decision involves choice 
In a recent work on autonomy in philosophy of education, Christopher Winch 
writes that it is normally assumed that "[a]utonomy is concerned with 
choosing what is worthwhile for oneself, however we conceive of the 
worthwhile in any particular society" (Winch, 2006, p. 95, emphasis added). 
From a phenomenological perspective this particular notion of choice usually 
means that there is an individual who is separate from the things the act of 
choosing applies to. This notion of choice is very much grounded in what I 
have called understanding something as a practical or a theoretical entity 
(Section 3.2.1). If the choice is made from critical rationality, the choice is 
essentially theoretical, in that it is thought to be based on deliberations made 
in relation to entities that exist apart from the individual making the choice, 
where the entities are thought of in terms of their essences and characteristics 
and there is an assessment of the entities in relation to the choice being made. 
The choice in question is thus a theoretical one, if we take theory to mean the 
consideration of entities and their characteristics. 
A first objection that can be made to this notion of choice is that it emphasizes 
theory over practice and theoretical knowledge and wisdom over skill and 
practical wisdom or phronesis. Indeed, different educational philosophers have 
emphasized the importance of such practical wisdom (See, for example Dunne, 
1993). Though this objection to a notion of choice that objectifies the situation 
and the issue in relation to which a choice needs to be made is pertinent, it 
does not pose any insurmountable obstacles for the notion of autonomy, as 
autonomy can be made to accommodate such a more practical version of 
choice, for example by invoking Aristotle's notion of virtue, as was done by 
Alasdair Maclntyre in his book After Virtue (MacIntyre, 1981). The real 
challenge to the notion of choice comes from the notion that perhaps 
sometimes choice of either the theoretical or practical kind is not involved in 
important situations where one acts and takes responsibility for those actions. 
In relation to this Bonnett and Cuypers discuss Harry Frankfurt's (1999) 
notion of "volitional necessity" in relation to the latter's notion of care as 
"caring about" what is important to us, which needs to be understood in the 
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context of the attempt to "formulate the fundamental structural conditions of 
the fact that we are creatures to whom things matter". "According to 
Frankfurt, caring about and loving something exhibit a special kind of 
necessity, [...] in virtue of which caring and loving are not altogether under a 
person's voluntary control". The counterpart of this "volitional necessity" is 
ii unthinkability", "a mode of necessity, which constrains or limits the 
dynamism and organization of the will" (Bonnett and Cuypers, 2003, p. 329). 
That is, that we care about something is not necessarily the result of choice. 
Bonnett and Cuypers write that, if one takes on board Frankfurt's notion of 
volitional necessity "two conceptions of autonomy are revealed: voluntaristic 
and nonvoluntaristic", where, on the one hand, "autonomy can be thought of as 
constituted by 'choosing' or 'decision making—, while, on the other hand, 
"authenticity can be thought of as constituted by 'caring' or 'loving' and is 
constrained by 'volitional necessity—. The latter "depends upon the substantial 
will and, due to the necessities of this will, to a considerable extent lies beyond 
a person's immediate voluntary control" (Bonnett and Cuypers, 2003, p. 330). 
If Bonnett and Cuypers are right about this, there is an aspect to the individual 
person that is ruled by such a volitional necessity, where this volitional 
necessity is neither a matter of choice nor, importantly, some deficient mode 
where the individual is in some way moved to act in certain ways that are 
beyond their control, as when overwhelmed by addictive or animal urges. An 
example that springs to mind is that of a pupil who is put in a position where 
they are instigated by their friends to partake in bullying another pupil but 
simply "cannot do it". Here the individual does not make a rational, 
theoretically based, choice not to bully, nor is it a drive or addiction that keeps 
them from committing it. 
In relation to the possibility of volitional necessity as opposed to choice, it 
needs to be made clear that such a notion of volitional necessity is relevant 
only if it is not the case that one chooses to follow what appears to be the 
necessity of one's volition. In such a case the choice would still be the most 
basic way in which the decision was made. This raises a number of questions, 
such as what happens in cases when (as is presumably possible) one chooses to 
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resist the volitional necessity one experiences or when there is a conflict of 
impulses (think of the movie Sophie's Choice, where a mother is forced to choose 
which of her two children is put to death) both of which have this volitional 
necessity. There is, therefore, a question as to what the relationship is between 
such a volitional necessity and the ability to make decisions. 
One way of answering this question is to say that different aspects of life ask 
for different aspects of the individual to respond to them. That is, different 
aspects of life require one to respond to them either practically, theoretically 
or from out of, for example, such volitional necessity. The cruelty involved in 
Sophie's Choice becomes painfully clear in that case, as it becomes clear that 
Sophie is asked to make a choice where no choice, but only necessity, is 
apposite. By making her choose, she is forced to treat her children as she 
would theoretical or practical entities (as those are entities in relation to which 
choice is appropriate). 
In sum, in the context of this thesis the suggestion that an autonomously taken 
decision involves choice raises a number of issues. First, there is the 
suggestion that there is another way in which decisions can be made, that of 
volitional necessity, and, if this is true, the question arises as to what the 
learning would be in relation to such a faculty of volitional necessity. Second, 
there is the question of when it is volitional necessity and when it is choice on 
which a decision should be made (to take just the two discussed in this section, 
though there may be more), and what it is that should "decide" between the 
two (or more), which brings us to the Heideggerian notion of "getting the 
being of an entity right". 
3.5.4 An autonomous decision involves critical rationality 
Discussing R. S. Peters and Dearden, Cooper observes that their preference for 
autonomy over authenticity "bears witness to the central place they allocate to 
rational criticism in the mental development of someone who is to 'choose 
what he is to become', and whose attitudes are not to be 'explained without 
reference to his own activity of mind— (Cooper, 1983, p. 21). And he adds that 
"[b]ecause of this emphasis upon rational criticism, it is with indoctrination 
and conditioning that the education for autonomy is pre-eminently contrasted" 
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(Cooper, 1983, p. 21). The three implications of this emphasis on critical 
rationality that I will discuss are that, first, this critical rationality is usually 
thought of in terms of public discourse, that, second, this critical rationality is 
conceived of in terms of giving reasons, and that, third, it ignores what Cooper 
calls the genealogical dimension of values and beliefs. 
The emphasis on public criteria of rationality can, according to Bonnett and 
Cuypers, lead to a conflict between, on the one hand, "the requirements of 
public rationality" and, on the other hand, "the subject's own sense of his or 
her existence" (Bonnett and Cuypers, 2003, p. 332). That is, there may arise a 
tension between two of our criteria for an autonomous decision. Cooper makes 
a similar point, when he gives the example of someone sticking to a religious 
conviction in the face of the public arguments that militate against this belief, 
and he writes that "we do not do right to try to shake him out of his 
[religious] conviction. To do so successfully could induce a feeling of self-
betrayal, of being bullied by people cleverer that himself, a lack of confidence 
in his right to 'stick to his guns', even a loss of dignity and sense of 
individuality" (Cooper, 1983, p. 22). The issue that arises out of the above is 
what the criteria would be to decide whether the public or the personal criteria 
should prevail. If someone is a hard-line misogynist we do, in my opinion, not 
do right by encouraging them to "stick to their guns", nor is it right to just 
leave it at there being a tension there between their private conviction and 
public discourse (which, I am assuming, disapproves of misogyny). In Section 
6.4.1 I propose a way of dealing with this kind of issue. 
The second difficulty with critical rationality is that it is often thought of in 
terms of giving reasons. Thus Cooper argues that there is in Peters and 
Dearden an "exaggerated stress upon rational criticism", because there are 
"efforts and attitudes of mind which should surely be encouraged, but which 
have little to do with seeking or giving further reasons" (Cooper, 1983, p. 21). 
Cooper gives the example of the desirability for a person "to obtain a clear 
assessment of his own motives", where we would expect the person only in 
"unusual circumstances" (Cooper, 1983, p. 21) to give reasons for regarding 
himself as having such motives, as, to take Cooper's example, being ambitious 
for honours and position. The other example Cooper gives is that it may be 
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seen as desirable for a person "to remain open to new possibilities of emotional 
response and fulfilment, in matters of music, say, or in one's sexual life" 
(Cooper, 1983, p. 22). Here, Cooper argues, reasons can be given both for and 
against a person remaining open to new possibilities, but the real reason for a 
person to do so, is according to this example "because otherwise he is a limited 
human being" (Cooper, 1983, p. 22). Further, Cooper stresses that one does not 
always need to provide criteria for doing certain things, for example devoting 
"time and energy to hearing and studying Beethoven's music" (Cooper, 1983, p. 
22). 
A similar question arises in response to Cooper's argument as did in response 
to the previous point, namely, how one would decide whether, in this case, 
giving reasons was or was not the appropriate thing to do. It seems to be 
appropriate to give reasons for actions or observations that are based in 
reason. And Cooper suggests that there are exceptions to this that are 
undervalued if the emphasis it too much on a kind of autonomy that entails 
critical rationality. Thus, when we notice that we are motivated by something 
like ambition or honour, this observation is itself not the result of a process of 
reasoning; and that the value of remaining open to new possibilities is not 
something we infer but something that we can "see" follows directly (without 
being mediated by a process of reasoning) from our being a human being; and 
that certain activities appear likewise valuable in their own right and not so 
because we infer that they are but because we "see" they are. What these 
examples point towards is a kind of direct access to things, and I have used the 
word "noticing" or "seeing" to indicate the directness of the experience. The 
question, therefore, arises what the situations are in which reason or "seeing" 
are appropriate, and this is, again one which the discussion about authenticity 
hopes to provide an answer to. 
The third difficulty with the emphasis on critical rationality is, according to 
Cooper, that the notion of autonomy, when it is yoked to critical rationality, 
"has no place for that dimension of examination Nietzsche called 
`genealogical—. He contrasts this with the notion of authenticity where the 
"concern with how one came by one's beliefs and values" (Cooper, 1983, p. 25) 
is usually of central importance. This genealogy is the "investigation into the 
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myriad causes, influences, props, fashions, interests, desires, and social 
conditions that enter into explanations of why people hold the values and 
beliefs they do" (Cooper, 1983, p. 24). Here Cooper warns against overuse of 
the notion of the "genetic fallacy", the idea that it is a fallacy to suppose that 
"questions of truth can be settled, or even touched, by considerations of the 
causes, interests, or whatever which may generate or maintain beliefs" 
(Cooper, 1983, p. 24). Cooper does not claim that the genealogy of a belief can 
decide its truth or falsity, rather, "genealogical is of the first importance in 
affecting people's attitudes towards their values and beliefs; not by offering 
confirmations or disconfirmations, but by 'clearing' or 'indicting' how they are 
arrived at" (Cooper, 1983, p. 24). 
In relation to the discussion about authenticity that is put forward in this 
thesis this last issue means that whenever we are dealing with an individual's 
values or beliefs, there is always a genealogical dimension to them. In other 
words, values and beliefs are always someone's values and beliefs and are never 
free-floating ones that exist in a vacuum. This is linked with the question of 
ownership of such values and beliefs I discussed earlier. It is also linked with 
the question of responsibility, as Michael Bonnett argues when he makes the 
point that essential to the notion of authenticity is the personal responsibility 
one takes for the choices one makes and the commitments one enters into, 
regardless whether these were entered into wittingly or not. And he adds that 
"it is such commitments, and the precise ways in which they are held, which 
will come to constitute the core of that meaning-giving subjectivity" (Bonnett, 
1986, p. 122). In a more general way, though, it can be argued that the 
genealogical dimension of the values and beliefs we have lies in the fact that we 
are historical beings (and as such better conceptualised as processes than 
substances — See section 2.3.2) who always exist as relating to our past and 
future. A notion of autonomy that conceives of the individual as having beliefs 
and values based, first and foremost, in reason ignores this historical 
dimension and will, therefore, have difficulty being clear about the kind of 
historical beings we are. 
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3.5.5 The ontological argument: the limits of what can be revealed 
in a rational, objective way 
The above can be summarised by saying that the notion of autonomy, as I have 
found it, is based on a particular way in which human beings can have access to 
things, but by no means the only one. Thus, Bonnett and Cuypers point out 
that the rationality promoted in autonomy is a particular way of revealing 
something, which "is always at the expense of other ways of revealing it" 
(Bonnett and Cuypers, 2003, p. 338). They write that rational thinking "relates 
us to the world and achieves its rigor by the application of public rule-
governed procedures to experience in terms of which it is thus organized and 
validated". They add that "[w]hat shows up in this framework of objectivity is 
heavily conditioned by the largely instrumental purposes that underlie the 
standards (conventions, criteria, etc.)". Such a rational way of taking the world 
is, they claim, "far from impartial", in that it "can be seen to underwrite a 
pervasive calculative stance towards the world" (Bonnett and Cuypers, 2003, p. 
338), and they mention the effects such a stance has on the environment 
(presumably because of the exploitation of nature it encourages), but one could 
easily think of other areas in life where such a "calculative stance" has a 
deleterious effect, such as personal relationships, and others concerning life 
and living beings, which is the domain in relation to which this thesis seeks to 
discover an appropriate form of learning. 
The point Bonnett and Cuypers make is that every way of "revealing" 
something, be it through critical rationality or otherwise (for example, 
through poetry or practical engagement with the thing) always involves a 
"negation" of other ways of "revealing" the thing. It has been suggested in this 
section that what is lacking is a way to arbitrate between the different ways in 
which things can be revealed — and this question will be pursued in the rest of 
the thesis. One way of approaching this is suggested by Bonnett and Cuypers, 
who write that what is called for is an awareness of this "negation of other 
ways of revealing the thing", so that through this awareness of the "denial" of 
other ways of apprehending the thing can "restore" its "inherent otherness" 
which is essential to its "integrity" (Bonnett and Cuypers, 2003, p. 338). Such 
"[a]wareness of negation is not awareness of nothing, but a remembrance of 
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what is being forgotten when we sum things up in categories and attempt to 
order our lives and the world in terms of them" (Bonnett and Cuypers, 2003, p. 
338). 
In sum, the notion of autonomy as we have encountered it in writings about 
education has a notion of ownership that leaves open the crucial question of 
the relationship between the individual and their social-historical context, 
entails the concept of choice in a way that still leaves open when and where 
making a choice is the appropriate way to make a decision, and, likewise, 
emphasizes critical rationality in a way that leaves open what the appropriate 
circumstances are for such critical rationality, rather than another way of 
access to the thing in question, to be the basis of one's actions and decisions. In 
short, rational autonomy takes the entities it encounters in the world as either 
practical or theoretical ones, and that, I have been saying from the beginning, 
is the limitation the process of learning to be authentic aims to overcome. 
3.6 Becoming authentic as a process of awakening, "giving 
oneself up", and finding one's true self 
Now that we have some understanding of what authenticity involves, I will 
take a first look at the process of becoming authentic. The process of becoming 
authentic can be characterised as a process of awakening, of giving oneself up, 
or of finding one's true self. I will take a closer look at these three ways of 
characterising authenticity, and conclude that the notion of "turning away 
from the world" and "turning back" as it is found in philosophy of education is 
appropriate in this context. 
I will consider the process of becoming authentic (as a process of awakening, of 
giving oneself up, or of finding one's true self) against the backdrop of the 
distinction Heidegger makes between disclosure and discovery, between what 
constitutes disclosing the being of things (What things can possibly exist?) and 
discovering actual things (Which things do actually exist of all the possible 
things that could exist?). This distinction will help bring out how learning to 
be authentic is different from versions of awakening, of giving oneself up, or of 
finding one's true self. But before I look at these three ways of characterizing 
the process of becoming authentic, I will consider how disclosure is, for 
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Heidegger, a more fundamental form of truth than the kind of truth we may 
discover. 
Heidegger ranks disclosure as Dasein's primordial truth. Thus he writes that 
resoluteness, as a "distinctive mode of Dasein's disclosedness", is existentially 
"the primordial truth", and that "[s]uch truth is primarily not a quality of 
'udgement' nor of any definite way of behaving, but something essentially 
constitutive for being-in-the-world as such [Dasein]" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 
343). As David Cooper puts it, Heidegger's notion of truth contrasts with the 
notion of truth as the agreement (one could also say "correspondence") 
between a proposition or a representation and objects or facts in the world. 
Cooper writes that "while this conception of truth as correspondence] is not 
simply mistaken, Heidegger levels two criticisms against those who subscribe 
to it. First, they treat 'agreement' as a matter of similarity between two 
entities, a representation and an object or fact represented", which he rejects as 
unintelligible. "Instead, he argues, we should think of a true assertion as 
disclosing or uncovering an object". Second, "it is not ... assertions or 
judgements which are the primary vehicles of truth. For it is we — Dasein —
who disclose and uncover" (Cooper, 2002, p. 54). It is therefore Dasein itself 
that is in truth or untruth. 
Disclosure is a concept Heidegger uses for the way in which the being of 
entities are accessed by Dasein. They are, therefore, essentially about Dasein's 
understanding of the being of entities. The German word for "to disclose" is 
erschliessen, which consists of two parts: the prefix "er14", which functions in 
much the same way as "dis" does in disclose, and " schliessen" which means to 
close. In the German the word erschliessen means "to open up", where what can 
be opened up is, for example, a country for trade, an oil well or a mine for 
extraction, a book for meaning, the heart for experience, a hotel for guests. 
Erschliessen can also mean that something reveals itself to someone, the 
meaning of a book can be revealed to the reader, nature can reveal itself to 
14 Note that the German prefix "ent" usually means the same as "er", which is a further 
indication of the closeness of the terms entschliessen (to decide) and erschliessen (to disclose) 
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someone, someone can reveal themselves to someone else. In short, 
authenticity discloses. 
What happens in the event of true disclosure is that Dasein itself is disclosed 
to itself (Section 3.2.1) in a non-reflective self-awareness (Section 3.4.1) at the 
same time that the being of the entities it is in contact with is being disclosed. 
"Whenever a 'there' [the most basic truth about Dasein is, according to 
Heidegger, that it is 'a there'] is disclosed, its whole being-in-the-world — that 
is to say, the world, being-in, and the self which, and an 'I am', this entity is —
is disclosed with equal primordiality" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 344). This is in line 
with the idea presented earlier, that the being of entities is disclosed at the 
level of the a priori, at point where both the "active" intentio and the "passive" 
intentum emerge. It thus brings together "what we take something as" with 
"how something presents itself to us". One could say that what is disclosed in 
authenticity is the deep structure of the way something presents itself or of what it 
is taken as. 
That is to say, the truth of disclosure is more basic than propositional truth, 
the truth of a judgement, or the truth of an action, of a way of behaving. Hence 
it would be misleading to say that authentic existence consists of holding 
certain propositional truths or behaving in a certain way. As disclosure is the 
way in which Dasein first discloses anything (itself or the world) one could say 
that before disclosure there is nothing for Dasein. In contrast, for Dasein to 
discover something, there needs to already be a world in which things can be 
discovered and "things", in the broadest sense of the word, to be discovered: if 
Dasein has no world of any sort and no sense of there being things of any kind 
it is impossible for Dasein to discover anything. Discovery presupposed 
disclosure. 
3.6.1 Awakening as discovery and disclosure 
My first characterisation of the process of becoming authentic is that of 
awakening, which can be found in the following quotation from Being and 
Time: "If Dasein discovers the world in its own way and brings it close, if it 
discloses to itself its own authentic being, then this discovery of the 'world' 
and this disclosure of Dasein are always accomplished as a clearing-away of 
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concealments and obscurities, as a breaking up of the disguises with which 
Dasein bars its own way" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 167). This awakening thus 
refers to a renewed understanding of both the self and the world. Note that 
this notion of authenticity as an awakening is linked to Heidegger's notion of 
the aim of philosophy. "Plato says in one of his major dialogues that the 
difference between the philosophising human being and the one who is not 
philosophising is the difference between being awake 	 and 
sleeping..."15(Heidegger, 1995a, p. 23). 
The kind of awakening Heidegger is interested in is, in his words, ontological 
(pertaining to the being of entities) rather than ontic (pertaining to actual 
entities). That is, disclosure is primarily ontological and discovery is ontic, and 
I will take them as being two distinct ways in which Dasein has access to being 
and beings, even though, as we saw in Section 3.6.1, disclosure, as more 
fundamental than discovery, is sometimes also used as encompassing both. In 
the case of awakening, there is the risk of conceptualising the state from which 
one awakens and the state in which one wakes up in terms of our ordinary 
(practical or theoretical) conceptions of things. That is, that one would find out 
that such and such is the case, where what is the case is facts like any other 
facts we encounter rather than facts of a different nature altogether. 
An example of this would be if a child discovered that his father, whom he had 
hitherto held up as his hero, was, in fact, deeply corrupt in his dealings with 
his business partners. For the child this could amount to a discovery which 
brings about a kind of awakening. His father is suddenly seen in a different 
light and with this comes a change in how he sees his own world: no longer is 
the beautiful house he grows up in the fruit of honest labour and business nous, 
it represents rather the ill-deserved gains of dishonesty and manipulation. 
Though this kind of discovery represents an awakening of sorts, it is not the 
kind of awakening Heidegger refers to when he talks about authenticity. The 
16 Many, more recent, interpreters of Heidegger, for example, Miguel de Beistegui point out 
this element in Heidegger's philosophy: "Returning the practice of philosophy to its Greek, 
specifically Platonic origin and inspiration, Heidegger understands philosophy as an 
awakening of life itself'. Or again in his claim that for Heidegger philosophy "is the most 
sustained attempt to face life, to turn it back on itself in order to make it transparent to itself 
and grasp its ownmost and highest possibilities" (de Beistegui, 2005, p. 25) 
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ontic discovery discloses what kind of person, of all the possible kinds of 
persons, his father actually is. This is different from ontological disclosure 
which would be the disclosure of what it is to be human, what the possibilities 
of being human are in the first place. 
As we saw in our discussion of autonomy (Section 3.5.4), in education we find 
the ontical approach to awakening in many critical forms of education which 
aim to awaken the pupil from the slumber of traditional ways of seeing things. 
Often the word narrative, or grand narrative, is used for the ways of looking at 
the world and themselves that the pupil grows up in. The awakening these 
critical forms of education aim for is that of the pupil seeing what is false about 
them. For example, the idea that people in western democracies are free would 
be critically analysed, shown to be a narrative which hides many aspects of our 
lives that are not free, as a result of, for example, schooling, media 
manipulation or the lack of any real political choice. As we saw in our analysis 
of autonomy, it is then claimed that a person who is able to critically engage 
with such narratives is better able to be an authentic person, because they can 
form their own opinions and are not as much subject to being told what to 
think as people who have not learned to think critically in such a way. An 
example of such a critical pedagogy is Paulo Freire's Pedagogy of the Oppressed 
(Freire, 1970/1996; Freire, 2004), and I will say more in Section 7.1.2 about 
how it differs from the approach promoted in this thesis. 
Though there is, I believe, a lot of merit in many of the critical forms of 
education, they do not think of awakening in the same way as Heidegger does. 
For Heidegger awakening, in the context of a discussion of authenticity, does 
not wake up to the fact that X is not Y but Z (e.g. "the education system is not 
there to help the individual flourish but to serve as a tool of the oppressor"), 
not even to the fact that there are such things as Xs, Ys, and Zs (e.g. "in this 
world there are oppressors and the oppressed and usually the oppressor, if 
successful, hides behind a mask of benevolence"). What Heidegger's authentic 
awakening discloses is, as we have seen, that as human beings, as Dasein, we 
are, more often than not, lived by the public discourse of das Man, and that we 
tend to take the entities, including ourselves, as practical or theoretical 
entities. This awakening to one's "lostness" in das Man is an awakening to the 
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nature of one's own being and, at the same time, an awakening to the being of 
the world and others; it puts the whole of human existence in a different light. 
3.6.2 Giving one-self up as discovery and disclosure 
A second way in which authenticity can be characterised is that of "giving 
oneself up". Thus "Eapnticipation the realisation of the finitude of one's 
existence, see Section 4.2.2] discloses to existence that its uttermost 
possibility lies in giving itself up, and thus shatter all one's tenaciousness to 
whatever existence one has reached" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 309). Here the act of 
giving oneself up can be seen as an act of resolve in the face of the disclosure of 
the truth of one's most authentic way of being. We will not usually come 
across calls for the self to be given up in western education, but, if we bear in 
mind the religious dimension of Heidegger's notion of authenticity, we can 
easily understand why "giving oneself up" would be part of it. As in the case of 
awakening, the danger with the notion of "giving oneself up" is that of 
conceiving of the self in terms of our ordinary everyday understanding as 
either a practical or a theoretical entity rather than in terms of an entity with 
the nature of Dasein. 
Sometimes such "giving oneself up" is thought of in terms of the individual 
giving up a belief they have about themselves, in order to discover a truer self. 
For example, when a young man, who believes that his most cherished asset is 
his image of the tough and callous womaniser discovers that he can give up 
that part of his self in order to become who he really is, for example, the 
faithful lover who is set to become a dedicated husband and father. In the 
context of education the notion of "giving oneself up" is often found when 
individuals subject themselves to the authority of a system, a regime or a 
master, because of the perceived need for the individual to give themselves up, 
to surrender their ego. Rather than saying that there is a true self hidden 
underneath the person that is there now, or that the person needs to be shaped 
in the right way, this notion of "giving oneself up" implies that any form of self 
needs to be relinquished, usually so that god or some divine power can take 
hold of one. Jesus Christ's obedience to his "Father" in going to his own 
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crucifixion is perhaps the prototypical version of this kind of giving oneself up 
in western civilisation. 
The danger of understanding such "giving oneself up" in practical terms is that 
the self is taken as ready-to-hand (a practical entity like an object one could 
give up by leaving it behind). It is then seen as a nuisance or as a threat, the 
cause of suffering or the impediment to one's realisation as a human being. 
And such a discovery of the self as an impediment is likely to result in one 
acting towards the self as such. For example, one may deny oneself any 
"nourishment" of the self and renounce all worldly goods; or one may set out 
to punish oneself for any manifestation of selfishness in order to teach oneself 
not to allow the self to take over; or one may subject oneself to a regime or the 
will of another person as a way of practising life without the self. 
In the case of taking the self that is to be given up as something present-at-
hand (a theoretical entity like a concept one could give up by replacing it with 
another one), the individual has a representation of the self as an entity within 
a framework of entities and relations that explains what the self is and what it 
does. Staying with the notion of "giving up", the self may be equated with the 
material, the worldly, in contrast with the spiritual, it may be seen as a 
manifestation of darkness that has to be dispelled or overcome, it may be seen 
as a theoretical posit, one that is not based on any empirical evidence, and so 
on. Then there will be either an account of how that liberation was possible 
and even inevitable, or of how it was impossible, just something one needs to 
learn to live with. All of which may suggest things one could do (which would 
take the self as ready-to-hand understood from within the present-at-hand 
scheme), or it could suggest mental representations one could foster that 
would bring about the liberation from the self, such as the repetition of 
mantras, the evocation of certain images, the Christian practice of thinking 
about the four last things (death, judgement, heaven, and hell), or meditation 
on certain sacred writings. 
But where the notions of the self as practical and theoretical both run into 
difficulty is that it is not clear what or who it is that would give up the self in 
the first place. For there to be something ready-to-hand or present-at-hand 
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there needs to be something that takes the entity as ready-to-hand or present-
at-hand. This is linked with what I said about the notion of learning as 
modification and growth, namely, that such learning requires there to be an 
object of learning. But in the case of "giving up the self" what is it that "gives 
up the self" as ready-to-hand or present-at-hand, other than the self? It is, 
therefore, not a matter of discovering that the self must be given up, but of 
disclosing the self in a way that is prior to any practical or theoretical take on 
it. The result of disclosure is, as we have seen, not a judgement or a way of 
behaving but, rather, a way of being. Heidegger then claims that in disclosing 
the nature of the entity of the self "all one's tenaciousness to whatever 
existence one has reached" is shattered (Heidegger, 1962, p. 309). Thus the 
"letting go" of the self is neither the result of an action one takes nor of a 
judgement one has of how things are, but it happens in the disclosure itself. 
How this can be made intelligible is the subject of the following three chapters. 
3.6.3 Finding one's true self as discovery and disclosure 
A third way of characterizing the process of becoming authentic is that of 
finding one's true self. Heidegger writes that "because only the self of the [self 
belonging to das Man] gets appealed to by the call of conscience] and 
brought to hear, das Man collapses. ... and  the self, which the appeal has 
robbed of its lodgement and hiding-place, gets brought to itself" (Heidegger, 
1962, p. 317). Here the idea is that of the inauthentic self, as it is constructed 
out of or by das Man, collapses and the true, authentic self comes to the fore. 
Characterizing the process in this way is clearly linked with "giving oneself 
up" as the inauthentic self "collapses" and with awakening, as one awakens to 
what one is authentically and finds one's true self. This "finding" is an instance 
of disclosure, of revealing to oneself what the possibilities are that the self has, 
rather than finding any particular actualisation of these possibilities. 
The true self has often been conceived of as present-at-hand in so far as it has 
been thought to have certain characteristics which were true to it. For 
example, a person may have conformed to certain expectations and behave and 
even think like the person they felt they were expected to be. In this case the 
true self would behave and think differently from how they normally behave 
100 
and think. This person would then, in discovering their true self, find out that, 
"deep down" they are inclined to behave and think differently from how they 
normally do. The true self is also often seen as a ready-to-hand entity, when 
the person uses it as if it was a physical object in the environment. Thus the 
person may "assert themselves", take a stand on who they are, say "this is the 
kind of person I am", or "fight for their right" to be themselves. 
It is important within the context of a phenomenological investigation to 
acknowledge that such a theoretical or practical discovery of a true self is often 
based in experience. It is, therefore, not to dismiss reports of cases where 
individuals find their true self, for example, because they discover that a 
certain role does not suit them and they assert themselves as a different 
person. The question that needs to be raised in the context of authenticity, 
though, is that there is no way of telling that what is being experienced as the 
true self is not simply an older version of the inauthentic self, as when a person 
was told to behave and think in a certain way and later told to behave and 
think differently: from a Heideggerian perspective both are inauthentic, it is 
just that one is older than the other. 
One of the problems is that it is not at all clear what this "true self' would 
consist of. We may tend to behave and think in ways that are heavily 
influenced and shaped by our environment, but it does not follow from this 
that there is something that behaves and thinks, like a prior self, which is not 
thus affected by our environment. What is more, because every human being 
grows up in some sort of an environment where some sort of demands will be 
made of it, where certain things will be expected of it, where there is, at a 
minimum, a preference on the part of other people as to what constitutes 
desirable behaviour and correct thought, it then becomes difficult to see what 
would be a coherent account of a self that is truer than the one that has grown 
up among people and done so in its own way by taking certain aspects of the 
environment as salient and by responding to those salient aspects in its own 
way. 
For Heidegger the authentic way in which Dasein may find its true self is 
when it understands itself not in terms of something practical or theoretical, 
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but as something with possibility as its essence (Section 4.2.2). It is, therefore, 
not any particular actual way of being that is true to Dasein's self but existence 
as possibility, as not any particular characteristics in the way that practical or 
theoretical entities have characteristics. This is again the essential openness at 
the core of Dasein that we encountered before. As was said at the beginning of 
this chapter, it is from out of the openness (with possibility as its essential 
nature) that the actual ways of a particular Dasein emerge. None of these actual 
ways are authentic in themselves, because they are all the result of having 
grown up into das Man. Finding one's true self, therefore, does not consist in 
finding any particular way of being, but in returning to the state of openness, 
possibility that exists when all the actual ways have subsided. 
In sum, the notions of awakening, giving oneself up and finding oneself can 
easily be taken to refer to discoveries one makes about oneself at the level of 
the ready-to-hand or present-at-hand. However, when this happens they are 
taken in a way that misses the point Heidegger wants to make. In looking for 
authentic existence, one is, according to Heidegger, not looking to awaken to 
"facts" about life one did not know before, but to what it means to be a human 
being, to what "facts" are possible for a human being in the first place. One is 
also not looking to get rid of or explain away the self, but rather to disclose to 
oneself that the kind of entity one is has "giving itself up" as one of its essential 
possibilities. One is not looking for one's "own" way of seeing or doing things, 
but for one's own way of being, where being cannot be reduce to what one does 
and believes, but comes prior to that. For Heidegger, authentic existence does 
not lie at the level of how one sees or does things, but prior to that, at the level 
of existing as openness and possibility. To repeat part of an earlier quote, the 
disclosive truth of authentic existence is "something essentially constitutive 
for being-in-the-world as such" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 343). 
3.7 In sum 
In this chapter I have attempted to give a first characterization of authentic 
existence and of the process that, according to Heidegger leads to authentic 
existence. We saw that Heidegger's Dasein is, in essence, openness and 
possibility, that within this openness the processes of understanding, 
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attunement and being-with emerge and that authentic existence consists in the 
falling silent of these processes, where the actual process that leads to this 
falling silent occurs at the level of the a priori and not in the relationship 
between Dasein and the entities it encounters in the world (objects of 
learning). 
We saw that a number of recent philosophers of education have conceived of 
the process of becoming authentic in terms that are essentially perfectionist, 
conceiving of it as a double movement of both becoming who one really is and 
reaching one's full potential as a human being, as a result of a "death and 
rebirth", a "turning away from the world" and a "turning back", in such a way 
that one gains an authentic sense for of one's own existence as well as that of 
the entities one encounters in the world. 
We saw that the first moment of the process of becoming authentic, the part 
that involves a "turning away from the world", is characterized by Heidegger 
as "bringing oneself back from lostness in das Man". This involves three, 
related aspects: extracting oneself from the ways of understanding things into 
which one has been socialised; understanding oneself in terms of oneself and 
not in terms of practical or theoretical entities; understanding things and 
oneself from not out of a past understanding of them. The moment of "turning 
back" then involves a return to das Man. 
We saw that the notion of rational autonomy that has been influential in 
education would not be able to answer the issues I am trying to address in this 
thesis in that it invariably takes the entities it encounters in the world as either 
practical or theoretical; it is unable to elucidate the notion of ownership so as 
to resolve the crucial question of the relationship between the individual and 
their social-historical context; it is unable to determine when and where 
making a rational choice is the appropriate way to come to particular a course 
of action; it is unable to determine what the appropriate circumstances are for 
critical rationality, rather than another way of access to reality, to be the basis 
of one's actions and decisions. 
We saw that in relation to the question of truth, Heidegger speaks of 
disclosure as being more fundamental than truth as the correspondence 
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between a proposition or a representation and reality: the truth of disclosure is 
more basic than propositional truth, the truth of a judgement, or the truth of 
an action, of a way of behaving. As authentic, Dasein is "in truth" in that 
Dasein itself is disclosed to itself in a non-reflective self-awareness at the same 
time that the being of the entities it is in contact with is being disclosed. We 
saw that the issue of concern in relation to the veracity of an authentic 
experience does not lie in the public domain, because of the a priori nature of 
authenticity. Even so, a question was raised regarding the intersubjective 
dimension of authenticity, which will be taken up later in the thesis. 
Finally I considered characterizations of the process of becoming authentic one 
can find in Heidegger's writings. I first argued that an overly voluntaristic 
interpretation of this process is unwarranted. We looked at the ways in which 
the process has been described as one of "awakening", of "giving oneself up", 
and of "finding oneself", where we saw that all three refer to processes of 
disclosure of the kinds of things that can possibly exist rather than to the 
discovery of things we actually believe exist, where it is always the self that is 
disclosed as something for which Dasein did not previously have the 
ontological categories, possibly involving changes in the structure of 
experience itself. That is, all three characterizations of the process of becoming 
authentic involve a radically different understanding of what it is for Dasein to 
be. 
I can now say that, based on the above, the process of becoming authentic is a 
process of falling silent that occurs at the level before there has been a decision 
as to the being of the entity in question (practical, theoretical or as belonging 
to live and living beings), where a connection with the entity remains even as 
the basic faculty of relating to the entity (understanding, attunement and 
being-with) has subsided. This process is a "turning away from the world", a 
turning away from understanding things as a result of enculturation, 
engagement with practical and theoretical entities, and previous experience. 
This is followed by a "turning back" to the world in a new way, where what is 
new has been disclosed at the level of the being of entities and may involve a 
structural change in the experience of the self. As we will see in detail in the 
next three chapters, this process is compatible with the notion of learning to be 
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authentic, in that it includes radical self-renewal and a change in the structure 
of experience, in such a way that it is not based in the relation to an object of 
learning and where the result of the process is that of Dasein having a sense 
for the being of entities in themselves. However, questions about Heidegger's 
account of the relationship between Dasein and other Daseins, individually or 
collectively, have come up that will be addressed at length in Chapter 6. 
105 
4 Authentic understanding 
4.1 Becoming authentic as gaining an authentic understanding of 
oneself 
4.1.1 Understanding as projection 
Understanding is one of the three aspects of Dasein's "comportment", its ways 
of relating to things. Thus understanding determines, in part, how we relate to 
things, people, ideas, ourselves, the world, nature - in short, everything. As we 
saw earlier, understanding, for Heidegger, refers to both our practical 
engagement with things (the ready-to-hand) and our theoretical understanding 
of them (the present-at-hand). "If understanding is a basic determination of 
existence, it is as such the condition of possibility of all the Dasein's particular 
possible manners of comportment [ways of relating to things]... not only 
practical but also cognitive [theoretical]" (Heidegger, 1982, p. 276). For 
Heidegger understanding itself does not only contain the possibility of 
understanding an entity as ready-to-hand, present-at-hand or existence, it is 
also something deeper than either practical or theoretical engagement, it is, as 
it were, the source of both. 
Heidegger writes that "the understanding has in itself the existential structure 
we call projection" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 184). Heidegger's word, projecting, is 
the translation of entwerfen, which literally means "throwing" something "off' 
or "away" from one, and it may also be used in the sense in which a geometer 
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"projects" a curve "upon" a planel6 (Heidegger, 1962, p. 185, editor's footnote). 
Thus we understand something by projecting, by projecting it upon 
possibilities — like projecting what the possibilities of a certain situation are 
before understanding the entity one wants to understand in terms of those 
possibilities. Importantly, these possibilities are not usually explicit: "the 
character of understanding as projection is such that the understanding does 
not grasp thematically :i.e. explicitly] that upon which it projects — that is to 
say, possibilities" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 185). 
We could take as an example an individual's understanding of a hammer as 
something one may drive a nail into a wall with. In this case the hammer is 
encountered as a piece of equipment, as something one may use in an 
instrumental way, doing something with it in order to achieve a certain goal. 
The entity (the hammer) is thus projected onto its possibilities (being a piece 
of equipment) and only understood after these possibilities have been 
projected. Often humorous situations play on this kind of projec tion, as when a 
naive individual projects an entity (for example, a piece of modern art) onto the 
wrong possibilities (for example, onto equipment), with the result that they do 
something out of place (for example, hang their coat on the piece of modern 
art). 
The word projecting is potentially confusing if it is taken in the sense 
analogous to "projecting an image on a screen" where the image determines 
what gets seen on the screen, just as when we say that "someone projects a 
feeling they have onto someone else", that is, when we use the word projecting 
in the same way as "sticking a label onto something", attaching a meaning to 
an entity that this entity does not have of itself. Rather, the entity that 
determines the meaning something can have is not an image, a label, a 
meaning that we project onto the thing but that which the entity gets projected 
onto. To return to the analogy of the screen, when the image is projected onto 
the screen, it is, in the way Heidegger understands projection, the screen that 
16 In ordinary German usage Entwurf is also used in the sense of "designing" or "sketching" 
some "project" which is to be carried through, but this is emphatically not the meaning 
Heidegger envisages. 
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determines what image it is possible to appear on it (more on this possible 
confusion later). We can thus also say that we understand something "in the 
light of', "by projecting it onto something else", or "in terms of something 
else. 
4.1.2 Our theoretical understanding is based in our practical 
understanding 
It was said in the section on Heidegger's perfectionist philosophy of education, 
that Dasein has, according to Heidegger, as its distinguishing characteristic 
that it has an understanding of being. Perhaps the first thing that springs to 
mind in hearing the phrase understanding of being is some kind of theoretical 
understanding. But, as we saw in the introduction, Heidegger posits that we 
can understand the being of an entity either theoretically, or practically or, 
indeed, in a way that is appropriate in relation to life and living beings. First I 
will look at the relationship between Dasein's theoretical and its practical 
understanding of being. 
With respect to the latter, "when Heidegger singles out Dasein as the unique 
possessor of an understanding of being, he is referring primarily to the fact 
that Dasein is the only kind of entity which takes a stand on its being 
practically" (Thomson, 2004, p. 443). We display an understanding of being in 
how we live our lives, in what we do, as much as in how we theorise. When we 
treat something as a certain kind of something (let's say, a pupil as a receptacle 
of knowledge) there is a certain kind of understanding of what kind of entity 
the pupil is, even if we do not hold the explicit (theoretical) belief that "the 
pupil is a receptacle to be filled with knowledge", but merely act in that way. 
That is, Heidegger thought of theory as derivative of practice. First, in the 
sense that we only become theoretical about something, when our practical 
flow of engagement with the thing has been interrupted. Second, in the sense 
that our theoretical concepts are ultimately derived from our practical 
engagement with things. And third, in the sense that being theoretical is itself a 
practice. That is, our way of dealing with the pupil involves a certain 
understanding of what kind of entity the pupil is, and it is only when our usual 
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flow of interaction with the entity (the pupil) is interrupted17 (e.g. the pupil 
resists the knowledge being poured into him or her) that we may begin to try 
to understand explicitly and theoretically what kind of being the entity (the 
pupil) has, in which case we may bring into practice some of our theoretical 
skills (such as going to the library to read up on the topic and analysing the 
situation). 
To give another example, the theoretical way of understanding things in terms 
of categories, classes, genus and species, is, according to Heidegger, derivative 
of such practical understanding of things. Thus we can classify a red pen as a 
kind of pen, a pen as an implement for writing, an implement for writing as an 
instrument for communication, and so on. But we can also classify the same 
pen as a material entity, as a manmade material entity, as a machine-produced 
entity, and so on. The way in which these theoretical meanings of the object 
are derivative of the practical one is that the very question of what kind of 
theoretical entity something is presupposes a practical context. One only asks 
about the pen as an instrument for communication if one is interested in doing 
so, for example if one is researching the development of instruments for 
communication through history, which means that one is asking the question 
as a historian. Or, if one is asking about the pen as a machine-produced entity, 
one is perhaps doing so out of an interest in setting up a pen factory, which is 
again practical. Even the purely academic interest one may have in things 
presupposes an overarching practical context of the person who is asking the 
question. 
Heidegger describes the origin of theoretical thinking in practical thinking in 
terms of an interruption in the flow of a smooth coping with things. If we are 
emerged in the flow of life, coping smoothly, we use things (like pens and 
doors and roads) without them becoming explicit (Heidegger would use the 
word "thematic"). Rather, Heidegger would say that these things are 
"transparent" when we are in the flow of things, in the sense of us not noticing 
them in any explicit way, as we are focussing on what we are doing, like 
17 Note that the term interruption here isn't primarily a pause. Interruption refers to a break 
in the flow of practical engagement 
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writing, leaving a room or driving on a road. It is only when things fail to go 
smoothly, when the pen runs out of ink, the door is stuck or the road becomes 
pot-holed, that we begin to take explicit notice of them. This is, according to 
Heidegger, the origin of our theoretical, present-at-hand, understanding of 
things, an understanding which is, as such, based in our practical, ready-to-
hand, understanding. 
4.1.3 Our practical understanding is structured by our self-
understanding 
Thus we have practical understanding and theoretical understanding, where 
the latter is based in the first. For Heidegger, however, both are based in 
Dasein's self-understanding. As Ian Thomson writes, Dasein "lives in an 
intelligible world implicitly structured by the stand it takes on its own 
identity" (Thomson, 2004, p. 443). That is, what something means to us 
depends on how we see ourselves. For example, as a teacher, the exercise 
books and the red pen in my bag are understood in terms of marking student 
work (what Heidegger calls the "towards-this"), which I understand in terms 
of the monitoring and giving feedback that is part of the practice of being a 
teacher (what Heidegger calls the "in-order-to"), which, in turn, I understand 
in terms of my being a teacher (what Heidegger calls the "for-the-sake-of-
which"). As Heidegger puts it, this time in the opposite order from our 
example, "The 'for-the-sake-of-which' signifies an 'in-order-to'; this in turn, a 
'towards-this" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 120). 
To put it differently, getting the meaning of these entities right (What kind of 
pens are these?) depends on getting their role in the activities right (What 
does it mean to mark student work?), which in turn depend on getting the 
whole of the role right (What does it mean to be a teacher?), which depends on 
getting oneself right (What does it mean to be me?). The questions put within 
brackets are phrased in a theoretical way but they are not questions one 
necessarily asks oneself explicitly, they serve merely as illustrations, as 
verbalisations of what is essentially tacit. 
One could counter that with many practical activities we understand the 
activity in terms of the wider practice rather than in terms of our self- 
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understanding. Thus we understand the activity of making a worksheet in 
terms of the practice of being a teacher. But, Heidegger would argue, we 
understand this wider practice, in this case being a teacher, ultimately in terms 
of ourselves. And this is true regardless of whether one is a teacher oneself; 
one could understand being a teacher just as well in terms of one's dislike of the 
teachers one had as a child, or in terms of one's relationship with one's spouse, 
who once wanted to be a teacher. 
But, as I said earlier, our understanding of ourselves (being a teacher) is also 
something we project. Therefore, some of the confusion surrounding the 
meaning of projection is due to the fact that, to return to the analogy of the 
screen, one does not only understand entities by projecting them onto the 
screen, the screen itself is also projected, that is, that which illuminates the entity 
one understands is also projected: one projects the entity one understands onto 
what is itself a projection. To return to the earlier example of understanding 
the red pen and the exercise books in terms of being a teacher, one does not 
only project the "pen and exercise books" onto the activity of "marking" and 
the activity of "marking" onto "being a teacher", one also projects "being a 
teacher" onto something. The question of understanding oneself then becomes 
a question of what it is one projects oneself onto: that is, in the light of what or in 
terms of what does one understand oneself? And this brings us right to the 
heart of the issue this thesis aims to resolve. If we understand things in terms 
of the possibilities we project for those things, what are the possibilities that 
allow us to understand ourselves as a living being? 
Heidegger, as we have seen, believes that the inauthentic individual 
understands themselves in terms of das Man, that is, in terms of the ways of 
understanding and doing things that they adopt unwittingly as they grow up 
in a particular society; in terms of, as we saw in the introduction, the entities 
they encounter in the world, the practical (ready-to-hand) and theoretical 
(present-at-hand) entities; in terms of what they recall of a previous 
understanding. Using the terminology of projection, we could say that the 
inauthentic individual project themselves onto a role, a kind of person, that 
exists in the discourse of the culture they live in, thus identifying themselves 
with being a teacher or some other persona from their culture; they project 
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themselves onto ready-to-hand entities, thus understanding themselves as an 
entity that can be used, for example to meet some expectation, to experience 
pleasure, or to make a certain impression; they project themselves onto present-
at-hand entities, thus considering themselves theoretically, for example as an 
immortal soul or an expression of the genetic code; they project themselves 
onto a previous understanding they had of themselves, which, in practice, 
means that they do so in terms of the discourse of the society they live in or 
ready-to-hand and present-at-hand entities. As was said in the introduction, this 
understanding of oneself as a practical or theoretical entity misses the essence 
of who one is, as one's being belongs to what I called life and living beings. 
4.1.4 Authentic self-understanding is understanding oneself in 
terms of oneself 
As was said, all understanding ultimately originates from or refers back to 
Dasein's self-understanding. I also said that all understanding projects entities 
onto their possibilities. The question that then arises is what it is that Dasein's 
authentic self-understanding is projected onto. Heidegger's answer is that 
Dasein's authentic self-understanding is projected onto nothing, because it can 
be understood out of itself (contrary to the ready-to-hand and present-at-hand, 
which can only be understood by being projected onto something). 
F. Volpi traces this notion of understanding something in terms of itself back 
to Aristotle18. Volpi notes that Heidegger appropriates Aristotle's notion of 
praxis (as opposed to poiesis) to designate Dasein. Praxis, for Aristotle and 
Heidegger, cannot be understood in terms of anything but itself. Praxis is 
something that is done for its own sake. "In the absence of any region in which 
it can be constituted, praxis has to be self-constituting; and in this way it 
becomes the originary ontological determination, self-sufficient, its own 
objective. It becomes ouheneka, Worumwillen [for-the-sake-of-which]" (Volpi, 
1996, p. 50). Dasein exists "for its own sake" and not as an instrument for 
achieving a goal other than being itself. Praxis contains its own goal and is not 
instrumental: "the distinctive characteristic of praxis is the fact that it is not 
18 The same point is made in (Dahlstrom, 2001) 
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with reference to anything else (heneka tinos) like poiesis, but that it contains in 
itself its own goal (hou heneka)" (Volpi, 1996, pp. 56-57). What is more, this 
understanding of something in terms of itself only can be either aware of 
something or ignorant of it, rather than be right or wrong about it in the sense 
of having correct beliefs about it. Something that can be understood out of 
itself cannot be misunderstood in the sense of being misinterpreted, it can only 
be missed altogether. 
One could as an analogy to praxis think of a work of art, in the way that we 
sometimes think of art as existing for its own sake only — art for art's sake. If 
art is understood in this way it is, contrary to an instrument, a consumer good 
or an object of theoretical reflection, not made to serve any purpose other than 
itself. The notion of the individual existing for its own sake is sometimes 
expressed in terms of the individual "being an end in itself'. This refers to the 
notion that the individual is neither an object to be used in instrumental ways 
nor one that needs theoretical justification. The individual human being exists 
for its own sake, and as such, can never be subsumed under something higher 
than itself (whether that be a practical purpose or a theoretical category). That 
is, according to Heidegger, all understanding projects entities onto an 
understanding of the being of the entity (in terms of the possibilities this kind 
of being has). Because Dasein is properly understood in terms of itself only, it 
cannot be projected onto anything but itself, if it is to be understood in an 
authentic way. 
4.2 The nature of authentic self-understanding 
4.2.1 Authentic Dasein understands itself as process 
Rather than understanding Dasein as a practical or theoretical entity, as 
something with an essence that persists through time, Heidegger conceives of 
Dasein as a process. As Reiner Schuermann puts it, "Heidegger's point of 
departure is the notion of subject as 'process' (Vollzug)" (Schuermann, 2008, pp. 
57-58). And he adds that "Et:he meaning of the subject's being is time; the 
subject's Being cannot be referred back to anything other than Dasein, out of 
which it would then 'enter' into time" (Schuermann, 2008, pp. 57-58). That is, 
there is not a substantial entity that is located within time (even if, from a 
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scientific standpoint this is not incorrect, but this investigation is 
phenomenological), but rather, this entity itself is the process of time, it is in 
essence the process of time, temporality. "The `essence' of this entity lies in its 
`to be' [Zu-sein]" (Heidegger, 1962). 
In the next chapter, on authentic attunement, we will see that Heidegger takes 
Dasein to be fundamentally openness, transcendence, in the form of being-in-
the-world. In the present chapter we see that, according to Heidegger, it is 
temporality, or process, that is the nature of that which emerges in this 
openness. That is, Heidegger argues that authentic understanding means that 
Dasein understands itself in terms of temporality, where this temporality, 
unlike the things we find in the world and even the being of entities, is 
something that can be understood in terms of itself. Thus we can say that 
authentic Dasein understands itself in terms of temporality and that Dasein is, 
in essence, temporality. 
To understand Heidegger's notion of temporality, we need to let go of both the 
common sense and the scientific notions of time. Both of these envisage time as 
a sequence of "nows", one that stretches from the indefinite past into the 
indefinite future. They envisage the individual as occurring "in" time, as 
coming into being at some point and going out of existence at a later one, not 
affecting the actual course of time itself. Though this may be an adequate way 
of conceiving of the time of science, it is, according to Heidegger, not the way 
in which we experience time. Heidegger's phenomenological investigation tells 
him that we have to understand time differently, if we want to do so in a way 
that it corresponds with the way that things present themselves to our 
awareness before they are coloured by common sense or other ways of 
thinking about the entity. 
An authentic understanding of time has, according to Heidegger, several 
aspects. Daniel Dahlstrom mentions five aspects of "genuine timeliness 
[authentic temporality]" (Dahlstrom, 2001, p. 337). The first of these is that 
genuine temporality comprises "ways in which to be-here is to be 'outside' or 
even 'beside oneself" (Dahlstrom, 2001, p. 337). This is very much in line with 
the notion of Dasein as transcendence I will discuss in the next chapter. That 
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is, it is not that one exists and that, once that has been established, one may 
turn towards the past, present, or future. Rather one exists as turning toward 
the past, present, or future. In this, genuine temporality is not an entity but "it 
unfolds", it emerges. "Temporality `is' not an entity at all. It is not, but it 
temporalises itself' (Heidegger, 1962, pp. 376-377). 
Thus, temporality is the way in which Dasein is "outside" or even "beside 
itself', as a kind of reaching out toward things in a way that can be 
characterised as being turned towards the past, present or future. Dasein can, 
as such, be characterised as openness and process. As Michael Zimmerman 
puts it, "Human understanding, then, does not take place inside a mind locked 
in the skull. Instead, understanding occurs because human temporality is 
receptive to particular ways in which things can present or manifest 
themselves. ... [w]hat we ordinarily take to be the ultimate constituents of 
`mind' — thoughts, beliefs, assertions, and so on — are for Heidegger phenomena 
that occur within the temporal clearing constitutive of human understanding" 
(Zimmerman, 1993, p. 243). 
Another way of putting this is to say that Dasein is, essentially, process, rather 
than, say, a substance. To deepen our understanding of the process nature of 
Dasein, I will briefly look at what, in the context of his discussions of the 
concepts of guilt and anxiety in Being and Time, Heidegger calls Dasein's 
"being-the-basis of a nullity" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 329). This concept of "being-
the-basis of a nullity" defines the dual aspect of, on the one hand, Dasein being 
"thrown" into a world which is not of its own making, and, on the other hand, 
Dasein projecting the meaning of that world in understanding. We have here 
the picture of a free-floating process of finding oneself in a world (being 
thrown), while at the same time having no choice but to project one's 
understanding of that world, which represents Heidegger's notion of 
understanding. 
That is, how I understand things is based on my upbringing, my cultural 
background, my life experiences, but these are not essential to my being; even 
so, I need to take responsibility for the way I understand things. One could 
object here that one's cultural conditioning and the way one has been brought 
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up are what is essential to one, and that to argue otherwise is to posit a 
substantive self, like a soul, at the core of Dasein. But we need to remember 
here that Heidegger does not posit some substantive essence at the core of 
Dasein, but rather a process. And the only things that can be said to be more 
essential than this process is the openness, the emptiness at the core of 
Dasein's being. "Out or or "within the space of the openness processes of 
being emerge: actual Dasein is nothing more than these processes. 
4.2.2 Dasein as possibility and finite totality 
Another aspect of Dasein's authentic self-understanding is that it takes itself as 
finite. This is linked with Dasein understanding itself in terms of temporality. 
"Genuine timeliness [temporality]" (Dahlstrom, 2001, p. 337), as Heidegger 
understands it, is finite. This is, of course, very different from the common 
sense notion of time as an endless succession of "nows". The grounds for such 
a statement lie in phenomenological observation, in that Heidegger's claim is 
that, if we return to the way we experience time and take away all the "ideas", 
the presuppositions we have about time, we actually experience time as finite —
at least in so far as we experience it from the first-person perspective. The 
evidence for such a claim (and its possible refutation) will lie in first-person 
phenomenological observation, and can never be scientific in any positivist 
sense. I will take the claim as initially plausible from a phenomenological 
perspective and hope that the following discussion will confirm that 
plausibility. 
In the previous chapter we saw that the notion of authenticity can be 
understood in terms of a double movement of death and rebirth. We also saw 
that it could be understood in terms of Dasein giving up the existence it has 
arrived at. Thus I looked at Heidegger writing that Dasein's "uttermost 
possibility lies in giving itself up, and thus shatter all one's tenaciousness to 
whatever existence one has reached" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 309). These notions 
of existential death and "giving up oneself" can be linked with the experience 
of time as finite. That is, in so far as Dasein actually understands itself as finite 
temporality, as a process that contains its own end as its ultimate horizon, it 
will understand itself as it really (authentically) is and thus become authentic 
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(in the perfectionist sense of both reaching its full potential and existing 
according to its real nature — Section 3.3.2). 
One way in which Heidegger puts the connection between understanding 
oneself as finite and being authentic is that only by understanding oneself as 
"being-towards-death" does one understand oneself in one's totality. This is 
because one's death is always already part of one's existence, in the sense that 
it is certain and as such a constant presence on the horizon of one's 
understanding of things (given that one's understanding of anything is based 
on projections and projections are inherently futural). As Reiner Schuermann 
puts it, "In its process (Vollzug), the subject, considered in itself, is [...] 
utterly finite. This ... is the meaning of 'wholeness' or 'totality' (Ganzheit). 
Ganzheit is not the sum total of traits belonging to Dasein, but its finite 
autonomy; its utter facticity, with no recourse to an infinite subject" 
(Schuermann, 2008, pp. 57-58). 
Dasein is, as we saw in the previous section, the basis of its own being, but it is 
the basis of its whole being only insofar as it is facing its whole being — and it 
does so only when it faces existential death, "the possibility of the impossibility 
of existence". As such death is not an event that lies in the future (though it is 
that as well, when taken from a third-person perspective, from a ready-to-hand 
or present-at-hand perspective) but something that is always part of the 
totality of Dasein's existence. "Death is not 'added on' to Dasein at its 'end'; 
but Dasein, as care, is the thrown (that is, null) basis for its death. The nullity 
by which Dasein's being is dominated through and through, is revealed to 
Dasein itself in authentic being-towards-death" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 354). In 
other words, "Dasein exists as thrown Being towards its end" (Heidegger, 
1962, p. 295). 
What is more, because Dasein is process that emerges out of openness, and 
because it is possible for these processes to subside, we have to say that 
essentially, Dasein is possibility. After all, if a process (a way of being) emerges 
in the openness of Dasein, then this is one of Dasein's "ways to be". But if 
Dasein is "in a certain way" this presupposes that it can be in other ways as 
well. That is, the actual way in which Dasein is represents only one of many 
117 
possible ways of being that could emerge. We can, therefore, say that authentic 
understanding involves Dasein understanding itself both as possibility and as 
finite temporality. We will see later in this chapter that Heidegger uses the 
word "transparency" to further characterize the nature of this understanding: 
"When one has an understanding of being-towards-death — towards death as 
one's ownmost possibility — one's potentiality-for-being becomes authentic and 
wholly transparent" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 354). 
4.3 How does Dasein get to understanding itself as a finite 
process? 
43.1 Authentic self-understanding as transparency 
Now that we have a first grasp on what authentic self-understanding entails 
and how it can accommodate processes of learning as modification and growth, 
I will return to the main question this thesis aims to answer, namely that of 
the process of learning to be authentic. In relation to authentic self-
understanding, Benjamin Crowe writes that "[t]he image one gets [...] is that 
life has become aware of itself somehow, has suddenly recognized that it has 
been living in a mode of falling. One has 'seen through' one's life as it has been 
lived" (Crowe, 2006, p. 173). In a similar vein, Miguel de Beistegui writes 
about Heidegger's notion of Dasein that "what is most singular about the 
human Dasein is that it is open (on)to itself, open to its own openness, and so 
can, up to a point, become transparent to itself, and thus be in a position to 
grasp its ownmost possibilities. This is the Durchsichtigmachen of life itself, its 
self-clarification, or explication" (de Beistegui 2005). 
This "seeing through" one's life is what Heidegger calls "transparency", which 
in German, Durchsigtigkeit, literally means "through" [durch] "sight" [Sicht]. 
Transparency is the way in which the whole of Dasein's existence becomes 
aware of itself as temporality, openness and possibility. "The sight which is 
related primarily and on the whole to existence we call 'transparency' 
[Durchsichtigkeit] (Heidegger, 1962, pp. 186-187). Importantly, "sight" is not 
to be understood in terms of sense-perception but rather in terms of knowing 
one's way around a situation, of being aware (in the most general sense of the 
term) of the situation and oneself in it. "In giving an existential signification to 
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`sight', we have merely drawn upon the peculiar feature of seeing, that it lets 
entities which are accessible to it be encountered unconcealedly in themselves" 
(Heidegger, 1962, p. 187). Ultimately, Heidegger would claim, understanding 
is itself irreducible to something else (such as perception or knowledge), which 
is the reason why he uses "sight" not in a literal sense but as a word to indicate 
the way in which understanding can be directed towards entities, has access to 
entities, and guides its ways of engaging with these entities. In this thesis the 
term "awareness" is often used to indicate Dasein's access to beings and being 
itself in the most general terms. 
Heidegger distinguishes "circumspection" [Umsicht], which allows for the 
access to, awareness of, ready-to-hand entities, "considerateness" 
[Ruecksicht], which allows for the access to, awareness of, other human 
beings, and "the sight which is directed upon being as such" [Sicht auf das Sein 
als solches], which allows for the access to, awareness of, the being of entities 
(Heidegger, 1962, pp. 186-187). Sight is used to denote what "guides" our 
interaction with an entity and what gives that interaction its particular 
"character" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 98). It is like an awareness in which one looks 
around in order to find out how to comport (relate) towards the entities one 
finds in the world (circumspection), towards the people one encounters 
(considerateness), towards the being of entities (the sight which is directed 
upon being as such) or towards oneself (transparency). 
Transparency refers to the way in which we are directed towards ourselves, the 
way we gain access to ourselves and the way our engagement with ourselves is 
guided. An important aspect of this kind of transparency is that it is not a kind 
of reflective self-awareness19, where the self becomes the object of reflection 
(practical or theoretical). If Dasein understands itself "this understanding, this 
becoming manifest of the self, is not a self-contemplation in the sense that the 
ego would become the object of some cognition or other" (Heidegger, 1982, p. 
277). What occurs is a kind of impersonal, unitary "it is disclosed that", which 
is a form of disclosure that discloses being-in-the-world as a whole, that is, 
19 See Section 5.4.1 for a discussion of non-reflective self-awareness in relation to attunement. 
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both the individual and the world at the same time. Heidegger writes that 
"[t]he self is there for the Dasein itself without reflection and without inner 
perception, before all reflection. Reflection, in the sense of a turning back 
[reflecting on], is only a mode of self-apprehension, but not the mode of 
primary self-disclosure" (Heidegger, 1982, p. 159). 
Importantly, the non-reflective nature of self-awareness goes for inauthentic 
Dasein as well as for authentic self-awareness. Thus Heidegger writes that 
"[t]he genuine, actual, though inauthentic understanding of the self takes 
place in such a way that this self, the self of our thoughtlessly random, 
common, everyday existence, 'reflects' itself to itself from out of that to which 
it has given itself over" (Heidegger, 1982, p. 161). This is so, because Dasein 
"finds itself primarily and constantly in things because, tending them, 
distressed by them, it always in some way or other rests in things. Each one of 
us is what he pursues and cares for" (Heidegger, 1982, p. 159). For example, 
one may understand oneself in terms of one's role in life, the things one 
possesses or would like to possess, the things one likes or dislikes, and so on. 
Heidegger's claim is that this way of understanding oneself is more 
fundamental than the reflective ideas we may have about ourselves, because 
these reflective ideas are ultimately based in the non-reflective ways of being 
in the world we have. 
Thus our every-day (inauthentic) self-understanding is primarily non-
reflective. For example, when we are asked what we are doing, we can usually 
tell directly (for example, "I am trying to fix the door") without having to step 
back from ourselves and reflecting on it. We could then say that, in so far as 
we are absorbed in the things we find in the world (fixing a door, explaining 
maths to a pupil, worrying about the mortgage), we non-reflectively 
understand ourselves as absorbed in these activities. "It is as though the 
Dasein's [being] were projected by the things, by the Dasein's commerce with 
them, and not by the Dasein itself from its own most peculiar self, which 
nevertheless exists, just as it is, always as dealing with things" (Heidegger, 
1982, p. 289). That is, "[t]o understand ourselves from the things with which 
we are occupied means to project our [being] upon such features of the 
business of our everyday occupation as the feasible, urgent, indispensable, 
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expedient" (Heidegger, 1982, p. 289). So we could say that according to the 
way in which we are engaged with things our understanding of ourselves will 
be shaped by those things. Dasein tends to understand itself "from out of that 
to which it has given itself over" (Heidegger, 1982, p. 161). 
So the first step in the process of gaining an authentic understanding of oneself 
is to be non-reflectively aware of the way in which we understand ourselves in 
the first place, inauthentically, in terms of the activities and the things we are 
engaged with. That is, we understand ourselves in terms of our engagement 
with those things, but what is lacking is that we are aware of the very process 
of understanding ourselves in terms of those things. So the question becomes 
one of becoming aware of the process that yields our inauthentic self-
understanding. To put it differently, our understanding becomes transparent 
in our "seizing upon the full disclosedness of being-in-the-world throughout 
all the constitutive items which are essential to it, and doing so with 
understanding" (Heidegger, 1962, pp. 186-187). That is, as we "seize upon" 
(become aware of) "the full disclosedness of being-in-the-world" (the way we 
understand the things in the world as well as ourselves), we become aware of 
ourselves as we are. This is transparency: "Dasein is revealed to itself in its 
current factical ability-to-be, and in such a way that Dasein is this revealing 
and being-revealed" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 355). 
If we are then to characterize the process of going from understanding oneself 
in terms of one's engagement with these entities (where one understands 
oneself as a ready-to-hand or present-at-hand entity) to understanding oneself 
in terms of the very process of projection itself (where one understands oneself 
as the finite process of projection), we can see that it is a process of withdrawal 
from one's absorption in the entities one finds in the world. Such a withdrawal 
from one's absorption in the world corresponds with the first part of the dual 
movement of "turning away from the world" and "turning back" I described in 
Chapter 3. In the next section I will look at the second part, the "turning 
back", but before that I will need to further specify the movement of 
withdrawal. 
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As I said earlier, authentic Dasein has a sense of itself as "thrown projection", a 
kind of free-floating process that has no substantial basis, that is finite, and 
that understands things, including itself, where "understanding" means that it 
can direct itself towards these things, have access to them and be guided in its 
engagement with them by this understanding. Authentic understanding, in 
contrast to inauthentic understanding, is the possibility that all this awakens 
to itself, becomes transparent to itself. The process of withdrawal from one's 
absorption in the things one encounters in the world is a process of not 
projecting the entities one understands onto the being of entities as projected 
but projecting them onto temporality itself. Temporality projects itself and 
does not require anything to be projected onto. The withdrawal is, therefore, 
one of not projecting the being of entities or of oneself, but of allowing the 
entities to project onto temporality itself. However, this process needs then to 
be further characterized as one of ceasing to project the being of entities, given 
that the, inauthentic, starting point of the process of becoming authentic 
begins with the projection of the being of entities in inauthentic 
understanding. 
We can, therefore, say that the process of withdrawal needs to be understood, 
not in the sense of a "drawing in" or "drawing back", but of the cessation of the 
activity of projecting, which itself begins in the cessation of the fixing and 
committing to the projection of the being of entities. This is a process of letting 
go. What withdraws is the commitment, the solidified state of being invested 
in a projection. And this process of withdrawal itself is experienced as a letting 
go of what is being projected as soon as it is being projected. That is, the mode 
of authentic understanding begins with one experiencing oneself as the on-
going process of projection that is not brought to a halt by the fixing of a 
particular projection in one's commitment to it. In other words, being 
absorbed in the entities one finds in the world consists in fixing the being of 
those entities and committing to the way in which these are fixed. And 
refraining from this fixing and committing means that the projections, though 
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they may still come20, are allowed to go as well. This exposes understanding as 
a process. 
Such a letting go of the being of entities that is being projected does, as was 
said, have to begin from a position where the being of an entity has been 
committed to and has become fixed. What this means is that the process of 
committing and fixing, of being committed and fixed, itself has to become 
transparent as such. This happens when the mode of being fixed is itself 
disclosed as essentially a process (an iterative process) of projection and when 
the being that is thus fixed is itself disclosed as possibility rather than 
something actual. In other words, the understanding has to be one of oneself as 
projecting the understanding of being in question, so that what is initially 
experienced as fixed is now experienced as being the result of an iterative 
process of projection. And this particular projection of an understanding of 
being then becomes transparent as just one possible projection out of many, 
where the other (possible but not actual) projections are given as possibility. 
This discloses the projection of the being of the entity as just that, a possibility 
and a projection. "Seeing" this will result in the letting go of the fixed 
understanding of being that is being projected, so that the process of 
projecting can henceforth be experienced as a process. 
We now have a characterization of the first part of the process of becoming 
authentic in the domain of understanding. It is the dissolution of an 
understanding of the being of an entity as fixed into an understanding of the 
being of this entity as a process of projection, where this projection is itself of a 
possibility. This dissolution happens when the process that fixes and commits 
becomes self-aware as being a process of possibility. The starting point of this, 
what triggers it, may arise internally or come from without the process of 
understanding, for example, when it is pointed out to the individual that what 
appears to them as the fixed being of an entity is actually an iterative process 
of projecting the being of the entity. At any rate, the process begins with 
something breaking through the repetitive process of projection that fixes 
20Strictly speaking, Heidegger would say that the projections in the authentic mode come as 
possibility rather than actual projections. 
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one's understanding of the being of an entity. In Chapter 6 I will look in detail 
at this moment of breaking through. 
4.3.2 Seizing the moment 
In the previous section we saw how, as Dasein becomes aware of itself as, 
among other things, a process of understanding that is based on projection, it 
gives up fixing and committing to the being of entities as it has projected that 
being. This dual movement of non-reflective self-awareness (which Heidegger 
calls transparency) and letting go was also characterized as a process of 
withdrawing from one's absorption in the entities one finds in the world. This, 
I said, corresponds with the aspect of "turning away from the world" which 
was, in the chapter on Heidegger's notion of authenticity, identified as part of 
authenticity. In that chapter a second aspect of authenticity was identified as 
"turning back" to the world, in the sense that the whole of authenticity was 
characterized as a "turning away from the world" and "turning back". I will 
now briefly look at the "turning back" part. This will require less space than 
our account of "turning away", because it follows naturally out of that first 
movement. 
What happens is that, as Dasein becomes aware of itself as a process of 
understanding that projects the being of entities as possibility, with every 
projection there is the possibility of understanding the being of the entity 
Dasein encounters in that projection. That is, as Dasein is aware of projecting 
the being of an entity, that projection offers Dasein a way of grasping, 
understanding, the entity. But the entity, as understood in terms of the being 
which Dasein has projected, is also still understood against the backdrop of the 
process of understanding itself (temporality), because that process itself has 
become transparent (self-aware). Therefore, while Dasein grasps the entity in a 
projected understanding, it does not become absorbed in the entity. This is 
then enables the kind of authentic learning as modification and growth we 
looked at in Section 4.2.3. 
This wider awareness of its own temporality within which the being of the 
entity is projected Heidegger calls "the situation". One could say that it is a 
kind of expanded awareness (one that includes the process of understanding 
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being aware itselP1) within which a narrower context of awareness exists. This 
narrower context of awareness Heidegger calls "circumstances" [Lage,], which 
is the situation as it is given through tradition and culture. That is, one's 
understanding of an entity is based in one's personal experience, culture or 
tradition (das Man), because whenever one projects the being of an actual 
entity, this being is mediated through das Man. But while this is a necessary 
limitation of any kind of understanding of being one may project, it is still 
possible to project it within a wider kind of awareness, the awareness of the 
process of understanding itself as temporality. That is, despite the refusal to 
fix and commit, the entity is understood as a certain kind of entity (having a 
certain kind of being), in such a way that there is an actual understanding of 
the entity. This is the moment where Dasein "turns back" to the world, 
engages with things, acts, takes a stand, and so on. 
Heidegger calls this moment of engagement "the instant" [Augenblick, also 
translated as "moment of vision"]. Augenblick is both a moment in time (the 
moment at which one takes an entity as having a certain kind of being) and a 
certain perspective on the situation (Augenblick consisting of the words for 
"eye" and "view" or "look" and thus signifies a certain view of the situation). It 
is, therefore, the moment at which the situation is viewed in a certain way. It 
"is that which, arising from resoluteness, has an eye first of all and solely for 
what constitutes the situation of action" (Heidegger, 1982, p. 287). But, though 
a certain perspective has been adopted, the wider non-reflective awareness of 
oneself as temporality, as the process of understanding, is hereby not 
relinquished. "It is the mode of resolute [authentic] existence in which the 
Dasein, as being-in-the-world, holds and keeps the world in view" (Heidegger, 
1982, p. 287). And this means that Dasein does not get absorbed in the entities 
it is dealing with, Dasein does not get lost in das Man again, even as it engages 
with the entity in terms that derive necessarily from das Man. 
As Dasein settles for the being of an entity, it does so in good faith. Heidegger 
calls this "holding-for-true", and one could say that it is a form of taking 
21 Note that this is not a contradiction, as non-reflective awareness can, contrary to reflective 
awareness, be simultaneously aware of both itself and that which it is aware of. 
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something as the entity it is to the best of one's ability to determine this. This is 
not a kind of relativism but an acknowledgement of the fact that at the level of 
the being of entities there is no higher court that one's immediate 
understanding of that being22. But, as has been said before, this understanding 
does not become fixed: "[t]he certainty of the [authentic understanding] 
signifies that one holds oneself free for the possibility of taking it back" 
(Heidegger, 1962, p. 355). And this in turn means, as we also saw earlier, that 
the process of projecting an understanding of being continues: "this holding-
for-true, as a resolute holding-oneself-free for taking back, is authentic 
resoluteness which resolves to keep repeating itself' (Heidegger, 1962, p. 355). 
So we have the situation where Dasein "simply cannot become rigid as regards 
the situation, but must understand that the resolution, in accordance with its 
own meaning as disclosure, must be held open and free for the current factical 
possibility" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 355). This does, however, not mean that 
Dasein does not take responsibility for its actions. On the contrary, because 
Dasein has not become absorbed in the public, anonymous understanding of 
the situation as it is given by das Man, it can and will take full responsibility, a 
responsibility it would otherwise quite easily be able to shrug off, as it would 
be able to pass on the responsibility for understanding the situation by saying 
that this is "how one tends to understand it" or "how it is always understood". 
With regard to the process of learning the authentic "turning back" to the 
world I have considered in this section, we can conclude that this process is 
very much the same process as that of the "turning away from the world" I 
discussed in the previous section: it is the process of understanding becoming 
transparent to itself and of letting go the understanding of being that is being 
projected, as a result of which an understanding of being will be projected as 
possibility in a way that one holds oneself free for the possibility of taking it back 
and that resolves to keep repeating itself. We saw that the very beginning of this 
involves a moment of "breaking through", which I will look at in more detail in 
22 Note that all scientific methods available to determine the truth of something already imply 
an understanding of the being of the entity the truth of which is being established, which 
means that it is logically impossible for such methods to establish the being of an entity. 
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Chapter 6. I have also briefly touched on the idea that this kind of non-
reflective awareness is one that is greater than and encompasses the awareness 
one may have of an object, and I will look at this aspect in more depth in the 
next chapter. Finally, we saw that this kind of authentic understanding, even 
though it contains the elements of taking back and repetition, enables one to be 
resolute in one's actions and take responsibility for them. 
4.4 The process of understanding learning to be authentic 
We are now in a position to recap the process of understanding learning to be 
authentic. It begins with inauthentic understanding, when Dasein understands 
itself non-reflectively from out of the entities it is engaged with (and does so in 
terms of practical and/or theoretical entities) and understands these entities 
from out of its understanding of itself: Dasein's self-understanding is projected 
onto the entities it is engaged with, just as the being of these entities is 
projected by Dasein itself. 
This state of affairs is then "broken through", which occurs because 
understanding finds itself face-to-face with something it notices it cannot 
possibly resolve, because a certain affective disposition arises (See Chapter 5), 
or because of a communication by another Dasein (See Chapter 6). This 
awakens a sense of the limitations of Dasein's current understanding, as well 
as a sense that these limitations are self-imposed and, as such, may conceal 
possible other ways of understanding. This begins two, reciprocally related, 
mutually reinforcing, processes: a "letting go" of existing projections and an 
increasing non-reflective awareness of the process of projecting itself. 
In terms of letting go of the projections, there is, as a first step, the cessation 
of the activity offi.  xing and committing to the projection of the being of entities. 
This is a letting go of what is being projected as fixed as soon as it is being 
projected. As a result, Dasein experiences itself as the on-going process of 
projection that is not brought to a halt by the fixing of a particular projection 
in its commitment to it. Also, this process becomes self-aware as being a 
process of possibility, as any actual projections are experienced as occurring 
within a process that is more fundamental than these projections themselves, 
and that could, therefore, also yield other projections. 
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In terms of Dasein becoming non-reflectively aware of its projections, there is 
again a reciprocally related process that drives it (as it were, a sub-process that 
is part of the overall process). It starts with either Dasein becoming aware of 
how it tends to understand itself in terms of the activities and the things it is 
engaged with, or with Dasein becoming aware of how it understands the 
entities it encounters in the world in terms of itself. Dasein begins to 
understand that both of these comprise a limitation, and that they are mutually 
reinforcing. What is more, to the extent that Dasein is more aware of itself as 
projecting the being of entities, it becomes more aware of how it understands 
itself in terms of the being of the entities it projects, and vice versa. 
The awareness of understanding itself in terms of the entities it finds in the 
world gives Dasein the notion of the possibility of understanding itself in 
terms of itself for the first time in an authentic way (before it will have 
understood this possibility inauthentically), as a process of projection, with the 
result that Dasein is directed towards itself, gains access to itself and is guided in 
its engagement with itself by the process of projecting (temporality), rather 
than by the projections. It also gives Dasein the notion of understanding the 
entities it finds in the world in terms of temporality. The result of this is that 
Dasein ceases to fix and commit to the projection of the being of itself, in a 
process of letting go. 
With these two, the process of letting go and that of becoming non-reflectively 
self-aware, we have the mutually reinforcing process of understanding 
becoming authentic. Dasein projects its self-understanding onto temporality, it 
projects it onto its own being and, thus, understands itself in terms of its own 
being and not in terms of the entities it encounters in the world. This 
temporality discloses understanding itself as a free-floating and finite process 
of projection. Authentic Dasein has a sense of itself as "thrown projection", a 
kind of free-floating process that has no substantial basis, that is limited, and 
that understands things, including itself, by projecting the thing it 
understands onto an understanding of the being of that thing. At the same 
time, authentic Dasein understands that "letting go" of any projection of itself 
and things in the world is the only way it has to understand things in a true 
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way, where this "letting go" is experienced as a kind of existential death that 
leaves behind only openness (the possibility of being affected). 
When this process is complete, Dasein understands itself and the things in the 
world in terms of temporality and no longer in terms of the entities it 
encounters in the world. Temporality projects itself and does not require 
anything to be projected onto, it temporalizes itself in a kind of impersonal, 
unitary "it is disclosed that", which is a form of disclosure that discloses being-
in-the-world as a whole, that is, both the individual and the world at the same 
time. This kind of non-reflective awareness is one that is greater than and 
encompasses the awareness one may have of an object. It is experienced as an 
impersonal "there is understanding", which is an experience of the absence of 
the separation between a subject and an object pole of experience. 
The being of the entities Dasein finds in the world is first projected onto 
temporality, which constitutes a pure contact with the entities, before there is 
either a practical or a theoretical engagement with them. When it concerns an 
entity with the nature of Dasein itself, this results in authentic being-with, a 
kind of communion where the other is experienced as one with Dasein and as 
an end in itself (See Chapter 6). This understanding will be different in 
actuality from the earlier understanding (which was based in inauthentic 
disclosure) in that the other Dasein will no longer appear as either a practical 
or theoretical entity. 
Where it concerns other entities, these become understood, in so far as it is 
necessary to engage with them practically of theoretically, in accordance with 
the situation as a whole. "Getting an entity right" means taking it as the kind 
of entity it is appropriate to take it as, relevant to the situation and the entity 
itself, grasping the being of the entity, as a ready-to-hand entity, a present-at-
hand one, or an entity like Dasein. Any actual understanding of a concrete 
situation is characterized by a readiness to "take back" and by "repetition", 
resulting in a stance towards entities (both Dasein itself and other entities) 
that can be full of resolve and that takes full responsibility for itself and the 
actions that flow from it. The entity will be understood in a way that is capable 
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of returning to the entity in itself and of then "taking a stand" on that entity 
that is genuinely Dasein's own. 
4.5 Educational consideration 
4.5.1 Relation with the main theories of learning 
If we now return briefly to the presuppositions I claimed were shared by the 
theories of learning I considered in Chapter 2, we can see how the process of 
understanding becoming transparent and of letting go one's understanding of 
being relates to these theories of learning. I said that, for these theories of 
learning, learning is a process of growth, increased integration and 
differentiation, which tends towards increased rigidity, where learning is 
always a modification of the existing way of being of the learner, and where 
learning always involves an intentional object, with there being some sort of a 
separation between the subject and the object. I will look at these in turn in 
relation to the process of understanding becoming authentic. 
We can reconcile learning as a process of modification and growth with the 
process of letting go, if we stick to the notion of understanding itself (and not 
just the learning that leads to the understanding) being a process. Though a 
full elaboration of this point would require more space, I can set it out in very 
broad terms. Viewing understanding itself as a process is, indeed, one way of 
interpreting Piaget's notion of understanding, which can be said to imply that 
understanding does not consist of a representation but of an intentional act 
which is carried out in a specific way, where the act is "built up" or re-
constituted again every time the understanding manifests in relation to a 
specific object. This notion of understanding as process is also compatible with 
the neurological notion of neurons that fire together wiring together, in that 
the structure of such neuronal acts as they repeat themselves is also one of a 
process taking shape. From this perspective, the process of letting go would 
simply mean that an understanding was not re-constituted in relation to the 
entity in relation to which it was originally constructed. This same process of 
understanding could then be re-constituted in relation to the entity at a later 
point, with the result that it would possibly grow and be modified as a result of 
this renewed engagement. The decision whether or not to re-constitute the 
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understanding would be the initial moment of "decision", Heidegger's "moment 
of vision" when the entity was or was not taken as a practical or theoretical 
object. 
Where this is a notable difference, though, is that the process of understanding 
becoming authentic is itself not one of increased integration, differentiation 
and rigidity. On the contrary there is a dissolution of any established 
integration and differentiation and with it of rigidity. I said that this 
dissolution was based in a mechanism of increased transparency (non-reflective 
self-awareness) and letting go, where the increased transparency discloses the 
existing integration and differentiation as processal and based in possibility, 
which leads to a letting go of some of that integration and differentiation, 
which in turn increases the transparency, which in turn leads to more letting 
go, and so on. It is, therefore, in many ways the opposite process to the one 
that is described in the theories of learning we have been looking at. But it is 
not merely a process of dissolving what has been constituted, because this 
dissolving makes way for, liberates, awakens a wider understanding, that of 
understanding itself as finite temporality, within which the processes of 
integration and differentiation described by the theories of learning take place. 
We can, therefore, speak of a genuine expansion of awareness. 
I also suggested that there was in the main theories of learning the 
presupposition that learning is always a modification of the existing way of 
being of the learner. This is true for the process of letting go and 
understanding becoming transparent as well, in the sense that the starting 
point is the inauthentic state of the learner, where there is a fixed 
understanding of the being of an entity and a commitment to it having that 
being. What is more, because the process of understanding as a process of 
projection lies at the heart of inauthentic understanding just as it does at the 
heart of authentic understanding, there is a sense of continuity with regard to 
understanding itself, in that it remains based on projection in both the 
inauthentic and the authentic mode. But the process of learning to become 
authentic itself, as a process of letting go, though beginning with inauthentic 
understanding, is essentially discontinuous, in that the end result (Dasein 
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experiencing itself as openness) cannot be said to be a modification of the initial 
state of there being a certain understanding of being. 
What is more, the moment when the individual resolves on the being of an 
entity after having let go of their previous understanding of it, it is hard to 
imagine what the way of being of the authentic individual is other than 
nothingness. As we saw earlier in this chapter, the being of the individual is 
usually closely connected to the understanding they have of the being of the 
entity or entities they are engaging with, and in that context it makes sense 
that learning is based in the existing way of being of the learner. In the case of 
not yet having decided on the being of the entity involved, as we saw in the 
previous point, there is, as yet, not a definite way of taking the entity, and with 
such an absence of a way of taking the entity, the next moment, that of 
resolving on the being of the entity, cannot be said to be a modification of 
one's earlier way of being. 
I said that, according to the main theories I discussed in Chapter 2, learning 
always includes an intentional object, with there being some sort of a 
separation between the subject and the object. It has become clear in this 
chapter that this is not the case in relation to the process of learning to be 
authentic, which is one of non-reflective self-awareness, an awareness that does 
not have an object as such and where the entity that is learning coincides 
with what it is learning about. What is more, since the process is one of letting 
go, there is an initial object (at ti) but not one at t2. This is different from 
what happens in the learning as described in the main theories of learning 
where the initial object (at ti) is transformed into a second object (at t2), as 
when rain turns from being understood as the angels emptying their watering 
cans (at ti) to being understood as air cooling off and shedding some of its 
H2O (at t2), in which cases there is something like an aspect shift and not a 
transition to authentic understanding. Importantly, the experience of this 
230ther than perhaps in a purely formal sense, if we assume that all awareness is awareness of 
something and thus has to have a formal object, but this would not invalidate that in the 
phenomenological sense such non-reflective self-awareness has no object. 
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letting go of an understanding of being is experienced as discontinuity and as a 
falling away rather than the transformation of an existing object. 
We have in this section seen that the process of understanding becoming 
authentic is different in most, if not all, respects from the processes we found 
in some of the main theories of learning. In Chapter 7 I will consider whether 
the two accounts are compatible and can be merged so as to provide one 
account of authentic learning. 
4.5.2 Implications for the way education conceives of the learner 
In the next two chapters I will put more flesh on the bones of the description 
of this process of becoming authentic (which is a unitary one, even if we 
analyse it from three different perspectives), when I consider how attunement 
(which will, among other things, further clarify the mechanism by which non-
reflective self-awareness, what I called transparency in this chapter, can 
actually spread) and being-with (which will give us, among other things, the 
mechanism by which a breaking through to Das ein as process can happen) 
become authentic. But even before we have the whole of the process in view, 
we can consider, in tentative terms, some further educational implications of 
what has been discussed in this chapter. 
4.5.2.1 The pupil is understood as a theoretical entity 
From the perspective of educational policy the learner (and the educator) is a 
present-at-hand (theoretical) entity. That is, the learner shows up in policy as 
a theoretical entity, one that has properties and relations, and that is treated as 
such. What we have seen over the past years is that the theoretical conception 
of the learner has encroached ever further towards the centre of educational 
practice. Educational policy can, per definition, only conceive of the pupil and 
the teacher as theoretical entities, as a result of the general and abstract nature 
of policy. Such policy then reaches educational practice in various ways: 
directives aimed at head teachers, the school inspectorate, educational targets 
and league tables. The teacher is then forced or encouraged to look at the 
individual learner through the categories supplied by the policy maker, they 
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are asked to identify pupils with special educational needs, gifted students, and 
so on, and to treat them respectively. 
The first question this raises is what tensions such a way of conceiving of the 
learner as a theoretical entity creates. And, indeed, there is a constant stream 
of complaints from those actually involved with the pupils that policies fail to 
do justice to certain pupils as only certain aspects are measured in the 
assessment of their learning; that the targets impoverish the actual teaching 
and learning that occurs; that certain well-meant policies miss their aim, 
because their general nature fails to do justice to the actual context they apply 
to, and so on. We could say that such a theoretical approach to pupils is by 
many in education experienced as a miss-match with the actual pupil they are 
dealing with, thus hampering good practice. 
But if we consider the matter carefully, we would have to conclude that such 
theoretical conceptions of pupils also have many benefits, at least potentially, 
in that it may help getting the right resources to the right pupils, by 
identifying them as in need of them; it can also help practitioners identify 
certain needs or risks, for example by alerting them to certain symptoms in 
students that may point towards them having these needs or running these 
risks; it may bring to light certain correlations that are only visible through a 
statistical lens directed at a large population, for example by statistically 
identifying a link between certain early experiences and academic success in 
later life. So the issue is not that the theoretical perspective on the pupil has no 
place in education, but that it needs to be applied in the right way. 
What has been argued in this chapter is that the pupil, as Dasein, is not 
primarily a theoretical entity, and needs to be engaged with first of all as an 
entity with the nature of Dasein. From within such an engagement with the 
pupil it may then become clear that a certain theoretical perspective is called 
for in relation to a certain aspect of the pupil's being (for example to gain 
access to funds available for pupils with special educational needs, or to help 
assess whether the pupil is ready to go on to another school). But such a 
perspective should always be embedded within an approach that takes them as 
an entity with the nature of Dasein. In terms of educational practice this means 
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that, first of all, the educator needs to be able to treat the pupil as a Dasein 
and, secondly, it has to be primarily the educator who decides when and where 
a theoretical perspective is called for, which means that they need an 
understanding of the theoretical perspectives that could be potentially 
relevant. 
There is a further consequence of the increasing prevalence of the theoretical 
perspective in educational practice, which is that increasingly the pupil is 
taught to look at him or herself in a theoretical way, thinking of themselves as 
being a certain kind of student (with certain properties and relations), being at 
certain levels of achievement in relation to certain targets, and so on. This 
internalization of the theoretical perspective on the part of the pupil is a 
corollary to the way they are approached in education, but increasingly there is 
the active teaching of such a theoretical view of oneself. Again, there are many 
potential benefits to such an approach, for example in the areas of 
metacognition and self-assessment, where it can give the pupil greater 
ownership of their learning processes and a better understanding of the 
criteria against they will be assessed. But again the issues arise that the 
theoretical perspective is a derivative one and should, therefore, not be the 
primary one. What is more, in certain domains of life the theoretical 
perspective simply misses the entity that it is trying to capture, for example in 
relation to learning to be good, happy, creative, inspired, loving, and so on, 
where no amount of conformity to the "characteristics" of a person with those 
qualities can ever bring about those qualities (even though it may fool some 
into thinking it does). Consequently, any attempt to teach and assess those in a 
way that takes the pupil as a theoretical entity will do more harm than good. 
It should be noted, however, that many, if not most, of the objections educators 
have against the theoretical perspective stem from concerns that understand 
the pupil as a practical (ready-to-hand) entity rather than as an entity with the 
nature of Dasein. That is, if the test says that the pupil should be in set X, the 
objection to following the test recommendation will usually be practical, for 
example, that in terms of temperament the pupil fits better in set Y. Similarly, 
the policy-derived decision to teach content X will probably be criticized, if it 
is, on grounds such as that it was poorly attuned with the needs, previous 
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learning or interests of the pupils. In other words, though many educators are 
critical of the limitations of the theoretical perspective discussed in this 
section, much of the criticism is based in, often quite legitimate, practical 
considerations. However, it should also be noted that the theoretical 
perspective can help break practical traditions that are deeply engrained, 
experienced by many as natural, but shown through research to be detrimental 
to the child (for example, when it is shown that collaborative learning has 
many advantages and some of the individualism is taken out of traditional 
educational practice). I will now turn to these practical considerations. 
4.5.2.2 The pupil is understood as a practical entity 
Though it does not meet with the same kind of opposition from educational 
practitioners as does the theoretical perspective, taking the pupil as a practical 
entity too has many pitfalls. Indeed the tradition of educational practice, as it 
is handed down from generation to generation, by and large takes the pupil as 
a practical entity. This is education in the sense of "the way in which one deals 
with a pupil", and it ranges from diverting a crying child's attention to 
something funny to make them stop crying, through sending a teenager to an 
outdoor pursuit camp to get them away from their games console, through 
ensuring that a class is silent before starting the lesson, to physically 
restraining a violent pupil. As with the theoretical perspective, these can be 
beneficial. More than that: it is hard to envisage an educational practice that 
would not avail itself extensively of this practical perspective. The on-the-job 
training of trainee teachers is, for example, a clear acknowledgement that 
policymakers take the pupil primarily as a practical entity. 
In terms of the theories of learning we have been looking at, such practical 
perspectives on the pupil result in what I have been calling learning as 
modification and growth. To put it differently, what the pupil does as a result of 
being taken as a practical entity they will be more likely24 to do again, either in 
relation to the entities they find in the world or in relation to themselves. For 
24 The fact that we have to talk about likelihood in this context is not because the child is 
taken as fundamentally a theoretical (statistical) entity but because what someone will do as a 
result of previous experiences is never pre-determined. 
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example, a child who is being sung to when they are afraid may learn to "self-
soothe" in later life by humming to themselves or even just calming 
themselves down by activating the same inner state as was first activated when 
they were sung to. This example highlights the importance of getting right 
the kind of education that takes the child as a practical entity, because the same 
child may be calmed down by putting some whiskey in their milk, thus making 
a life of alcohol abuse that much more likely. 
One of the main thrusts of educational critiques of the practical perspective on 
the pupil has usually come in the guise of a critique of instrumentalism (see, for 
example, Ball, 2004; Gur-Ze'ev, 2002), where the pupil is shaped (by engaging 
with him or her as a practical entity) in a way that is believed to result in a 
benefit for either other people than the child itself (like the community or the 
state) or a future conception of the child itself. For example, teaching a child to 
be a good office worker is usually an aim in a society where office workers are 
needed for the economy and where being an office worker is seen as a route to 
economic security for the individual involved. Apart from the principled 
critique of such instrumentalism that it takes the child as an instrument where 
it never should be (for example, from a Kantian perspective where the 
individual is taken as an end in itself), there is the criticism that such ways of 
educating the child may alienate the child from itself (Is this child not an artist 
at heart rather than an office worker?) and that they risk subordinating the 
interests of the child to that of the provider of the education (Yes, the state 
needs office workers, but would this child not be more secure economically if it 
did something else?). 
An alternative way of looking at this critique of instrumentalism is that it is 
not so much the case that an instrumental approach alienates some children 
from themselves in some respects, but that it alienates all children from 
themselves, because there is, according to this notion of the individual, 
something inherently alienating in such an instrumental approach. At the basis 
of such a critique lies the idea that an individual has in themselves the 
potential to find their own "shape" and that such finding one's own shape is 
part of what it is to lead a flourishing life. Consequently, any attempt to shape 
them per definition alienates them from this potential to find their own 
137 
"shape". This version of the critique of instrumentalism comes close to 
Heidegger's notion of Dasein as being an end in itself, though most such 
accounts will fall back on the kind of "finding one's true self' which we saw, in 
Section 3.6.3, does not amount to the radical notion of the self as we find in 
Heidegger, but tends to take the self as some kind of substance, like a soul. 
Any categorical rejections of reward and punishment in the context education 
will usually fall under this kind of critique. 
So what is the practical perspective on the child that does justice to its 
fundamental nature as an entity with the nature of Dasein? It appears that 
there simply is no substitute for the educator taking the child primarily as an 
entity with the nature of Dasein in the actual engagement with the child as it 
happens, because only then will they get the "situation", as I called it in Section 
4.3.2, for their practical decisions right (the context, in this case, being the 
child itself, because it can be understood in terms of itself only). When we then 
consider that the theoretical perspective is based in the practical one, and that 
the introduction of the theoretical perspective is in this context a practical act, 
we begin to see the primary importance of getting the relation between the 
perspective on the pupil as a practical entity and as an entity with the nature of 
Dasein right. 
4.5.2.3 The Pupil is understood as an entity with the nature of Dasein itself 
If we take the practical perspective (which, I have claimed, has priority over 
the theoretical perspective) together with the perspective on the child as an 
entity with the nature of Dasein, the primary consideration becomes one of 
whether the child is behaving in a way that is authentic or not. This is so, 
because any further learning will crucially depend on how the child 
understands the being of the entity it is engaging with, and this being, I have 
argued, can only be got right if the child has an authentic understanding of 
itself, which is to say, if it is authentic. This question is, however, not a 
theoretical or a practical one. Rather, it is expressed as a concern that the child 
be authentic and an appeal to the child's authentic self (I will elaborate on this 
in Chapter 6, when I look at authentic being-with). The ensuing engagement 
with the child will, as it were, mirror the educator's authentic self- 
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understanding, in that it will be one of on-going openness towards the child 
(taking the child as essentially possibility), one that is not brought to a close in 
a judgement about the child (or, as we will see in Chapter 6, an articulation of 
the child's being), one that is itself transparent (the teacher is non-reflectively 
self-aware of the way he or she approaches the child) and, as such, brings to 
light any fixed ways of taking things, based in commitment, on behalf of the 
child (or oneself, for that matter), for all to see as such fixed ways of taking 
things, so that they can be let go of. 
That is, the concern on the part of the educator is that of awakening an 
authentic understanding, in the pupil, of itself and the entities it finds in the 
world — where this concern itself is neither a theoretical one (based in a 
theoretical conception of how things ought to be) nor a practical one (based in 
a traditional or habitual way of being towards the pupil). Rather, the concern is 
itself based in an understanding (however imperfect and tentative it may be) of 
the possibility of the self to be authentic, in a way that is neither theoretical nor 
traditional. As a result, such a concern is itself only as genuine as the 
educator's understanding at any given point in time. The actual way of being 
of the concern is one of experiencing understanding (regardless of whose 
understanding it is) as a finite process that is capable of becoming transparent 
to itself in a way that is not reflexive but direct. 
The way authentic understanding is experienced is, as we have seen, not 
personal and this lack of personal ownership means that it is easier for the 
educator to let go of their own ways of understanding, a lack of identification 
(in the sense of fixing) that will also communicate itself to the pupil. This 
opens up the possibility of all forms of questioning and self-examination to 
freely take hold, and, in that sense, opens up the possibility of true rationality, 
as the lack of identification with the understanding one has achieved makes 
possible that this understanding gets shaped according to the criteria of reason 
rather than, say, prejudice or vested interests. But most important of all, the 
combination of increasing transparency and lack of identification with one's 
existing understanding makes possible for the pupil and the educator to let go 
of their existing understanding of the being of entities and achieve the 
openness that is part of the state of authenticity. 
139 
5 Authentic attunement 
5.1 Authentic attunement 
In this chapter I will argue that the process of coming to find oneself in an 
authentic mood is one of an increased non-reflective self-awareness, where the 
increase is the result of a spreading which starts with "staying with" the 
beginning of such non-reflective self-awareness. The change involved in this 
process is one of moving from experiencing oneself and the entities one 
encounters in the world in terms of das Man to experiencing oneself in terms 
of oneself and the entities in terms of the nothingness from which the entities 
emerge. The result of this change is the experience of oneself as 
"transcendence", and of one's relationship with things in the world as one of 
disconnection and openness, of "letting the entities be" and immediacy of 
contact with these entities. The mechanism that drives this change is that of a 
reciprocal movement of increased non-reflective self-awareness of oneself as 
transcendence and disclosure of the nothingness of the world. 
The importance of such a mood of non-reflective self-awareness that is 
characterised by disconnection and nearness to the entities it finds in the world 
is twofold. First, it is an integral part of the process of learning to be 
authentic: it brings to awareness the structure of the self; it represents a 
turning away (disconnecting) from the world; it returns Dasein to the state of 
being-possible (rather than being absorbed in any actual way of finding itself 
emotionally in the world). Second, it entails an openness to things at the level 
of mood and emotion, enabling Dasein to respond adequately to events, in so 
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far as they require responding to, because Dasein's experience of itself and the 
world has not been coloured in advance by a mood that takes it and the things 
it encounters in any particular way (other than that the possibility exists of 
taking them in certain particular ways). Third, as a mood of disconnection and 
nearness, it is pervaded by "a peculiar calm" (Heidegger, 1998b, p. 88), which is 
experienced as having the potential to respond emotionally if necessary, while 
not identifying with things in the world, so that one does not expend energy 
responding unnecessarily at an emotional level to what happens, even if one 
does act practically or theoretically. Fourth, the combination of the openness 
to things as they present themselves, the ability to "let be" the entity one 
encounters, and the possibility to respond emotionally in a way that is 
commensurate with this entity together make possible the emotional 
experiences of affection, love, and communion in an authentic way (More on 
these in Chapter 6). 
5.2 Attunement and mood 
In Chapter 3 I referred to the emotional dimension of Dasein's existence with 
the word attunement, which is a translation of the word "Befindlichkeir , the 
word Heidegger uses and which is sometimes also translated as state-of-mind 
or sofindingness. The word Befindlichkeit, itself a neologism, comes from the 
German "finding oneself" in a certain place, situation or emotional state. Thus 
one may ask, in German, "How are you finding yourself?", which would 
translate as "How are you doing?", where the notion of "finding oneself' has 
obvious spatial connotations in terms of being located in a certain place, or one 
could say, emotional space. The translation "attunement" is based in the fact 
that mood in German is called " Stimmune which is related to the notion of 
tuning an instrument and consequently of being in tune with certain things in 
a certain way. 
As we saw in Chapter 3, according to Heidegger "[m]ood has already 
disclosed, in every case, being-in-the-world as a whole, and makes it possible 
first of all to direct oneself towards something" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 176). This 
is at once the most important and perhaps most counter-intuitive aspect of a 
mood, as Heidegger uses the word. A mood, and all other ways in which 
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attunement manifests, is something that lies at the basis of, or permeates, the 
whole of one's experience. In the words of Matthew Ratcliffe, a "mood is not an 
intentional state directed at either the self or something other than the self and 
it is not a more encompassing state directed at lots of things." A mood is there 
prior to there being the experience of anything in particular. A mood does not 
"'colour' some already experienced world. It is what opens up a world in the 
first place; it is through moods that we find ourselves in a world" (Ratcliffe, 
2008, p. 48)25. 
We can contrast being in a certain mood with having certain feelings about 
something, where the feelings we have about something do imply a separation 
between the one having the feelings and the entity they have the feelings 
about. Being in a certain mood, in contrast, means that one experiences both 
oneself and the world one finds oneself in as coloured by this mood. It will be 
assumed in the rest of this chapter that even a feeling that is directed towards 
a particular thing, a person, an object, or something like "life", is based in 
attunement. As was explained in Chapter 3, even a feeling that is directed 
towards a particular entity reveals both oneself (say, as amused) and the entity 
of is intending (say, as amusing) in a certain light. I will look at this in more 
detail as we go along. 
Importantly, for Heidegger a basic mood is what makes possible for certain 
things to come to one's notice rather than other things: Tilt is a condition of 
possibility for any specifically directed intentional state" (Ratcliffe, 2008, p. 
48). We are familiar with this kind of phenomenon in that we may say that one 
25Note that by interpreting anxiety as a mood where there is no separation between the 
experiencer and what is experienced, I am ignoring the fact that Heidegger did sometimes 
attribute the structure of intentionality to anxiety: he sets out that Dasein is, in anxiety, 
anxious about something as well as anxious in the face of something (the nothingness of the 
world). Thus Heidegger writes that "Dasein is anxious ... about its ownmost potentiality-for-
being." (Heidegger, 1962, p. 321). Some commentators have found Heidegger's extension of 
the structure of intentionality to include attunement contrived. I agree with this assessment 
and find Ratcliffe's (2008) notion of an existential feeling as unitary more appropriate. 
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needs to be in the right mood to understand a joke or to be receptive to certain 
kinds of music, that is, our mood either first makes it possible to hear a joke or 
be touched by a work of art or we may be brought in the right mood for jokes 
or art by initially being exposed to "a bit of a joke or "a bit of art. This can 
then lead to a mutually reinforcing cycle of first being exposed to "a bit of a 
joke, to then getting in the mood for jokes, as a result of which one hears the 
funny side of more things, which increases one's jocular mood, and so on. We 
will see in our discussion of the process of attunement learning to be authentic 
how there too there is such a positive feedback loop (reciprocity) that drives 
the process of learning to be authentic. 
What happens to such basic moods is in education as important as the faculty 
of understanding I considered in the previous chapter. An example of a basic 
mood would be that of a pupil, let's say a boy, who generally experiences the 
world as a hostile place. In such a case the pupil finds (experiences) himself, at a 
basic level, as being under threat in a world that is potentially very hostile. 
That is, his basic feeling about life in general includes the experience of a 
world that is threatening, even if this basic feeling is not usually experienced 
consciously. This basic feeling then discloses the world as inhabited by 
potentially hostile people and situations and probably, if he is not entirely 
traumatised, this is counterbalanced by the sense that there are also some 
people and situations that can protect him, like the friends he trusts, certain 
clothes and other possessions that make him feel confident, as well as ways in 
which he can momentarily escape the unpleasant sense of living in a hostile 
world, such as doing sports or going fishing, escaping in entertainment 
(playing video games, perhaps) or drinking alcopops. But apart from disclosing 
the world and the things that fill it in a certain way, this same basic feeling 
discloses himself as a certain kind of entity, one that is, in this case, essentially 
vulnerable, in need of protection and the occasional escape, one that perhaps 
needs to build up defences, remain alert to threats, hone his skills of defence 
and attack, and so on. In short, he finds the world as both threatening and 
providing shelter, and himself as both vulnerable and to some extent capable of 
looking after himself, where a constant effort is being made to minimise the 
former and strengthen the latter. Thus a mood is defined in terms of its 
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possibilities: where threat is a possibility, security also is, where being hurt is a 
possibility, as well as defending himself. 
There are several ways in which mood, in the way it is used here, is relevant in 
education. I will briefly mention two examples here. The first is that the way 
of being in the world, of being attuned, which an individual "picks up" in early 
life may well persist even if what caused it has disappeared in fact. To return 
to our example, even though the actual threats that made the pupil feel 
vulnerable in the first place have in actual fact disappeared (for example, the 
hostile stepfather has moved out), the pupil still experiences the world as 
threatening and himself as vulnerable. A tragic example of this phenomenon is 
that of the child who has been abused and in later life finds it impossible to 
establish deep, trusting relationships because he or she is stuck in a mood that 
takes the other human being as a possible abuser, themselves as a possible 
abused and the world in general as a place that does not provide protection 
against abuse from those close to one. This phenomenon may be referred to as 
"internalisation", where it is believed the circumstances of one's upbringing are 
internalised, with the result that one structures one's experiences in line with 
such internalised expectations. 
The second example of the importance of attunement in education is that of 
the kind of mood that is conveyed through education itself, in such a way that 
the pupil adopts it as a more or less permanent one. An educational experience 
that is, for example, characterised by reward and punishment may well instil in 
the pupil, if it is done over a long enough time, a basic sense that "life" 
sometimes punishes or rewards one and that one is oneself subject to such 
reward and punishment, where one's actions may attain a quality of seeking 
(reward) and avoiding (punishment), where one may perceptually structure a 
situation one enters for the first time in terms of possible reward and 
punishment, and so on. Being assessed, competing, being tied to a schedule, 
deferring to an authoritative figure (the teacher), being part of a group (the 
class) are other examples of "moods" that tend to be instilled into the pupil. 
The basic mood of the educational experience has been much commented on, 
for example in discussions of "the hidden curriculum" (Meighan and Siraj- 
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Blatchford, 2003, pp. 63-182), which charge that some of the deepest influence 
schooling has on the individual is through aspects of the experience that are 
not part of the stated curriculum (such as Maths and Science or social and 
emotional skills), but come with the experience of schooling itself. In Chapter 
3 we saw how we can make a fundamental distinction between discovery and 
disclosure: we may discover something (as one possibility among many other 
given possibilities), and we may disclose something (revealing what kinds of 
things are possible in the first place). With regard to mood, we would make a 
similar distinction. On the one hand, one may discover that different moods are 
possible: thus the victim of abuse may discover that it is possible to trust 
adults after all, where before they had experienced that kind of trust only, for 
example, in the company of animals or when immersed in a novel. On the other 
hand, and this is the kind of thing I am after in this chapter, the very 
possibility of mood itself may be disclosed, where this disclosure of mood as 
such discloses the possibilities of both inauthentic and authentic mood. What 
such a disclosure involves will be become clear in the remainder of this 
chapter. 
5.3 Moods of authenticity 
Before I look at the process of moving from an inauthentic to an authentic 
mood, I will look at Heidegger's description of the mood that goes with 
authentic existence. This will give me the mode of being which learning to be 
authentic should result in, at least in so far as attunement is concerned. This 
mood of authenticity has been given different names at different times by 
Heidegger. In Being and Time it is existential angst, usually translated as 
anxiety, a state where, according to Heidegger, Dasein experiences itself "as it 
really is", i.e. authentically. It should be noted, though, that other basic moods 
have been suggested by Heidegger as the defining moods of authentic 
existence. In the 1929-1930 course The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics 
(Heidegger, 1995a) Heidegger singled out boredom and after 1930 "Heidegger 
became reluctant to identify one fundamental, defining mood; even so, we find 
that in his later thinking he gave greater attention to 'awe' (die Scheu) and 
`astonishment' (das Erstaunen) in describing the prevailing affective disposition 
of Dasein's authentic existing, thereby recalling the importance of the mood of 
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"wonder" spoken of long ago by the ancient Greek philosophers" (Capobianco, 
2007, p. 1). 
It is important to note that Heidegger gave all of the concepts that refer to the 
mood of authenticity their own specific meaning which deviated significantly 
from their ordinary meaning. For example, with respect to the concept of 
anxiety, Heidegger writes in What is Metaphysics? that "a peculiar calm 
pervades [anxiety]" (Heidegger, 1998b, p. 88), which means that anxiety does 
not share some of the characteristics of common anxiety, such as the notable 
absence of calm. What is more, anxiety is not contradictory to joy. "Along with 
the sober anxiety which brings us face to face with [authentic being] there 
goes an unshakable joy in this possibility" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 358). Also, in 
the common form of anxiety one is anxious about some, at least in principle, 
identifiable thing, whereas in the anxiety that is part of authentic existence 
there is no such determinate thing in the face of which we are anxious. That is, 
there is "indeterminateness in the face of which and concerning which we 
become anxious and  this] is no mere lack of determination but rather the 
essential impossibility of determining it26" (Heidegger, 1998b, p. 88). 
Though over time Heidegger gives different names to this authentic mood, 
they all have certain common characteristics: they disclose Dasein itself as 
transcendence, as "encompassing" both self and world; they disclose Dasein as 
individualized and as nothingness; they involve both a detachment from and an 
openness towards the things it finds in the world; they disclose Dasein as 
always being attuned, as things mattering to it, as always being in some kind 
of mood, and that it can be either inauthentic or authentic in its mood. I will 
characterise the disclosure of the possibility of mood in general Das ein's 
authentic non-reflective self-awareness. 
26 Note that this notion of the impossibility of determining what it is anxiety intends is in line 
with the notion, mooted earlier, that finding oneself does not, strictly speaking have an 
intentional object, but rather stands at the basis of how one experiences both oneself and the 
world on is in. 
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5.3.1 The authentic mood discloses Dasein as transcendence 
As we saw at the beginning of this chapter, Heidegger writes that "Mood has 
already disclosed, in every case, being-in-the-world as a whole" (Heidegger, 
1962, p. 176). That is, understood authentically a mood does not only disclose 
both self and world in a unitary way, thus making it possible for certain kinds 
of things to be discovered, it also discloses being-in-the-world as a unitary 
entity, one that comprises both self and world. Of course, we may not be aware 
of the fact that mood discloses being-in-the-world as unitary, because we are 
absorbed in the entities that are discovered within the space of being-in-the-
world, but, Heidegger would contend, this does not detract from the fact that 
mood actually discloses the unitary structure of self and world — and we will 
see in Section 5.4.1 how the notion of non-reflective self-awareness can help 
bring this aspect of mood into focus. 
Heidegger's notion of Dasein is not that of a subject as opposed to an object. 
Traditionally (for example in Kant's critical philosophy and German Idealism 
in general) one of the meanings of the word transcendence has been that of the 
subject (the ego, the soul) coming into contact with things in the world 
(objects, itself as taken in a reflexive way, other people). For Heidegger, 
however, there is not a subject first who then establishes contact with things 
in the world. Rather, Dasein itself is this process of transcendence, it is "being-
in-the-world" 27. "Transcendence is not instituted by an object coming together 
with a subject, or a thou with an I, but the Dasein itself, as 'being-a-subject', 
transcends. The Dasein as such is being-towards-itself, being-with others, and 
being-among entities handy and extant" (Heidegger, 1982, p. 301). 
One way of envisaging this notion of Dasein as being-in-the-world (a term that 
is hyphenated to indicate the unity between self and world) is, as we saw in 
Chapter 3, as openness. This openness, this open space where things can 
manifest, is there prior to there being anything like a subject or an object. This 
openness is itself transcendence, it is where self and world come together. "Self 
27 Note that this does not amount to an Idealist position, as Heidegger denies neither the 
actual existence of things in the world, nor the possibility of Dasein to have access to such 
things. 
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and world belong together in the single entity, the Dasein. Self and world are 
not two beings, like subject and object, or like I and thou, but self and world 
are the basic determination of the Dasein itself in the unity of the structure of 
being-in-the-world" (Heidegger, 1982, p. 297). Dasein's authentic mood 
discloses the unitary nature of being-in-the-world to Dasein. 
This notion of self and world belonging together goes, of course, very much 
against the common sense notion of an immanent subject which then needs 
access to things in the world - giving rise to the question as to how it is 
possible for an immanent subject to get such access and, ultimately, to 
scepticism. But Heidegger claims that phenomenologically things present 
themselves quite differently. Rather than there first being a subject that then 
seeks access to things in the world, there is first transcendence and only later 
the notion of a separate subject. "Exactly that which is called immanence in 
theory of knowledge in a complete inversion of the phenomenal facts, the 
sphere of the subject, is intrinsically and primarily and alone the transcendent" 
(Heidegger, 1982, p. 299). To try to arbitrate between these two positions 
would go far beyond the scope of this chapter, but ultimately Heidegger's 
argument rests on an awareness of what is given to experience in a 
phenomenological way, which means that at least one of the tests of its validity 
is phenomenological. It is hoped that this chapter will make enough of a 
phenomenological case for the plausibility of the notion of Dasein as being-in-
the-world, openness, transcendence. 
5.3.2 Authenticity disclosing Dasein as individualized and existing 
in nothingness 
The mood of authenticity discloses Dasein (to) itself as transcendence in a 
radical way. It discloses Dasein itself as it is in itself, prior to any involvement 
it has in das Man, that is, in Heidegger's terminology, as individualized. And it 
discloses the emptiness, the nothingness that accompanies Dasein: in the mood 
of Authenticity "man is brought before the nothing itself' (Heidegger, 1998b, 
p. 88). In Being and Time Heidegger characterises this notion of Dasein in itself 
and in relation to nothingness is with the concept of thrown projection (we already 
encountered this concept in Section 4.2.1). 
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On the one hand, authentic Dasein experiences itself as "thrown", as finding 
itself in a world (parents, siblings, a place in which it lives, a language it 
speaks, norms it is required to follow, and so on) that predates it, with a 
"personality" (things it likes and dislikes, talents and weaknesses, a 
temperament, and so on) that predates even its awareness of this "personality". 
What is more, in the mood of authenticity Dasein experiences itself as not 
being anything more basic than the being it has been thrown into. One could 
say that, in terms of being a something, Dasein finds that any "something" it is 
is purely a function of the personality and world it has found itself inhabiting, 
without there being a basis in itself for these. To return to the notion of 
becoming authentic in terms of "bringing oneself back from lostness in das 
Man" (Heidegger, 1962, pp. 312-313), one could say that Dasein finds that it is 
lost in das Man (it finds itself with a personality that has been appropriated 
from das Man and in a world which is not of its own making) and that it finds 
that apart from das Man it is not a "something", but rather openness, a 
"nothing". 
On the other hand, authentic Dasein experiences that it "exists as thrown 
Being towards its end" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 295). As we saw in Section 4.2.2, 
authentic Dasein experiences itself as "thrown towards its end", as irreducibly 
finite, to the extent that its very being becomes defined by this finitude. 
Authentic Dasein is always face to face with its own existential death, in 
Heidegger's terms "the possibility of the impossibility of all possibilities". And, 
just as authentic understanding involves an awareness of the nothingness of 
death, the mood of authenticity "puts Dasein's being-in-the-world face to face 
with the 'nothing' of the world" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 321). 
The upshot of this is that Dasein experiences itself, in the mood of authenticity 
as having nothing substantial to either fall back on (a basis in itself or in the 
world) or project itself onto (an understanding of itself). Rather, Dasein has to 
ultimately understand itself as process (temporality) in relation to 
nothingness, if it wishes to understand itself in terms of itself rather than in 
terms of das Man. Dasein in the mood of authenticity is a Dasein that is 
denuded of the sense of being something in terms of das Man, living in a world 
that is also no longer understood in terms of das Man. The Dasein from which 
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the call of conscience originates is experienced on its own and in terms of itself 
only. And this makes sense in the context of understanding the process of 
becoming authentic is one of "bringing oneself back from lostness in das Man" 
(Heidegger, 1962, pp. 312-313). 
5.3.3 Authentic mood as detachment and nearness 
It has been argued that the idea that authentic attunement "makes manifest the 
nothing" (Heidegger, 1998b, p. 88) means that Dasein experiences itself as 
individualized and as existing in the nothingness of the world. This experience 
is sometimes referred to with the word "uncanniness", which is the translation 
of the German Unheimlichkeit, which literally means "not-at-home-ness", as the 
root of the word, Heim, means home. We can see how the meaning of uncanny 
as "uncomfortably strange or unfamiliar" (SOED, 2007) fits with the idea of 
feeling "not at home" - and this is the pun Heidegger is playing on. Another 
way Heidegger has of describing this feeling of uncanniness is that of Dasein's 
experience of itself "as the 'not-at-home' — the bare 'that-it-is' in the 'nothing' 
of the world" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 321). This corresponds with the notions, I 
discussed in the previous section, of Dasein experiencing itself as 
individualized, in terms of itself (the "bare 'that it is—) and in relation to 
nothingness (the "'nothing' of the world"). 
We see how this distances the mood of authentic existence from the moods, 
described in the examples at the beginning of this chapter, of, for example, 
feeling under threat in a potentially hostile world or feeling curious in a world 
full of things to discover. What the mood of authenticity does is not disclose 
Dasein as a certain kind of Dasein (for example, being potentially under threat 
or as the potential discoverer things), but as possibility itself, as something 
that has the possibility to be affected by mood, where it is the possibility that is 
the essential characteristic of Dasein, before any particular way of being 
affected has manifested. That is, "anxiety discloses Dasein as being-possible, 
and indeed as the only kind of thing which it can be of its own accord as 
something individualised in individualisation" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 143). The 
mood of authenticity does also not disclose the world as a certain kind of world 
(for example, being potentially threatening or full of things that may be 
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discovered), but as the nothingness, the emptiness, out of which a particular 
way of being of the entities in that world may emerge. 
But, apart from this detachment from things, where "being affected" 
emotionally (in terms of a mood) is a possibility but not yet actual, we also find 
that anxiety involves a new kind of openness to oneself and things in the 
world. As Heidegger puts it in What is Metaphysics?, "All things and we 
ourselves sink into indifference. This, however, not in the sense of mere 
disappearance. Rather, in their very receding, things turn towards us" 
(Heidegger, 1998b, p. 88). Thus we have a combination of detachment and 
"things turning towards us". Michael Zimmerman describes this new-found 
openness to things as one which "allows things and other humans to manifest 
themselves in more complex, complete, and novel ways, rather than as mere 
objects or instruments for our ends" (Zimmerman, 1993, p. 245). Thus we have 
a mood that is characterised by detachment as well as by a closeness to things, 
an openness to what the things are in themselves. 
When we return to some of the concepts that in Heidegger's later philosophy 
stand for "the prevailing affective disposition of Dasein's authentic existing" 
(Capobianco, 2007, p. 1), we find the same dual movement of detachment and 
openness. In the 1955 lectures What is Philosophy?, Heidegger uses the word 
astonishment: "In astonishment, we hold ourselves back (etre en arret). We step 
back, as it were, from beings, [astonished] that they are rather than are not 
[where this stepping back] is at the same time enraptured by and, as it were, 
held fast by that from which it steps back" (Heidegger, 1958, p. 85, cited in 
Capobianco 2007). And again, writing about awe, in his Elucidations of 
Holderlin's Poetry of 1943, Heidegger writes about "holding oneself back" and a 
nearness: "As this primordially firm holding oneself back (Ansichhalten) before 
what is awesome, awe has at the same time the most intimate affection for it... 
. Awe is that reserved, patient, astonished remembrance of that which abides 
near in a nearness that consists solely in keeping what is distant in its fullness 
distant, and thereby keeping it ready for its welling-up emergence from its 
source" (Heidegger, 2000, p. 153, cited in Capobianco 2007). 
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When we look at the notion of authentic attunement as one where Dasein has 
been individualized and experiences the entities it encounters in the world in 
this mood of detachment and nearness, we can easily see how this would be the 
case in relation to practical and theoretical entities: as Dasein no longer 
projects an understanding of being onto these entities (because it experiences 
itself in terms of itself and no longer out of the entities it encounters in the 
world) these entities appear both detached (they are no longer understood 
from out of Dasein's self-understanding) and near (they are no longer mediated 
by das Man). We can, indeed, see how this mood of authenticity would be a 
constituent part of having "a sense for the being of entities" we said earlier was 
one of the outcomes of the process of becoming authentic. 
This is all well and good, but a problem does, it seems, arise when Dasein 
encounters another Dasein. As this other Dasein is not understood from out of 
Dasein's self-understanding or mediated by das Man, it will appear as it is in 
itself. But, as we will see in Chapter 6, the other Dasein that is encountered by 
Dasein is not disconnected from this Dasein. The basic faculty of being-with 
entails that the communal (any group which Dasein is part of) as well as the 
interpersonal (the other Dasein that is encountered) are co-constitutive of this 
Dasein. It is, therefore, possibly incoherent to talk about the mood of 
authenticity disclosing everything as detached. Practical and theoretical entities 
may well appear thus, but how their being is understood is, as we saw in 
Chapter 4, dependent on Dasein's projection of an understanding of being. 
This is not the case with another Dasein, who, as we will also see in the next 
chapter, appears, to authentic Dasein as existing for its own sake, in terms of 
itself, and, therefore, not in terms of an understanding of being that is 
projected by another Dasein. 
There is another way of putting it, which is to say that authentic attunement 
would be a much impoverished one, if the feelings and emotions it brought 
were restricted to things such as awe and wonder. One would expect and hope 
for more human emotions, at least in relation to other Daseins. In the next 
chapter I will attempt to rectify this shortcoming in Heidegger's account, by 
establishing what affective dispositions could be part of authentic being-with, 
and, as such, appropriate ones to appear as part of authentic attunement. 
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Bearing this promissory note in mind, with the characterisation of "the 
prevailing affective disposition of Dasein's authentic existence" as detachment 
and nearness we have returned in many ways to the idea that Dasein has the 
possibility of the individual being directly affected by something coming from 
outside of it, without it being mediated through das Man and without it being 
assimilated into what the individual already knows. In the basic mood of 
authenticity, of anxiety, astonishment or awe, Dasein experiences itself as 
transcendence, where this transcendence means that Dasein finds itself in a 
world that predates it and with a personality that is not of its own making and 
where its understanding of the things in the world is one it itself projects and 
which can be authentic in terms of its own existential death. Authentic Dasein 
does not feel connected to itself or things in the world in a way that is based 
on an established connection (from out of das Man). Rather, as we have seen, 
"things turn towards" it, it is "enraptured by" and "held fast by" these things. 
These things are "near" to Dasein in their distance. Dasein is "ready for 
[their] welling-up emergence from [their] source". And they do so as arising 
within the transcendence of being-in-the-world, where Dasein is experienced 
as individualized (and in an, as yet, unspecified way connected with other 
Dasein's) and the entities that it encounters in the world are experienced as 
arising in the nothingness of the world. 
5.4 The process of attunement learning to be authentic 
5.4.1 Learning to be authentic happens at the level of non-reflective 
self-awareness 
The nature of the process that leads to the above described mode of authentic 
attunement is one that happens at the level of non-reflective self-awareness. 
Contrary to other terms used in our discussion of the mood of authenticity, 
this notion of non-reflective self-awareness is not one Heidegger himself used, 
but it is helpful in constructing an account of attunement learning to be 
authentic. 
Such a non-reflective awareness is akin to kinaesthetic or proprioceptive 
awareness in that there is no reflective sense-perception of oneself as such, as 
from a distance, but rather an awareness of oneself from the inside, as when, in 
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kinaesthesis, the sensory nerves in the muscles themselves are aware of the 
movement one makes when one moves. But, whereas kinaesthetic awareness is 
located firmly within the individual's body, the non-reflective self-awareness 
that comes with the mood of the individual spans being-in-the-world as a 
whole, because, as we saw earlier, one's mood discloses both oneself and the 
world in a particular way. Thus, Dan Zahavi writes, in relation to a discussion 
of Heidegger's notion of attunement, that "Heidegger did, in fact, operate with 
a form of self-acquaintance that precedes reflection", where "no self-
acquaintance can occur independently of, or prior to, our world-disclosure" 
just as "this world-disclosure ... cannot occur independently of or prior to a 
disclosure of self' (Zahavi, 2005, pp. 84-85). 
Note how these remarks pertain to the whole of the being-in-the-world, i.e. 
also to being-with and understanding. Indeed, we already saw in the previous 
chapter that the transparency that goes with authentic understanding is a kind 
of non-reflective awareness of oneself as a being that understands by way of 
projection. And a similar kind of non-reflective self-awareness applies to 
attunement, where the non-reflective self-awareness of authentic attunement 
is, as we said earlier, more akin to proprioceptive or kinaesthetic awareness 
than to the kind of "sight" that characterizes transparency. 
That authentic attunement involves a kind of non-reflective self-awareness is 
in itself not surprising, if we consider that emotions are generally experienced 
in such a non-reflective way. The way we experience emotions is primarily not 
by taking a third-person perspective on them, but by simply feeling them. Just 
as we said earlier that we do not have to "take a step back from ourselves" to 
know what we are doing (reading or fixing a door), so too, we do not have to 
envisage ourselves getting red in the face to know that we feel embarrassment 
(though sometimes a physical sign may alert us to an emotion we have been 
having without noticing it). The link between emotions and kinaesthetic is 
very clear, and, indeed, emotions are often experienced as physical, as when a 
feeling of anger may be located in the stomach or love in the heart. So, if we 
are looking for a process that leads to Dasein experiencing itself as having the 
possibility of being attuned in a way (of having a certain mood) and we want to 
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conceive of that process in terms of attunement itself, we are, in effect, looking 
for a process that happens at the level of non-reflective awareness. 
Inauthentic Dasein is absorbed in das Man and, as such, not aware of the 
primordial non-reflective self-awareness that lies at the basis of its moods, 
because it is absorbed in a mood that colours both it and the entities it 
encounters in the world. This brings us back to the notion, discussed in 
Chapter 3, of the process of becoming authentic as one of "becoming who one 
already is", in that becoming authentic consists of beginning to experience 
oneself as being non-reflectively self-aware and to live accordingly. As we saw 
earlier, Dasein, as it has given up its absorption in the things in the world, 
finds itself in the mood of wonder (anxiety, awe or astonishment). Thus we are 
looking for a change in Dasein's mood from one that constitutes its non-
reflective self-awareness as based in the mood that gives it both itself and the world 
to one that constitutes its non-reflective self-awareness of itself as based in itself; 
as it is both detached from and open (by way of possibility) to being affected by 
the things in the world. 
In sum, what needs to be brought into view in the process of attunement 
learning to be authentic is that of a change away from the individual being in a 
mood that connects him or her with the world (in that it mood discloses the 
world as a certain kind of world and the individual as a certain kind of 
individual) into the direction of the individual being in a mood that is 
characterised by both a sense of detachment and of openness towards things in 
the world, where the things are "let be" and the self is disclosed in terms of 
itself only. 
5.4.2 The authentic response to established affective associations 
Normally the question of learning to have a certain affective disposition is 
conceived of as a process of association. Matthew Ratcliffe writes the following 
about this: "There are primary emotions [which are not learned], which are 
innate, hard-wired connections between body states and types of perceptual 
objects/situations, such as snakes or small, dark spaces. However, in the case 
of creatures such as ourselves, equipped with the ability to learn a vast myriad 
of new things, secondary emotions [which are learned] are in the majority. 
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These are learned associations between types of environment or perceptual 
object and bodily states. For example, one is not born with a fear of the dentist 
but one often learns it" (Ratcliffe, 2002, p. 298). 
However, the notion of learning to be in a particular mood through association 
does not fit with the notion of getting into the mood of authenticty as a 
process of "bringing oneself back from lostness in 'the they—, as this process is 
per definition one that occurs without any kind of association, association 
being based on continuation (of the association between two elements) rather 
than the radical interruption that is characteristic of the process of becoming 
authentic. To put it differently, if, as I said earlier, anxiety "makes manifest the 
nothing" (Heidegger, 1998b, p. 88), this nothing cannot come as a result of an 
association with something without ceasing to be nothing. However, before I go 
into the question of the process leading to authentic attunement, I will 
consider what it means to respond in an authentic way, if and when such an 
associative link between a situation or an entity and a particular emotion has 
been created. 
Such a consideration of an authentic affective response to an association that 
has been established is called for, if only, because much of education, of both 
parenting and schooling, involves creating associative connections between 
certain situations or entities and certain emotions. Everything that can be 
called conditioning involves what, in Section 2.2.1, I called "valence", which I 
said consisted of "emotional force or significance" (SOED, 2007), especially in 
terms of things like pleasure and pain. Thus there are two kinds of affective 
association that get established, one where certain ways of acting and 
perceiving become associated with pleasure or pain, another where, as I said 
earlier, certain situations or entities become associated with certain emotions. 
Regarding the first, much of education is premised on the idea that the 
educator needs to decide on what ways of acting and perceiving are the right 
ones for the child and that the way to get the child to act and perceive in the 
desired way is to create associations between ways of acting and perceiving 
and pleasure or pain. What is salient in the context of learning to be authentic 
is not which actions and ways of perceiving should become associated with 
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pleasure and which with pain. Rather, it is a question of how to respond to 
such associations that come into being anyway, outside the control of the 
educator. 
In so far as certain actions and ways of perceiving become associated with 
pleasure or pain, as a result of the child's engagement with the natural world, 
the task of authentic education seems to be purely that of teaching the child to 
retain only those associations that it needs to remember (as when a child burns 
his or her hand in a kettle), to "get over" associations that have become 
irrational (as when an unfortunate encounter with a dog turns into a phobia), 
and to "come to terms with" dramatic events at a personal level, such as an 
experience of loss or long-term illness. All of these consist in initially letting 
go of the mood that has formed in association with the situation or entity 
involved and reconnecting with it in a way that is characterized by detachment 
and nearness. Properly understood, this means that the kettle is not touched 
again when hot, not because the child has become afraid but because it 
"knows", and dogs that are encountered are understood to be potentially 
dangerous, but this results in a fearless caution that is open to sensing that a 
dog the child encounters may be friendly. 
In the case of a personal loss the challenge is greater, as a period of grieving 
and an abiding sense of loss may well be inevitable, indeed, one could say, 
right and proper. Consequently, the detachment and nearness of authenticity is 
experienced in relation to the emotion itself; in that the inauthentic28 emotion 
is allowed to exist within a wider authentic one. Emotions such as grief and 
loss, which are a natural part of life, are not to be replaced in authentic 
attunement, but are to be given (perhaps after the individual has, initially, been 
quite overwhelmed by them) a place within the wider non-reflective self-
awareness of authentic attunement. The resulting absence of the individual 
being absorbed in this mood of grief or loss is usually experienced by others as 
the individual being dignified in their grief, where their dignity consists in 
them not reducing their world to the emotion they experience, even though 
28 Note that the word inauthentic has lost any normative connotation and refers purely to the 
mode of being which is not characterized by detachment and openness. 
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they may well feel that the whole of their world is filled with the emotion: it is 
the experience of one's world (and especially the nothingness surrounding that 
world) existing prior to the sense of grief or loss that fills every corner of it 
that maintains the individual in the wakeful dignity of authentic attunement. 
In so far as the experience of pleasure or pain is associated with the actions of 
others, we can distinguish between two extremes, viz. those associations that 
are created by the other intentionally and those that are not. Those that are 
not created intentionally, such as when a young child refuses to play with 
another child, because they keep ruining their game, are similar to the natural 
associations I mentioned earlier, in that they are taken in an authentic way 
when the child learns to not spoil the game anymore, but does so without 
retaining fear of being excluded or not being liked. But such unintentionally 
created associations quickly become blurred into intentional ones, as even 
relatively young children quickly learn that they can influence others by 
rewarding or punishing them for their behaviour. 
If we take the issue of a child being punished or rewarded for a certain way of 
behaving, we are faced with a combination of, on the one hand, an association 
being created for them between certain ways of behaving and pleasure or pain 
(of which I indicated above how to approach it authentically) and, on the other 
hand, the fact itself that another individual, who the child is related to through 
being-with, takes it upon themselves to inflict pain or provide pleasure. As we 
will see and discuss further in Chapter 6, the stance one takes in case one 
rewards or punishes the other person is inauthentic, as one takes the other 
person as a practical entity. The affective impact this has on the person who is 
being rewarded is primarily that of having been reduced to a practical entity, 
which is a sense of being a thing and, as such, disconnected from the other, as 
the relationship with the other is no longer one of genuine being-with but that 
between an agent (the other punishing or rewarding) and an object — thus 
feelings of loneliness at having been disconnected and sadness at having been 
reduced may accompany both being rewarded and being punished. 
The authentic response at the level of attunement to such being reduced to an 
object (regardless whether it is pleasurable or painful) is to appeal to the other 
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in their authentic being-with (see Chapter 6) and to "die towards" any actual 
connections one may have with the person so that only the authentic 
connection which exists prior to any actual (inauthentic) connection remains. 
What such an authentic affective response to having been reduced may be will 
become clear in Section 6.4.2, when I consider the authentic affective 
disposition of being-with. At a minimum such an authentic response to being 
reduced to an object involves facing up to the disconnection that is being 
imposed by the other, to abide with the nothingness that accompanies it and to 
remain open towards the other person, to retain the immediacy of the mood of 
authenticity. 
The second inauthentic kind of learning at the emotional level occurs when 
certain situations or entities (including persons) become associated with 
certain emotions. Here too the authentic response it that of letting go of any 
established connections and to return to the affective disposition that is prior 
to any actual way of responding affectively, when the entity or the situation 
appears as both detached (one has not identified with it) and near to one (one 
does not allow a way of responding to it derived from das Man to interfere), 
where "having been brought back from absorption in das Man" means that 
what is left, after such a "dying towards" an existing inauthentic connection, is 
that one can be affected in a way that is unmediated by previous encounters 
with similar entities or situations, or by ways of feeling about oneself one 
wishes to uphold, or by ways of responding that are coloured by the culture 
one is part of. 
Such an affective response to a situation or an entity is still possible, even after 
all associative connections have dissolved. First, there are the innate emotional 
responses that would remain, such as the examples I mentioned at the 
beginning of this section29. Second, there is the affective response based in 
being-with, where the connection between different individuals is co-
constitutive of these individuals. This being-with makes empathy and 
29 Note that even innate responses are, neurologically speaking, associative, but that 
phenomenologically speaking they are not, because it is not the case that one responds 
because two kinds of experiences are associated with each other, rather there is a link between 
an experience and a hard-wired response. 
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compassion possible, for example, when one feels sorrow at the plight of the 
dispossessed or joy at the sight of a happy child. And, as we will see in Section 
6.3.1.3, such authentic being affected can be expanded, to include us being 
affected by the natural world, where, for example, being touched by a beautiful 
sunset may be more than an innate response, but based in a genuine human 
connection with the universe in a way that is experienced emotionally as well 
as cognitively. Though such a possibility is probably controversial, it is not 
necessary to arbitrate on this point here, but merely to point out the 
possibility, in order to substantiate the point that emotional engagement with 
situations and entities is possible even after previously established associations 
have dissolved. 
At this point we need to ask whether it is not desirable for an individual 
growing up to internalize some associations between situations or entities and 
certain emotions. Should a child not learn to be afraid of dangerous animals, to 
be happy at birthdays, to be respectful in the company of elders, to be sad at 
other people's misfortune, to be grateful at being granted a favour, and so on 
It would take too long to explore this question fully, but my initial response is 
that the mechanisms I have described above of authentic attunement are all 
that is needed. Painful or pleasurable events can serve to teach the appropriate 
cognitive response (for example, to stay away from wasps) rather than needing 
that cognitive response to be grounded in a lingering emotional response. 
Appropriate responses to the plight of others (from birthdays to misfortune) 
are based in authentic being-with, as we will see in Chapter 6, and are likely to 
become sentimental and shallow if based in association. Appropriate responses 
to the position of others can be taught in terms of cognition (for example, you 
address your teachers in certain ways, which is different from the way you 
address your class mates), without them requiring an affective basis. 
5.4.3 The process of attunement learning to become authentic 
Now that we have seen that the process of attunement learning to be authentic 
is not one of association, we can turn to the process itself. Since one always 
finds oneself in some mood or other, the question of learning to be in the mood 
of authenticity becomes one of going from the mood one finds oneself in, say, 
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being driven to achieve, to the mood of detachment and nearness, of 
authenticity. This mood one already finds oneself in discloses oneself and the 
world in a certain way: in our example, one experiences oneself as badly 
needing to be fulfilled by some achievement and the world as a field of 
potential opportunities for achievement as well as for failure. We could say 
that going from such a mood of "needing to achieve" to one of authenticity is a 
matter of replacing the first with the latter, but, as we saw earlier, that would 
be a change at the level of what in Section 3.6 I called discovery rather than 
disclosure. In other words, as I have said that such a change cannot be based in 
either taking the new mood over from the society one lives in or retrieving the 
mood from memory (which would constitute a form of continuation), the new 
mood needs to be found in itself and of itself. 
One possible solution lies in the fact that all moods share a level of non-
reflective awareness. We are always to some extent aware of the mood we are in, 
in a non-reflective way, even if it is minimal and implicit. Earlier I said that the 
mood of authenticity is characterised by such non-reflective self-awareness to the 
extent that, because of the lack of absorption in both oneself and the world, it 
amounted to a non-reflective self-awareness of the capacity to get absorbed in 
oneself and in the world itself. So we can take this aspect of authentic 
attunement to be already there potentially among the other moods one may 
have, as the mood one would find oneself in, if one allowed what was 
inessential about the other moods to fall away. This could provide us with a 
path towards the mood of disconnection and openness. 
Such a move from a non-reflective awareness of the inauthentic mood one was in 
to a non-reflective self-awareness of the capacity to get absorbed would involve 
allowing both the moods of authentic existence and the inauthentic moods to 
exist. One would become aware of one's mood as mood, without getting 
absorbed in oneself or the things in the world that get co-disclosed in the 
mood. But this would not happen as a process of exclusion of awareness of 
oneself or the things in the world, but rather as a process of becoming aware of 
the mood as it discloses oneself and the world. That is, one becomes aware of 
the mood as mood, as disclosive, while at the same time the self and the world 
are left as they are given by the inauthentic mood. 
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That is, first, there is the non-reflective self-awareness a) of being focussed on 
something in such a mood, b) of responding to what one is focussed on as 
coloured through the mood, c) of the totality of this perceiving and acting 
internally. At this point one is still absorbed in das Man, in things in the world, 
but this state of absorption is becoming self-aware from the inside out, 
without, as yet, quite reaching a total self-awareness. Importantly, there is at 
this point no movement away from the mood one is in, there is a "staying with" 
the mood that is similar to the unconditional acceptance of "how one finds 
oneself' promoted in some humanistic psychotherapy as the first importance 
step in the therapeutic process. 
Second, there is the feeling of the totality of the mood, which, at this point, co-
discloses the emptiness around the mood ("the nothing"), even as the mood 
encompasses both the self and the world as disclosed by the mood. This 
emptiness can be experienced as empty, but also as mere space or possibility, 
and it is accompanied by feelings of longing and curiositys° for the otherness of 
the entities residing in the emptiness, and by feelings of urgency in the face of 
the possibility of falling back into a world and self-defining mood. That is, as 
the self-awareness spreads to the point of being self-aware of the totality of 
one's being-in-the-world, it begins to co-disclose the emptiness around itself as 
emptiness in terms of mood, but, at the same time, as containing things that 
one can possibly be in contact with in a way that is more direct and revealing 
than the contact one may have with these entities through a mood that defines 
them in a certain way (as potentially threatening or discoverable, to take two 
earlier examples). To use terms I used earlier, one becomes aware of the 
possibility of nearness of being "enraptured by" and "held fast by" these 
things. 
Thus, this disclosure of emptiness co-discloses a longing and curiosity for 
immediate contact with these entities, which is a primal kind of longing, one 
that is not instrumental to fulfilling any other need than the contact with what 
3° Note that the way curiosity is used here is different from the way Heidegger uses it in Being 
and Time, in relation to das Man. The way the word is used here lacks the negative 
connotations of Heidegger's use of the word. 
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is other. This sense of longing and curiosity is like the "the essential openness to 
values and primary love of meaning of the personally existing being" (Heidegger, 
2004, p. 250) we looked at earlier. There is, at this point, also a sense that it is 
"now or never" in terms of the possibility of establishing such contact, because 
the process of absorption, where world and self are experienced in terms of 
each other, is still there, co-given with the emptiness and the otherness of 
things. This longing and curiosity together with the sense of urgency provide 
a motivation for Dasein to remain in the space of the mood of authenticity. 
This is expressed in what I will call a "staying with" the beginnings of an 
authentic mood, which, as such, marks the beginning of the process of 
spreading and reciprocity that, as we will see below, characterises the process 
of coming to find oneself in a mood of authenticity. 
Third, as one is "staying with" the inauthentic mood one is in, while the 
emptiness surrounding it is being disclosed and some of the entities hiding in 
this emptiness are beginning to emerge, there is the letting go of the mood one 
was in, in response to the feelings of urgency, longing and curiosity. As one's 
non-reflective self-awareness discloses oneself and the world as consisting of 
the unity of being-in-the-world, as defined by the possibilities given by the 
mood one is in, and as the emptiness surrounding this being-in-the-world is 
co-disclosed, the longing for and curiosity about the entities that are beginning 
to emerge from within this emptiness serve to enhance one's awareness of 
oneself as being-in-the-world and as part-defined by one's mood. This is a 
reciprocal illuminating of, on the one hand, the emptiness with its emerging 
possibilities and, on the other hand, the mood as part-defining being-in-the-
world. And this reciprocal illuminating of mood and emptiness eventually 
exposes the mood as finite, as based in das Man and continuity (previous 
experience), and one is drawn towards the emptiness, leaving the mood behind, 
as it were. 
Finally, there is the experience of oneself in terms of oneself and the 
emergence of entities from out of this emptiness in terms of themselves. As one 
allows the mood one was in to dissolve, there is still the experience of oneself, 
but now one experiences oneself as capable of having a mood, of experiencing 
oneself and the world in terms of a mood, of having being-in-the-world 
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permeated by a mood. The possibility of having being-in-the-world permeated 
by an inauthentic mood, of connecting to the world through das Man, is always 
there, as it needs to be for one to be able to respond to situations that may 
require to be defined in terms of mood, but in the moment of disconnection and 
openness there is no such defining mood. Rather, there is the mood of 
detachment and nearness (anxiety, awe or astonishment), where one is 
experienced in terms of oneself rather than the world, and where things in the 
world are experienced as both detached (because they are other than oneself) 
and near (because they are experienced in an unmediated way through one's 
essential openness). 
The movement of learning associated with this kind of awareness is one of 
spreading, where the non-reflective self-awareness that was always already 
part of one's inauthentic mood grows until it encompasses the whole of one's 
being-in-the-world. The movement is also one of reciprocation: the non-
reflective self-awareness that is already there in any mood grows as a result of 
experiencing something that appears as in certain ways detached and near, 
which discloses some of the emptiness that surrounds things that are detached 
and near, which in turn discloses more of the mood in an enhanced self-
awareness, which then co-discloses more of the emptiness around the mood, 
and so on. Note that at any point either a communicative element, in terms of 
authentic being-with, or an element of understanding, as we saw in the 
previous section, may affect these processes of reciprocation and spreading. 
5.5 Educational considerations 
5.5.1 The school atmosphere and learning to be authentic 
I will now consider the practical dimension of the process articulated above 
and ask, by way of example, how a group of teachers may bring about such a 
process of attunement becoming authentic in a school setting. That is, because 
we are dealing with a mood, an atmosphere, something that colours the whole 
of being-in-the-world (the subject, any intentional objects encountered by the 
subject, the world as it is experienced as a whole, other individuals, and the 
school community), the natural place to start is the collective of teachers, as 
the atmosphere of a school is most easily established by a collective of 
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individuals. Of course, not every teaching body will have the coherence, the 
opportunity, or, indeed, the wish to wittingly establish a certain atmosphere in 
their school (even if all do so in actual fact), but for the sake of this example I 
will assume that some do. Note that in real life such a teaching body would 
want to include the pupils, the support staff and the parents in the creation of 
this atmosphere, but for simplicity sake I will leave that dimension out of my 
description, as it does not affect the nature of an atmosphere that is conducive 
to the flourishing of the affective disposition of authenticity. 
The pupil who enters the school already does so with a certain affective 
disposition, experiencing him or herself and the world in a certain way. This is 
always a specific way. I will take as our example a pupil who experiences 
herself as inferior to others, the world as unsafe, and others (notably adults) as 
judgemental. Part of this is that the pupil experiences herself as separate from 
the world, and is prone to withdrawing from certain things, so as not to expose 
herself to further judgement. At the same time she is prone to asserting herself 
in an over-confident way, so as to pre-empt any judgements that she expects 
will come her way. In this mode the pupil's relationship with things is one of 
absorption (in the things in the world) and definition (by a certain mood) and 
the teachers, understanding the importance of the process of attunement 
becoming authentic, will, first of all, want to be aware of the how pupil is 
absorbed by things. This corresponds with the notion of "staying with" the 
inauthentic mood I discussed in the previous section, where the existing 
inauthentic mood is allowed to exist as it is, where there is merely an increased 
awareness of that mood. 
For example, in our example of the pupil who feels herself to be inferior, the 
teachers may observe how she understands herself in terms of (identifies with) 
the low grades she receives for poorly executed work and the "street cred" she 
gets for being defiant towards her teachers. Rather than trying to turn a 
"negative" understanding of herself in terms of the things she finds in the 
world into a "positive" one (telling her, for example, that doing her homework 
will make her feel good about herself and that the respect she earns from her 
peers is not going to be of much use to her in the long term), the teachers will 
seek to create an atmosphere where both are allowed to first exist un-resisted 
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(the student "staying with" the mood) and then subside, so that the 
identification can make place for an understanding of herself "in terms of 
herself'. 
Thus, there could be an atmosphere which did not compare the pupil to others 
in a way that entailed value judgment. Practically this could, for example, 
means that grades are not given at all, but where the teacher simply indicates 
what is lacking in a student's work relative to either their next level of 
development or, in the context of work going towards a set examination, 
relative to full marks. Such a simple "this is what you would need to do in 
order to get full marks", when done in an atmosphere that is non-comparative 
and non-judgemental would allow for the self-understanding in terms of 
grades to exist un-resisted, but it would be brought into relief (it would meet 
the emptiness surrounding it) so that it became increasingly non-reflectively 
self-aware. There would, in the attitude of the teachers, be nothing that would 
prevent the student understanding herself in terms of her grades to subside, if 
and when the pupil herself was ready for that. 
Similarly, a non-judgemental approach to the student culture giving kudos to 
obstreperous behaviour would be accompanied by a sense, on the part of the 
teachers, that pupils and teachers were not separated at the essential level of 
their humanity, even if this would not entail the teachers becoming immature 
(for example, in depending on their sense of self-worth on pupil approval) or 
failing in their responsibilities as adults "in a position of trust" (for example, in 
colluding with immature student behaviour). This is an atmosphere where 
adults and children are one in their most basic humanity, but where, at a 
functional and developmental level, it is accepted that they have different 
responsibilities and needs, such as the student need to be among their peers 
from time to time or the need to explore (and, therefore, be set) boundaries 
(they are then held to). Such a limiting of the separation between student and 
teacher groups to a functional level would do much to create an atmosphere 
where the pupil could be herself "in terms of herself', rather than as a member 
of a group. 
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At the same time, there would be an atmosphere that appealed to the pupils' 
authentic views and opinions to be voiced and heard. When the pupil is "taking 
seriously" in this way, it would not only encourage them to understand 
themselves in terms of themselves, in terms of their giving voice to what really 
concerns them, but would also challenge them to be real and not to get stuck 
in a stereotypical way of being themselves, for example, because it earns them 
approval from their peers or teachers, or because it represents a way of looking 
at themselves they have internalised on the basis of past experience. As such, 
the pupil is allowed to be "other" and challenged to reveal what is genuine 
about themselves. In terms of emotion and feeling this would manifest as an 
emotionally secure atmosphere, where the security is not brought about by 
way of belonging to an in-group (of pupils, teachers or the school as a whole), 
but where the security is extended to all (including visitors, newcomers and 
"outsiders"). This can only be done if there is a great deal of genuine care for 
individuals, the buildings, the surrounding area, any plants and animals that 
are there, and, at least in intention, the wider community. 
But this atmosphere of security needs to be combined with one where the 
authentic person is appealed to, where there is a challenge for all to step out of 
their comfort zone and to step out into the open (See Chapter 6 on authentic 
public exposure). Such a stepping out of one's comfort zone is, indeed, 
necessary if the care and security of everyone is to be made possible in the first 
place, because, in remaining in one's comfort zone, one inevitably excludes 
someone else (for example, by creating an in-group which inevitably leaves 
some out, or by seeking comfort in food or drink, which allows one to avoid 
facing up to things others can possibly not ignore), which undermines the 
atmosphere of security for all, which I said was necessary for authentic 
attunement. This, therefore, entails an appeal to the responsibility individuals 
have for each other to enable the possibility for all to be authentic, where this 
responsibility is neither ready-to-hand (expressed in being held accountable) 
nor present-at-hand (expressed in judgments concerning whether one is 
meeting one's responsibilities, or in being made to feel guilty or proud of 
oneself), but based in authentic being-with, which is experienced as affection, 
communion or even love (see again Chapter 6). The teachers wishing to create 
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an atmosphere that promotes learning to be authentic will, therefore, need to 
create one where these emotions circulate freely among all involved. 
This stepping out of one's comfort zone is also necessary, if one is to become 
aware of the whole of one's being-in-the-world (of oneself as transcendence), 
because, again, remaining in the comfort zone hides certain aspects of oneself 
and of the world from view. This is the stage of the individual "staying with" 
the non-reflective self-awareness which is already to some extent there. Thus, the 
girl in our example would, by stepping out of her comfort zone - which she 
was encouraged to do by way of an atmosphere of security, responsibility and 
affection - come face to face with the inauthentic, "defining" mood (a mood that 
"defines", that makes one experiences oneself and the world in a specific 
affective way) she finds herself in. And, as I said, in her case this defining mood 
is, put simply, one of herself as inferior and the world as judgmental. For her 
to "stay with" this mood the result would be that the non-reflective self-
awareness that is always already part of a mood spreads until it encompasses 
the whole of her being-in-the-world. 
With regard to emotions and feelings, the kind of atmosphere that would 
encourage such "stepping out of one's comfort zone" and such a "staying with", 
would be one of intense watchfulness and wakefulness - where the individual is 
not watched as a ready-to-hand entity (as when one watches for what to 
correct or reinforce, what to punish or reward) or a present-at-hand entity (as 
when one watches for signs and symptoms that indicate certain characteristics, 
on the basis of which one would then judge the person); rather, the individual 
would be watched as openness and possibility, where there is no judgment 
(apart from instances where laws and school rules are at stake) and no attempt 
is made to interfere with the pupil's way of being (unless certain boundaries 
are being crossed, such as when harm is being done to themselves or others). I 
will say more about this issue, which is that of rules and boundaries, in the 
next section. 
What is being watched is the individual as openness and possibility, where the 
way in which they are at any point in time is taken as one of the possible way 
of being they have rather than how they "actually" are. And they will not be 
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expected to repeat this way of being, so, where they have been difficult or 
unpleasant (unless it has become a full-blown disciplinary issue), things won't 
be held against them for long. Similarly they won't be reminded of the "good" 
pupil they may have been in the past, in an attempt to elicit a repeat 
performance. Rather than linking the way of being that manifests (the defining 
mood the pupil is in) with collective norms or past or future ways of being, this 
way of being is taken as arising within the openness of authentic existence. 
That is, apart from the encouragement to stay with (though not "hang on to") 
the defining mood that manifests, there is also the encouragement for the pupil 
to stay with the nothingness that is already in some ways there in this mood. 
This nothingness is experienced as limitation (the pupil experiences herself as 
existing in the mood of inferiority but at the same time experiences that mood 
as limited), as emptiness (the pupil experiences a probably quite benevolent 
and reinvigorating emptiness around her mood of inferiority), as possibility 
(she experiences that many possibilities exist outside the one defining mood 
she is staying with), as silence (the pupil experiences a calming silence around 
the mood, which allows her to not get absorbed in it again immediately). 
This awareness of the nothingness surrounding her defining mood may be 
something she simply notices, or it may be something she discovers as she 
tries to understand her defining mood, or that comes to her attention because 
it is pointed out to her. Whichever may be the case, as she becomes aware of 
the emptiness that is part of her being-in-the-world, she becomes more open 
towards the entities that may emerge from within this emptiness. As the 
defining mood which discloses herself as inferior and the world as judgmental 
stands out more and more against the emptiness of being-in-the-world, and is 
thus exposed as limited, a sense of curiosity about what does not manifest 
within this defining mood is awakened. This is accompanied by a sense of 
longing for contact with what has been excluded as a result of remaining in the 
defining mood, as well as a sense of urgency with regard to the possibility of 
an unmediated engagement with these entities, as the opportunity do have this 
engagement is understood to be one that could be lost again. 
At this point the push towards authenticity can easily be levelled off with the 
individual opting for a watered-down version of it. As she becomes aware of 
169 
the limiting nature of her defining mood of inferiority, the pupil may well take 
the emerging curiosity as a sign to start experimenting with other ways of 
being-in-the-world, by slipping into another defining mood which is neither a 
like-for-like substitution of the previous defining mood, nor an authentic 
mood, but one that represents a kind of "enlightened compromise" (for example 
one of being self-determining, saying, as it were, "the mood of inferiority does 
not suit me, I want to be able to feel different moods at different times"). 
Though this mood has certain elements of authenticity, such as its 
responsiveness to the situation, and may well represent a real improvement for 
the individual involved, it falls short of genuine authenticity. But because it is 
experienced as a liberation from the confines of the defining mood, having got 
there may well dampen the longing for true contact with the entities that 
emerge in the emptiness and a lessening of the sense of urgency to let go of all 
of the defining mood. 
What is needed in order not to remain at the level of this initial letting go of 
one's defining mood, as a result of having "stayed with" it, is for a process of 
reciprocation to be kept going. This is the process where, as we have seen, the 
non-reflective self-awareness that is already there in any mood exposes some of 
the emptiness that is part of being-in-the-world, which in turn awakens the 
individual's curiosity, longing and sense of urgency to come into contact with 
the entities that are beginning to emerge within this emptiness. If at this point 
the curiosity, longing and sense of urgency are satisfied in a way that involves 
renewed absorption (for example, the pupil in our example finds herself to be 
more confident and not judged as much as she had previously thought), the 
process comes to a halt. If, however, the individual, at this point, experiences 
something that appears as in certain ways "detached and near", this experience 
in turn discloses more of the emptiness that surrounds things, where this 
emptiness in turn discloses more of the mood in an enhanced self-awareness, 
and so on. 
Such an experience of things that appear detached and near, of things as they 
appear in the affective disposition of authentic existence, is one that, though it 
cannot be stage-managed, may be made more likely. That is, having made the 
initial step of opening herself up towards the world around her (leaving 
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behind, however tentatively, the defining mood of inferiority), what the girl in 
our example meets next is crucial with respect to whether she will engage in 
the reciprocal process of sensing the openness that is her authentic being and 
the emptiness of the world. I will consider two examples how such experience 
of the "emptiness of the world" and openness of other living creatures may be 
encouraged. 
5.5.2 Teaching subjects and learning to be authentic 
The experience of the "emptiness of the world" may be encouraged by teaching 
the knowledge and skills that make any culturally transmitted disciplines, like 
Maths or History, in such a way that their most basic ontological and 
epistemological presuppositions become "transparent" (Section 4.3.1). That is, 
offering the pupil the experience of getting to know an entity in the full depth 
of its "construction" by the discipline, by taking the pupil through some of the 
important "decisions" that have been made regarding the nature of the entity 
that have led to it appearing as it does in the discipline, will give the pupil the 
opportunity to experience the entity from within the nothingness of the world. 
To take an example from Geography, explaining how we have taken a certain 
entity (let's say a river) as one that we have access to by way of description, 
measurement and visual representation on a two-dimensional plane (a map) 
will expose the entity as a certain kind of entity, where other options can be 
taken (and have been taken in different cultures), for example, by taking the 
river as a living thing, a process rather than a substantive entity, a plurality 
rather than a singular, and so on. In other words, the teacher would present 
some of the main ontological and epistemological "decisions" that have been 
made with respect to an entity, with the result that we may now encounter the 
100 mile long river in Geography as a five inch blue line on a map. This can be 
done at all levels, but each level will have its own opportunities and limitations 
(the young ones not being capable of as much complexity and the older ones 
not being capable of as much benign ignorance). The key to this is to awaken 
the engagement, the contact with the entity in a way that is prior to either a 
practical or theoretical engagement with it. 
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The experience of the openness of other living creatures is the other area 
where an incipient awareness of the emptiness in being-in-the-world can be 
fostered. In terms of inter-personal and communal relationships, it is by being 
openness and possibility oneself that one exposes the other to the nature of 
human beings as openness and possibility. That is, the teachers in the school 
wishing to foster an atmosphere of authentic attunement cannot do better than 
being authentic in themselves, and this makes clear once again how the teacher 
is as much a learner in this area as the pupil. But it is also important that the 
openness and possibility that is there in other living creatures is brought to 
the attention of the pupil. Here we are in the domain of nature education, 
where nature should not be presented to the pupil only as ready-to-hand (as 
objects of use, as a help or a threat) or present-at-hand (as field of inquiry with 
its categories, its species and genera), but as self-arising, openness and 
possibility and, in many respects, end in itself. I will return to this issue in 
Chapter 6. 
With respect to both human beings and nature, there is an added task related 
to the one set out in the paragraph before the previous one, that of taking the 
pupil through many of the decisions that have been made regarding their 
nature, for them to appear as they do in the discipline one is studying. The 
disciplines to do with the natural world, such as biology and environmental 
science, need to be taught against a backdrop of a contact with nature and 
great care should be taken in explicating how the various disciplines have 
approached this field that presents itself to experience first as openness and 
possibility, albeit in a limited fashion compared to the human being as a whole. 
Ethical issues to do with the use of natural resources and things like animal 
testing should not be left out, but it should be remembered that they are often 
presented in such a way that these ethical issues are themselves merely a 
different inauthentic" concern arising together with the inauthentic concern 
for the control of nature, and can, therefore, only be approached in the right 
way if authentic contact with nature has been established in advance. 
31 Note, as was indicated earlier, the word inauthentic is used in a purely non-normative way. 
For a discussion of what an ethics based in Heidegger's philosophy might look like, see 
Raffoul (2012). 
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The disciplines studying human beings, from psychology and sociology to 
history and philosophy should also be taught against the backdrop of a contact 
with, an engagement with, an allowing the individual and the community to 
emerge, in terms of the openness and possibility that makes up authentic 
human nature. As with education concerning the natural world, establishing 
the relationship between authentic human nature and the way it is taken in 
these disciplines is extremely delicate and complex and requires that the 
teacher has a deep understanding of their discipline (though much of the latter 
difficulties may be offset by text books that made this relationship accessible). 
Similarly, lessons to do with food, physical exercise or sex education, fall in 
this category and demand an authentic understanding of both the human being 
as Dasein and the human body as part of the natural world, to set the scene for 
any subsequent inauthentic knowledge concerning them. 
There is also a physical side to the creation of a school culture that is amenable 
to the pupil learning to be authentic at the affective level. Moods are sensitive 
to the physiological substratum out of which they appear, as is clear when we 
consider how depression may be induced by illness, anger by alcohol abuse, 
nervousness by caffeine, lethargy by lack of sleep, restlessness by sensitivity to 
certain food additives, and so on. It is, therefore, of great importance that the 
food, the physical surroundings, the health of the pupils and teachers are all 
given consideration. Outside elements that impose their own mood need to be 
clearly kept under control. Elements that absorb the individual, like things 
that are addictive psychologically or physically need to be minimized and 
exposed for what they are. There need to be moments of disengagement from 
activity and of silence. Space prohibits the full treatment of the issues involved 
in relation to the physical level, but that does not mean it is not of vital 
importance. 
In general terms we can say that a clear hierarchy of experience presents itself 
in relation to how the disciplines may be taught in such a way that their study 
contributes to the pupil's opportunity to become authentic at the affective 
level. First there is the mode of being of the teacher, where the extent to which 
they are authentic is decisive, because the dynamics of human relationships are 
in many ways decisive (as we will see in Chapter 6). Second, there is the 
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material, the physical context of the buildings, the physical atmosphere, the 
pupil's health, wakefulness and freedom from addiction, the quiet and the space 
available for individuals to be. All of these are conducive to the emergence of 
the mood of authenticity in the educational setting. To the extent that the 
above are in place, there can be the engagement with, study of, human beings 
as they present themselves to experience before they have been taken as either 
practical or theoretical entities (as I put it earlier, before ontological or 
epistemological decisions have been made that alienate them from their nature 
as openness and possibility). 
This is an area where actual classroom activities may come in: there could be 
moments where everybody is together in silence; there could be discussions to 
expose and leave behind inauthentic articulations of the human being; there 
could be games that do the same, and so on. Finally, there is the enculturation 
of the pupils into the discipline, which, if it is done in the context of the two 
previous points, will not be an absorption into the discipline in the sense that 
the discipline begins to dictate the atmosphere, the mood, but in such a way 
that the mood of the discipline (for example, one of objective analysis which 
leaves out emotions in psychology or one of attempting to gain a measure of 
control over people's behaviour in business studies) is always a limited sub-set 
of the mood of authenticity that envelops the inauthentic mood of the 
discipline and that prevails in the case of contradiction between the two 
(imagine, for example, investment bankers, who now appear absorbed in the 
mood of profit optimization that is inherent in their trade, working under such 
a prevailing mood of authenticity). 
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6 Authentic being-with 
6.1 Authentic being-with 
Being-with designates that the Dasein that is encountered by another Dasein 
"is there with them" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 160). Dasein is being-in-the-world 
(what in the previous chapter I called transcendence) and "the world is always 
the one that [Dasein] share[s] with others" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 155), which 
means that Dasein's world is a "with-world" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 155) and that 
"being-with is an existential constituent of being-in-the-world" (Heidegger, 
1962, p. 163). Being-with is, therefore, a constituent part of Dasein itself: "So 
far as Dasein is at all, it has being-with-one-another as its kind of being" 
(Heidegger, 1962, p. 163). Being-with is in many ways the educationally most 
important of Dasein's three basic faculties, because it represents the 
interpersonal and communal dimension of human life, and it is in this 
dimension that education itself is rooted. 
As we will see later in this chapter, Being-with is the basis of what Heidegger 
calls discourse (Rede). Indeed, Heidegger himself does usually take discourse 
rather than being-with as one of the basic faculties of Dasein (together with 
understanding and attunement): "Discourse is existentially equiprimordial with 
Cattunement] and understanding" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 204). The reason being-
with rather than discourse is taken as the third basic faculty of Dasein is that 
in Dasein's authentic mode discourse becomes "silent" and fails to be 
articulated in a coherent, positive way. This has to do with the lack of a 
convincing account of authentic being-with which I have commented on a 
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number of times already in this thesis. In this chapter I hope to construct such 
a positive account of authentic being-with, where I will look at three 
candidates: an elaboration of Heidegger's account of being-with in § 26 of 
Being and Time, his account of the authentic community in § 74 of Being and 
Time, and his account of the "call of conscience" in Division Two, Chapter II of 
Being and Time. 
I will begin this chapter by looking at Heidegger's account of being-with in 
general. Then I will look at ways to conceive of authentic being-with and find 
that these tend to remain in some ways unsatisfactory. I will then look in detail 
at the notion of the "call of conscience". I will look at the process of "hearing 
the call of conscience" as it interrupts Dasein's absorption in das Man. What 
the call of conscience does is that it shows Dasein the possibility of authentic 
existence, appeals to Dasein to become authentic, summons it to being authentic 
and calls it forward into authentic existence. The characteristics Heidegger 
claims such a call needs to have, in order for it to be able to interrupt Dasein's 
listening away to das Man, are that it is impersonal, unwitting, unplanned for 
and silent, a giving to understand that comes from Dasein itself and stands out 
from all the other voices Dasein hears. 
Having established a positive account of authentic being-with, I will attempt to 
construct an account of the actual learning involved in being-with becoming 
authentic. I will characterise this process of learning in terms of a change from 
experiencing others in terms of separateness and actuality to experiencing them 
in terms of oneness and possibility; I will characterise the process involved in this 
change as one of becoming silent; I will characterise the beginning of this 
process of spreading as "opening up" and "falling away". I will end this chapter 
by revisiting the notion of authentic being-with, to refine it with the help of 
what I have understood about the process of being-with learning to be 
authentic and will do so in the context of certain educational examples. 
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6.1.1 Heidegger's account of being-with 
6.1.1.1Being-with 
As we saw in the chapter on Heidegger's notion of authenticity, being-with 
(Mitsein) is, according to Heidegger, one of the three basic faculties of Dasein, 
where Dasein as being-in-the-word "in every case maintains itself in some 
definite way of concernful Being-with-one-another" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 204). 
What this means is that Dasein is not only the faculties of understanding and 
attunement, but also that of being-with, where it is always in the fundamental 
openness of Dasein that these three faculties manifest. Thus William McNeill 
writes that "my very being-in-the-world is, always and intrinsically, a being-
with. In this perspective, the assertion 'I am', notes Heidegger, is incorrect: 
one should really say: 'I am one', in the sense of 'I am others, I am them— 
(McNeill, 2006, p. 82). It is a bold claim, indeed, that Dasein, the individual 
human being, is not only him or herself (the way they understand things and 
the way they find themselves emotionally attuned in the world) but is also 
other people (other individuals as well as the collective). 
Most of Being and Time, and indeed the writings of most commentators on 
Heidegger, has tended to focus on the ways in which this being-with is said to 
manifest in actuality, which are that of "discourse" (language and other 
discursive practices) and das Man (the ways in which things are done and 
perceived by the general culture and tradition the individual finds him or 
herself in). But what has had less attention is what it means for being-with 
itself to be authentic, and those accounts of authentic being-with that exists in 
Heidegger's early writings (that of the authentic community and of the voice of 
conscience) are, as we will see, in many ways unsatisfactory. In so far as 
authentic being-with has been conceived, it has been so in negative terms, as it 
involves Dasein "bringing itself back from lostness in das Man" as well as 
discourse becoming "silent" in the call of conscience (I will look at this in detail 
later in this chapter). And, though this negative approach is in line with 
Heidegger's general approach to authenticity, what is missing is a convincing 
positive account of authentic being-with that does justice to it, both in terms of 
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the interpersonal and of the communal aspect of it. I will first look at the 
communal aspect of being-with and then at the interpersonal one. 
6.1.1.2Being-with as existing as part of a common world 
In discussion of the being-with faculty of Dasein, the emphasis has usually 
been on the communal, the collective dimension of being-with, rather than on 
the interpersonal one. As with all the basic faculties, Heidegger posits this 
faculty as prior to and as the basis of any actual manifestation of it. As William 
McNeill puts is, "Being-with gives rise to a common world and a common 
good" (McNeill, 2006, pp. 79-82). That is, rather than a common world giving 
rise to something like communal life, it is, according to Heidegger the basic 
faculty of being-with that makes possible for individuals to have anything like 
a common world. 
We experience being-with in the transcendence of being-in-the-world. Just as 
every understanding has its attunement and every attunement has its 
understanding, every understanding and attunement also have their being-
with. "Dasein-with is already essentially manifest in a co-attunement and a co-
understanding" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 205). For example, with a particular 
understanding of something, there is a way of being attuned emotionally, as 
well as a way in which other Daseins are there "with" one in that 
understanding. In concrete terms, if one, for example, understands a bird as 
belonging to a certain species (i.e. theoretically), there belongs to this 
theoretical understanding a kind of detached, objectifying way of being 
emotionally attuned to the situation, and one is also there with others, for 
example with the authors of the textbook in which one first found the name of 
the species or with one's father who may have introduced one to the joys of 
bird watching. 
So being-with gives rise to a common world (which, according to McNeill's 
reading, includes a common good, because the world we live in is always one of 
values as well), and this common world gives rise to language as well as 
deliberative practices. Heidegger calls this discourse. "That common world and 
common good give rise to discourse" (McNeill, 2006, pp. 79-82). Discourse 
gives one the ways of conceptualizing (through articulation) the world and the 
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entities within it, and thus allows one to decide in what ways to act in any 
given situation. "One's deliberations derive from that communal dimension as 
they are discursive (and this is true for ethical deliberation and phronesis as 
well)" (McNeill, 2006, pp. 79-82). Taking something as a certain kind of thing 
and acting in certain a kind of way are, in so far as they are based in being-with, 
part of the discourse that articulates the common world. 
As discourse being-with articulates the way in which things are understood as 
well as Dasein's attunement. Articulation refers to the way in which some 
things are taken as belonging together and some things as belonging apart. As 
"the articulation of the intelligibility of the 'there', [discourse] is a primordial 
existentiale of disclosedness" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 204), which is to say that it 
is one of the basic faculties with which Dasein discloses the world and the 
entities it finds in the world. Discourse is the foundation of language as well as 
the discursive practices that exist in cultures and traditions, as these articulate 
the world and the entities in it. "The intelligibility of being-in-the-world — an 
intelligibility which goes with [attunement] — expresses itself as discourse 
[spricht sich als Rede aus]. This totality-of-significations of intelligibility is put 
into words" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 204). In other words, language and cultural 
practices have their basis in being-with. 
Because we often act out of deliberations, and because deliberations are 
discursive and, as such, based in the common world which is itself based in the 
with-world of being-with, our deliberations are themselves collective in origin. 
The terms I have used for the collective ways of conceiving of and acting in 
relation to things is das Man. "Thus one's deliberations take the form of 'one 
does ...'". (McNeill, 2006, pp. 79-82). "This 'one' [das Man], properly 
understood, is the 'how' of everydayness, of our average, concrete being-with-
one-another; from it arise the ways in which human beings 'at first and for the 
most part' see and are affected by and address the world" (McNeill, 2006, p. 
82). 
Here we encounter a clear link with educational practice. On the basis of the 
above we can say that some perspectives on things (taking them as certain 
kinds of things and acting in relation to them in certain ways) that are 
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collective in origin are actualized as concrete perspectives in the individual 
Dasein. Another way of saying this would be that some perspectives from the 
collective are "internalized", which is a common way of explaining how a 
person ends up looking at things in a way that is similar to the way others, 
especially those close to them during their formative years, looked at them. 
The Heideggerian way to describe such "internalization" is, first, to reject the 
internal/external dichotomy: Dasein is transcendence and other people are 
there with them in the world that shows up in the transcendence. What 
happens during "internalization" is that, as a result of the individuals 
concerned being turned towards the same entities in the world and in the same 
way, this way of being turned towards these entities sticks (a process that can 
be explained by the conventional accounts of learning I discussed in Chapter 
2). The reason we then observe that one individual (e.g., the child) has adopted 
the ways of being of the other (e.g., the culture they grow up in or the parent) 
is that what they were turned towards had previously not been articulated (i.e. 
taking some things as belonging together and some as belonging apart) in as 
coherent, persuasive or committed a way by the child as it had been by the 
culture of the parent. And it is this articulation that does the work in 
"internalization", where the process, from the perspective of the child is one of 
partaking in the articulation. Thus the process of enculturation is another apt 
way of putting the process of internalization, or, as Heidegger would say, 
entering into das Man. 
With this we have an account of the collective dimension of das Man, including 
the way in which the individual is "enculturated" into it. But, as it has been put 
several times in this thesis, becoming authentic involves "bringing oneself back 
from lostness in das Man". We, therefore, need an account of the basic faculty 
of being-with as it exists for the Dasein that has extracted itself from das Man, 
while retaining what is essential to being-with. But before we can do so, we 
need to look at the interpersonal dimension of being-with, at the way two 
individual Daseins encounter each other. This is an aspect of being-with, but it 
has received much less attention that the communal aspect in Heidegger's 
writings. 
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6.1.1.3Being-with in terms of interpersonal relationships 
Heidegger points out how we encounter the other Dasein through our 
engagement with practical (ready-to-hand) entities. "The structure of the 
world's worldhood is such that others are not proximally present-at-hand as 
free-floating subjects along with other things, but show themselves in the 
world in their special environmental being, and do so in terms of what is 
ready-to-hand in that world" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 160). We encounter the 
things in the world as things that other Daseins are also involved in. For 
example, "along with the equipment to be found when one is at work, those 
others for whom the 'work' is destined are 'encountered' too". Or when "we 
walk along the edge of a field [...] the field shows itself as belonging to such-
and-such a person" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 153). And we could add that, if, for 
example, we walked carelessly across the field, we would be shown to 
ourselves, from the perspective of the farmer, as someone trespassing or 
trampling their crops. 
This is a rather limited account of how we encounter other individuals, in that 
it is via the entities we encounter in the world and not, as it were, face to face. 
Sarah Sorial, in her PhD Thesis about Heidegger's notion of being-with, 
discusses how "the other" (the individual one comes face to face with) fails to 
become truly another person in Heidegger's analysis. This other person 
becomes somehow strangely impersonal, like a flat character in a play. "The 
specificity of the other, that unknowable and evasive aspect of the other 
expressed in her face and by her speech is something that Heidegger bypasses 
in his pursuit of Being" (Sorial, 2005, p. 144). That is, "Heideggerian ontology, 
effaces the alterity of the other by reducing her to the anonymous categories of 
Being" (Sorial, 2005, p. 144). What this means is that Heidegger loses sight of 
the "ontic [actual and concrete] differences and multiplicity that exists in 
concrete relations between Daseins" (Sorial, 2005, p. 144). In other words, 
Heidegger fails to bring out what is specific about the experience of 
encountering "another person", their specific individuality, their specificity and 
their particularity. We saw examples of this at the beginning of this chapter 
when I quoted from Heidegger's descriptions of how we encounter the other 
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person, which, in his writings is, almost always, indirectly, like when we make 
something for them or walk along their field. 
Another indication of Heidegger's neglect in this area is the lack of discussions 
of the most important interpersonal events in people's lives, such as love and 
friendship. The word "love", for example, occurs only once in the whole of 
Being and Time, and even then only as a mention in a footnote about anxiety 
(Heidegger, 1962, p. 492). Similarly, the word "friend" only occurs twice, but 
never as part of a discussion of friendship itself (Heidegger, 1962, p. 206 & 
294). What is more, this friend "has no distinguishing attributes he  or she 
appears to have no face, no figure, no sex, no name. It is not man or woman, 
nor is it an 'I,' a subject or a person. Rather, it is another Dasein that each 
Dasein carries with it, in the form of a voice it hears in itself' (Sorial, 2005, p. 
103). Contrast this with a concept like truth, which appears dozens of times, 
and it becomes clear that it was not Heidegger's priority to specify different 
possibilities with regard to interpersonal relationships. 
Given the limitations of Heidegger's account of interpersonal relationships, I 
will attempt to construct one, using his claim that, from the perspective of 
being-with, Dasein is "for the sake of others" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 160). We 
already saw in Chapter 4 that Dasein is properly understood in terms of itself 
only. So, when an individual Dasein meets another Dasein, how is it to take 
this other Dasein? If this Dasein (Dasein 1) was to understand the other 
Dasein (Dasein 2) like it understands ready-to-hand or present-at-hand objects 
(i.e. in terms of Dasein l's world, the totality of references Dasein 1 has), then 
it would not understand this Dasein 2 in an authentic way (in accordance with 
the being of Dasein 2). This is because Dasein 2 has its own world from out of 
which it understands itself as well as the entities it encounters. This Dasein 2 
understands itself from out of its own world, and this self-understanding from 
out of its own world is the most fundamental way in which Dasein 2 can be 
understood (more fundamental than any theoretical or instrumental way). As 
Heidegger puts it: "Dasein's being [is] that being for the sake of which Dasein 
itself is as it is" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 160). This reasoning lies at the heart of 
Heidegger's argument that each individual Dasein can only be understood in 
an authentic way if it is understood in terms of its own experience of the 
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world, as its own for the sake of which, its own end as well as totality of 
references. 
But in the context of being-with Heidegger brings in another factor, namely, 
the notion that, when we encounter another Dasein, because that Dasein has 
its own world, its own for the sake of we also encounter ourselves as existing 
for the sake of (in terms of the world of) that other Dasein: "as being-with, 
Dasein 'is' essentially for the sake of others" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 160). Such an 
existing for the sake of others does not mean that one exists for the benefit of 
others, as subordinate to their wishes and needs. Nor does it simply imply that 
one means something to the other person in terms of the other person's world, 
though that is undoubtedly the case as well. Rather, it means that in oneself, as 
part of one's own perspective, one exists as for the sake of the other person. 
That is, one is always also who one is in terms of the world of the other 
person, where this being in terms of the world of the other person is fundamental to 
one's being. There is no self that is more basic than the one that exists in terms 
of the other person (though the communal dimension of being-with as well as 
other parts of the self - attunement and understanding - are co-original with 
it). One could say that, from one's own perspective, one exists from the perspective 
of the other person as well. Or to use Heidegger's phrase, one becomes 
disclosed in one's Dasein in "being-with, as the existential 'for the sake of of 
others" (Heidegger 1962). 
Importantly, this phenomenon of existing from the perspective of others is 
always the case ontologically (at the level of possibility), but only the case in 
certain ways ontically (in actual, concrete situations). That is, it is, for 
example, not the case that one necessarily exists for oneself in terms of the world 
of the neurotic person that works in the office canteen. Such an existing in 
terms of the world of the other person is there always in principle (at the level 
of possibility), but the actual perspectives of the individuals one is in contact 
with do not all get actualized in oneself (which in the case of the above 
example would involve actualizing a neurotic perspective on oneself, which 
could be quite disturbing). That is, though the phenomenon of existing from 
the perspective of the other is always there in the form of possibility, not all 
the perspectives become actualized as concrete (factual) perspectives one has 
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on oneself (To repeat what has been stated several times before, for Heidegger 
possibility constitutes the primordial nature of Dasein and is, therefore, not 
only that which makes the actual possible, but also, and more importantly, that 
which constitutes authentic Dasein). 
So we can say that the faculty of being-with implies that an individual exists as 
from the perspective of the other individual. Such existing as from the perspective of 
the other is there first as possibility, where some of the possibilities become 
actualized, notably those perspectives that are held by those close to the 
individual (parents, for example, but also the language and culture the 
individual grows up in). These perspectives themselves consist of articulation, 
of taking some things as belonging together and some as belonging apart, 
which manifest as ways of being turned towards entities in the world. And we 
already saw in the discussion of being-with as existing as part of a community 
how the perspectives others have on the things one find in the world can 
become "internalized" by the individual Dasein. To this I can now add that the 
perspectives others may have on the individual Dasein get internalized by that 
Dasein. 
Now that we have a sense of the dimension of being-with, we can consider 
what authentic being-with is like. As we have seen in the analyses of authentic 
understanding and authentic mood, the authentic mode of Dasein is one where 
Dasein exists as possibility rather than any of the actual ways of being that lie 
in that possibility. Thus in authentic understanding Dasein existed as the 
possibility to have an understanding of being, prior to adopting any actual 
understanding of being. Likewise, in authentic mood, Dasein existed as the 
possibility of being affected by the entities it finds in the world, prior to being 
affected in any actual way. So when we now seek to establish what the mode of 
authentic being-with is like, we need to look in the direction of Dasein existing 
as the possibility of existing for itself from the perspective of the other (prior 
to entering into any such perspective in actuality), as well as existing in a 
common world (prior to entering into any actual articulation of that world in 
das Man). 
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6.1.2 The poverty of Heidegger's account authentic being-with 
6.1.2.1 Authenticity is expressed mostly as individuality 
One difficulty in finding a description of authentic being-with in Being and 
Time is that the authentic mode is portrayed as one where Dasein becomes 
"individualized". For example, in the authentic state of "anxiety" (the mood of 
being both "detached from" and "near to" the entities one finds in the world) 
"[t]he 'world' can offer nothing more, and neither can the Dasein-with of others" 
(Heidegger, 1962, p. 232, emphasis added). Or, "anxiety discloses Dasein as 
[...] something individualized in individualization" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 232), 
where the German, "vereinzelt in der Vereinzelung", is actually stronger than the 
translation, "individualized in individualization", suggests, because it can also 
be translated as "isolated in isolation" or "separated in separation". Likewise, in 
the context of authentic understanding, Heidegger writes that "all being-with 
others, will fail us when our ownmost potentiality-for-Being the authentic 
facing of death] is the issue." (Heidegger, 1962, p. 307). It, therefore, seems as 
if Heidegger claims that in its authentic mode Dasein becomes individualized, 
to the point where the faculty of being-with either disappears altogether or 
becomes irrelevant. 
We find this kind of critique back in Lambert Zuidervaart's charge that 
Heidegger "turns the truth of Dasein into a denial of mediation" (Zuidervaart, 
2007, p. 94), because for Heidegger "[t]he most primordial truth is an 
anticipatory resoluteness [i.e. authenticity] whereby Dasein secures its own 
`freedom towards death' in disentanglement from the entities, including others, 
to which Dasein necessarily stands in relation" (Zuidervaart, 2007, p. 91). But 
now that we have looked in more detail at the notion of being-with, we can see 
that Zuidervaart's notion of intersubjectivity keeps looking for a connection 
between separate individuals, where what we need is an account of authenticity 
that does justice to the fundamental nature of being-with, which goes beyond 
that of a connection between separate individuals. 
One possible solution to the difficulty of reconciling the individuality 
associated with authenticity with the fundamental character of being-with is 
suggested by Sorial, who argues that it is the very individuality (note that she 
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mainly uses Nancy's concept of "singularity") that is shared in being-with. 
"While we are all different in the sense that we have different faces and bodies, 
mannerisms and gestures, while we have different possibilities and will pursue 
different projects, there remains a commonality about our experiences. Our 
bodies are all capable of feeling pain when hurt, we all fall in love and desire, 
weep and grieve and we all share the experience of being-toward-death. What 
is shared here is our singularity ..." (Sorial, 2005, pp. 89-90). Thus our 
individuality (singularity) not only divides us but also unites us. "This sharing 
of singularities are what constitute the 'we.' Singularity refers to both the 
uniting and dividing phenomenon of being-with; uniting because it is what we 
all share, but also what divides us because there remains something unique and 
untransferable about our singularity" (Sorial, 2005, pp. 89-90). 
But Sorial's proposal fails to do justice to the nature of being-with. It 
understands the relationships between individuals in present-at-hand terms, in 
terms analogous to us being divided because, for example, all of us are wearing 
a different cap, but united because every cap has the quality of being different. 
This translates into saying that each Dasein is individual, because it is its own 
"for the sake of which", but all Daseins are united because they all have this 
"for the sake of which". Thus she writes that "[d]eath is both a singular and 
shared experience, in the sense that finitude and mortality is something that 
we share, but that we also have to assume individually. The experience of 
death, my death, or the death of the other demonstrates to me that the only 
thing I can recognise in the death of the other is that there is nothing 
recognisable" (Sorial, 2005, p. 93). 
What is missing here is the incorporation of the idea I considered earlier, 
namely, that "as being-with, Dasein 'is' essentially for the sake of others" 
(Heidegger, 1962, p. 160). That is, all Daseins do not only share the fact that 
they all have their own individualized perspective on the world, but also the 
fact that for each Dasein their own perspective exists as existing in terms of 
the perspectives of other Daseins. It is, therefore, not so much a sharing of 
present-at-hand qualities or characteristics, but a sense of being constituted by 
the other, while retaining one's inalienable individuality, which I am after. 
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6.1.2.2Authentic interpersonal relationships 
One place where Heidegger does write something about authentic 
interpersonal relationships is where he writes that authentic Dasein has the 
possibility to "let the others who are with it 'be' their ownmost potentiality-
for-being, and so co-disclose this potentiality in the solicitude which leaps 
forth and liberates" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 344). That is, authentic Dasein can 
show other Daseins that they have the possibility to be authentic as well. And 
it can, according to this citation, be done in a solicitude (Fuersorge, the kind of 
care human beings have for each other) that "leaps forth and liberates". This 
particular authentic care is one that is contrasted with inauthentic care, which 
consists of "taking care of or caring for the other in her place, to spare her 
from the troubles of care" (Nancy, 2008, pp. 6,7). Such inauthentic care 
"relieves the other of her own care" (Nancy, 2008, pp. 6,7) and can be seen 
along the lines of a kind of care that takes the other's responsibility away, but 
with that also, in some way, their dignity. In contrast, authentic care, by 
showing the other the possibility of authentic existence, "hands them" the 
possibility of taking such responsibility for themselves. 
Jean-Luc Nancy believes that this notion of authentic care is not fully 
intelligible, as he asks how we can "leap ahead of the decision and the opening 
of the other [...] so as to 'hand it over' to her? This is not clearly established" 
(Nancy, 2008, pp. 6,7). As Nancy is well-aware, it is not about the "handing 
over" between two present-at-hand entities that exist external to each other 
but rather one of co-constituting the transcendence that each individual Dasein 
is. As Heidegger puts it, "Dasein-with [being-with] is already essentially 
manifest in a co-state-of-mind and a co-understanding" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 
205). So we could say that such authentic care for the other does justice to the 
individuality (singularity) of each Dasein (in that responsibility is left with, or 
even handed back to, the Dasein that is being shown authentic care), while the 
very possibility of such authentic interpersonal care is based in the shared 
nature of being-with. So the question of how such "handing over" is possible is, 
given that the notion of being-with we have got from Heidegger entails this 
possibility, secondary to the question of what this notion of authentic being-
with is. 
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The other place where we find Heidegger write about authentic interpersonal 
relationships is when he writes about working together. Jean-Luc Nancy 
objects that it is not clear how authentic working together can happen. The 
contrast is one between inauthentic working together where "we find a 
common occupation by virtue of an exterior task" and authentic working 
together where "we find an engagement for the same affair [Sache] in 
common" (Nancy, 2008, p. 7). Nancy writes that in the case of authentic 
working together "there must be a common thing or cause" (Nancy, 2008, p. 
7). When we look closely at what it says in Being and Time, we find that 
Heidegger writes that people working together authentically are engaged with 
the same thing, in the sense of being wholeheartedly involved in it (sick 
gemeinsam einsetzen fuer dieselbe Sache), in a way that is determined by, driven 
by the engagement that each individual (eigens) Dasein has (Heidegger, 1962, 
p. 159). In other words, the cooperation is not external (as in the inauthentic 
way of working together on the same external task where, for example, for one 
the task means an opportunity for making money, while for the other it means a 
way to get personal satisfaction) but consists of those involved being truly 
engaged in the same thing, where they have each appropriated the task for 
themselves (including the reasons for doing it, which are probably, though this 
is not made clear, internal to the task) in such a way that they can be said to 
have a common world with a common good. But, again the shortcoming in 
Heidegger's account seems to be that we cannot determine what such 
authentic working together would mean, because we lack, as yet, a concept of 
authentic being-with. 
So, just as we saw in the discussion of authentic care for the other person, 
there is a combination of having a shared understanding and attunement (a co-
understanding and a co-attunement based in being-with) while retaining the 
individuality of each Dasein. And again the shortcoming in Heidegger's 
account appears to be in characterizing authentic being-with. However, now 
we find, in Heidegger's description of inauthentic working together, that he 
associates this with "distance and reserve" as well as "mistrust" (Heidegger, 
1962, p. 159), which points towards the likelihood that authentic working 
together would be associated with their opposites. However, a correct working 
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out of such opposites still requires an understanding of authentic being with, 
because authenticity is not simply the opposite of inauthenticity but that which 
makes the inauthentic mode possible in the first place, and, therefore, it cannot 
be simply inferred from the inauthentic state what the authentic one would be 
like. 
6.1.2.3 The authentic community 
Jean-Luc Nancy also critiques Heidegger's notion of authentic being-with as it 
manifests as the authentic community. According to Nancy, Heidegger falls 
into the trap of privileging the collective in his notion of the people as 
authentic being-with. First he notes that "Heidegger does everything to affirm 
the essentiality of the with" (Nancy, 2008, p. 3), where this "with" is not "the 
simple external 'with' of things which are only put together, only contiguous 
to one another" (Nancy, 2008, p. 3). But, though being-with is not simply the 
being together of externally related Daseins, Nancy also rejects the 
interpretation of the "with" which we may call the internal "with", the one that 
supposes "a single communal Dasein beyond the singulars" (Nancy, 2008, p. 4). 
In the case of an internal "with" the individual Dasein is but an expression of 
the collective, and as such subordinate to it. Between these two extremes the 
right understanding of being-with would, according to Nancy, "require that 
the openings that  constitute the individual Daseins] intersect each other in 
some way, that they cross, mix or let their properties interfere with one 
another, but without merging into a unique Dasein (or else the mit [the with 
would be lost)?" (Nancy, 2008, p. 4). As we saw in the discussion of authentic 
being-with in terms of interpersonal relationships, what we need is an account 
of being-with that does justice to, on the one hand, the notions of co-
understanding and co-attunement and, on the other hand, the individuality 
(singularity) of Dasein. 
In his account of the authentic community Heidegger, according to Nancy, 
puts so much emphasis on the collective dimension that the individual becomes 
subordinate to the collective. We encounter much the same objection, when 
Lambert Zuidervaart notes that there was a problem with Heidegger's notion 
of authenticity as implying that "participation in an exclusive community is the 
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proper path to authentic truth" (Zuidervaart, 2007, p. 87): while authenticity 
may in itself not be verifiable in a public way, Heidegger does nominate das 
Volk, the people of a specific nationality, as the authentic community. That is, 
Heidegger argues that a people (das Volk) is the site where authentic being-
with manifests. Thus Zuidervaart writes that Heidegger's notion of 
authenticity comes to imply that "participation in an exclusive community is 
the proper path to authentic truth" (Zuidervaart, 2007, p. 87). This would be 
so, because, on the one hand, authenticity is the one measure of truth, but is in 
itself not verifiable in a public way, while, on the other hand, a certain kind of 
community (das Volk, the people of a specific nationality) becomes Heidegger's 
expression of the authentic community, as based in Dasein's being-with. Thus, 
given Heidegger's involvement with Nazism, Zuidervaart writes that "Adorno 
had good reason to attack the 'jargon of authenticity' as a 'German ideology'" 
(Zuidervaart, 2007, pp. 86-87). 
Returning to Nancy, as a result of this privileging of das Volk the individual 
becomes, according to Nancy, subordinate to the collective, thus giving up the 
individuality that is necessary for authentic being-with: "the community that 
becomes a single thing (body, mind, fatherland, leader ...) necessarily loses the 
in of being-in-common. Or, it loses the with or the together that defines it" 
(Cited in Sorial, 2005, pp. 90-91). According to Nancy, Heidegger ascribes "to 
community a common being, whereas community is a matter of something quite 
different, namely, of existence inasmuch as it is in common, but without letting 
itself be absorbed into a common substance" (Cited in Sorial, 2005, pp. 90-91). 
"It is precisely because we are singular beings that the project of fusion or 
communion is problematic for Nancy" (Sorial, 2005, pp. 90-91). 
Benjamin Crowe takes a more positive view of Heidegger's notion of the 
authentic community. As we saw when we looked at authentic interpersonal 
relationships in terms of working together, "authentic individuals participate 
in one way or another in the resolution of common problems or in the 
realization of common goals" (Crowe, 2006, p. 203). This is expanded in 
Heidegger's notion of the "generation", where individuals growing up in the 
same culture, as part of the same generation, share certain ways of looking at 
things (for example, the inter-war generation in Germany that all had to come 
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to terms with what they considered an unfair defeat in the First World War) 
as well as challenges (for example, restoring Germany's sense of dignity). 
Thus, Crowe writes, "an authentic individual inevitably incorporates shared 
ideals and projects into her overall pattern of vocational commitment, simply 
by virtue of belonging to a 'generation— (Crowe, 2006, p. 203). This is the 
fateful philosophical move that, one could argue, eventually led Heidegger to 
ally himself politically with the Nazis. 
Thus Heidegger writes in § 74 of Being and Time how the moment of authentic 
understanding is one that always occurs as a collective event as well as an 
individual one: "if fateful Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, exists essentially in 
Being-with others, its historizing [Geschehen, similar to what earlier we called 
seizing the moment] is a co-historizing [Mitgeschehen], and is determinative for 
it as destiny (Geschick)" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 436). That is, the event of 
"historizing", the authentic seizing of the moment, happens in the context of a 
collective phenomenon, the generation. Thus Heidegger writes about "the 
historizing of the community, of a people" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 436) and that 
"Dasein's fateful destiny in and with its 'generation' goes to make up the full 
authentic historizing of Dasein" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 436). This, as we saw 
earlier, is where Nancy charges that Heidegger makes the individual 
subordinate to the collective. 
Though it is true that Heidegger does, at certain points, emphasize how the 
individual Daseins become authentic in a way that is in some ways inalienably 
collective, it goes, I think, too far to say that he subordinates the individual to 
the collective in any systematic way. It is true that he writes, for example, that 
Top ur fates have already been guided in advance, in our Being-with-one-
another in the same world and in our resoluteness for definite possibilities" 
(Heidegger, 1962, p. 436), but that does not mean that we can find in Being and 
Time anything like a systematic subordination of the individual to the 
collective. Indeed, the criticism I discussed earlier, that the collective 
dimension tends to be lost in his account of authenticity, is easier to defend, 
simply on the basis of the weight of the textual evidence, and it is hard to see 
how the two can be true at the same time. 
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It seems to me that the difficulty again stems from the fact that Heidegger has 
not worked out the concept of authentic being-with in a way that can 
accommodate the different demands such a concept raises: the preservation of 
both the individual and the collective dimensions of Dasein as well as the 
notion that Dasein exists "for the sake of the other Dasein as well as for its 
own sake. Benjamin Crowe comes closer to a satisfactory, if also limited, 
account of authentic being-with, drawing on Heidegger's writings that precede 
Being and Time and that draw more explicitly on religious sources. Crowe 
combines the notions of sharing membership of a generation with the 
interpersonal commitment to authentic individuality: "we find Heidegger 
elaborating the idea of a generational 'community of struggle' 
[Kampfgemeinschaft]. Here individuals are united not only through a common 
culture or a shared historical situation, but also through a commitment on the 
part of each person to the value of an authentic way of life" (Crowe, 2006, p. 
203). 
Importantly, the collective dimension of the authentic community as Crowe 
finds it in Heidegger's early writings is a far cry from the kinds notion of 
subordinating individuals to the collective. "This commitment seems to entail 
the rejection of paternalistic relationships of a sort that ultimately subjugate 
other people by encouraging the innate drive of self-abdication. In place of 
this, Heidegger envisions the possibility of a community in which each 
individual exemplifies what it means to be authentic in his or her own unique 
way" (Crowe, 2006, p. 203). Crowe does not elaborate on this notion of the 
authentic community in enough detail for it to yield the kind of notion of 
authentic being-with that I require, but he does point in a direction that can be 
taken up to construct a notion of authentic being-with that allows for both an 
authentic community and authentic interpersonal relationships. 
6.2 The call of conscience 
We saw in the previous section that Heidegger's account of authenticity 
requires an account of authentic being-with and that such an account will have 
to do justice to both Dasein's individuality and to the ways in which the 
communal as well as the interpersonal are co-constitutive of this Dasein. The 
192 
elements of authentic being-with that I have been able to glean from 
Heidegger's writings are that of a care for the other person which shows the 
other the possibility of authentic existence and "hands them" the possibility of 
taking responsibility for themselves; a working together from out of a common 
world and a common good; and a generation which shares a common culture 
or a shared historical situation, but also a commitment on the part of each 
individual to the value of an authentic way of life. I will now attempt to bring 
these together in a coherent concept of authentic being-with, with the help of 
Heidegger's notion of the "call of conscience", which is, as a form of discourse, 
part of being-with, and which plays an important part in Heidegger's account 
of the process of becoming authentic. 
6.2.1 The nature of the call of conscience 
6.2.1.1 The nature of the call 
As we have seen, Heidegger writes that for Dasein to become authentic, it 
needs to be brought back from lostness in das Man. That is, "because Dasein is 
lost in das Man, it must first find itself. In order to find itself at all, it must be 
`shown' to itself in its possible authenticity" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 313). In other 
words, because Dasein has tended to understand itself in terms of das Man it is 
not aware of its possibility of authentic existence, and as such it needs to have 
this possibility pointed out to it. What Dasein needs to be shown is that it is 
already authentic in potential: "[i]n terms of its possibility, Dasein is already a 
potentiality-for-being-its-self for  being authentic], but it needs to have this 
possibility attestedu" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 313). This notion of "being shown 
what one already is" is very much in line with perfectionism, with "becoming 
who one is", as we saw in the chapter on Heidegger's notion of authenticity. 
And, Heidegger continues, "this potentiality [for-being-itself] is attested 
[bezeugt] by that which is familiar to us as the 'voice of conscience— 
(Heidegger, 1962, p. 313). As such, the call of conscience is that which, more 
92 The English attestation is the translation of the German Bezeugung, which also means 
testimony. To attest can be translated as to give testimony of, to confirm the truth of 
something by saying something about it; express one's respect, sympathy, mercy to someone. 
The root word in Bezeugung is Zeuge, which means witness, and which is etymologically 
related to the word zeigen, which means to show. 
193 
than anything else in Being and Time, can be said to bring Dasein back from 
lostness in das Man. 
The call of conscience is itself a phenomenon with the nature of Dasein (i.e. it 
is not a practical or a theoretical entity), which is located both "in" oneself and 
somewhere "beyond" oneself. Thus Heidegger writes that "we must ... hold 
fast .... to the phenomenal finding that I receive the call as coming both from 
me and beyond me, but also to the implication that this phenomenon here is 
delineated ontologically as a phenomenon of Dasein" (Heidegger, 1962). 
Another way of putting it could be to say that the call is located in Dasein, but 
that at the level of the call Dasein is undifferentiated as to the individual and 
the collective. This is very much in line with the notion that authentic being-
with has to be able to accommodate the individual as well as the interpersonal 
and the communal dimensions of human existence. That is, the voice of 
conscience is neither a voice that comes from outside the person (as in a literal 
"hearing" the call of conscience) nor is it an internal dialogue taking place in 
the individual — it is somehow prior to the separation of individuals. 
Therefore, when Heidegger writes that "[i] n conscience Dasein calls itself 
(Heidegger, 1962, p. 320), we have to take "Dasein" as a generic term. Thus, 
the call of conscience can come, for example, from another person or through 
the reading of poetry — just as we sometimes say that a poem speaks for the 
whole of humanity, we could say that the call speaks for the whole of 
humanity. This undifferentiated element of the call of conscience is further 
accentuated when Heidegger writes about the call that —It' calls" (Heidegger, 
1962, p. 320). This phrase, "it calls" [es raft], has the grammatical structure, 
sometimes called the middle voice, which we find in phrases like "it rains" or "it 
sometimes happens that". This "middle voice" indicates that there is no subject 
in the sense of an agent who or that does the "raining" or the "happening". 
Another way of saying the same thing, contrived though this may sound in 
English, is that "there is a calling of the voice of conscience". 
What this means is that the call exists prior to there being a differentiated 
subject. This is similar to what I said about authentic understanding (4.2.3) 
which, I said, occurs prior to the separation of subject and object at the 
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moment when "Temporality [...] temporalises itself" (Heidegger, 1962, pp. 376-
377): prior to an engagement with entities in terms of action and perception 
where there is no separation between the subject and object moments in the 
intentional act. Similarly, prior to the differentiation between individuals or 
between the individual and the collective, there is no separation between the 
one call and the one hearing. But, importantly, there can still be calling and 
hearing, it's just that now this process is best characterized with the phrase "it 
calls", where this call comes from both the person hearing it and from beyond 
them. 
As we saw in Chapter 5, the caller of the call is "Dasein in its uncanniness", 
and that "[c]onscience is the call of care from the uncanniness of being-in-the-
world" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 335), where uncanniness literally means "not-at-
home-ness" or being in a place that feels "uncomfortably strange or 
unfamiliar". That is, the caller is experienced as "Dasein ... as the 'not-at-home' 
— the bare 'that-it-is' in the 'nothing' of the world" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 321). 
But this Dasein is, in terms of attunement, authentic Dasein, who experiences 
the entities it encounters in the world in a way that it is at once disconnected 
from them and near to them. As such, this Dasein is fully individualized, 
because it has not identified with anything, but at the same time it is open to 
being affected by them. This is also the Dasein that is able to exist prior to a 
differentiation between subject and object, because it has not identified with 
anything in the world. And it is able to communicate with other Daseins, 
because it is near to them, open to them, the more so, because it has not 
become absorbed in the (practical and theoretical) entities it finds in the world. 
We can, therefore, in the call of conscience arising from Dasein in the mood of 
authenticity, see the beginnings of a Dasein that can resolve in itself the 
ostensible contradiction of authentic being-with involving both Dasein's 
individuality and the ways in which the communal as well as the interpersonal 
are co-constitutive of this Dasein. But, as was said in the chapter on authentic 
attunement, this characterization of authentic Dasein as "the bare 'that-it-is' in 
the 'nothing' of the world" lacks an affective disposition that is appropriate for 
authentic inter-human relationships: it may experience nearness and openness 
towards entities, but this is not quite the same as feeling the kinds of emotions 
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we associate with deep interpersonal connectedness. I will return to this later 
in the chapter. 
Authentic Dasein is also the Dasein that has brought itself "back from lostness 
in das Man" (Heidegger, 1962, pp. 312-313). As all language is part of das Man, 
there is, therefore, the implication that there can be some kind of 
communication that is prior to language. Such a communication that is not 
based in language is one that does not take things as certain things, either 
practically (when, for example, a pupil takes a window as a way of exiting the 
classroom) or theoretically (when, for example, the teacher takes the pupil's 
behaviour as meriting a sticker with a disapproving face on their report card), 
because language articulates, and taking things as certain things is a form of 
articulation. The call of conscience does not take Dasein as anything, because 
Dasein can be understood in terms of itself only, having its own "for the sake 
of". Yet it plays an important part in bringing Dasein "back from lostness in 
das Man" (Heidegger, 1962, pp. 312-313), as we will see later, in that it shows 
Dasein that it has the possibility of authentic existence, appeals to Dasein to 
become authentic, summons it to being authentic, and calls Dasein forward into 
authentic existence. 
6.2.1 .2 Characteristics of the call of conscience 
I am trying to come closer to an account of authentic being-with that does 
justice to Dasein's individuality as well as to the ways in which the communal 
and the interpersonal are co-constitutive of this Dasein, where there is a 
concern for the other person's authentic existence, where working together 
occurs from out of a common world and a common good, where the communal 
is combined with a commitment on the part of each individual to the value of 
an authentic way of life. With regard to the call of conscience, we see that the 
voice of conscience, as it calls Dasein back from lostness in das Man, originates 
in authentic Dasein in such a way that it is prior to a differentiation into 
someone calling and someone hearing, thus allowing for the co-existence of 
individuality and the interconnection that is part of being-with. What is more, 
the call shows Dasein its possibility for being authentic in such a way that it 
does not take Dasein as either something practical or theoretical. I will 
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elaborate on these characteristics by considering some of the further 
characterizations of the call of conscience we find in Heidegger's writings. 
First, the call of conscience communicates in such a way that, though the 
message is communicated, there are no specifics about how this is done, that is, 
"the 'voice' is taken ... as a giving-to-understand" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 316), 
where "giving to understand" (zuverstehengeben) is a very general expression 
saying that something is communicated without being at all specific about the 
means of communication. This is similar to saying, for example, that one's 
attention was drawn to something, without specifying how this is done, thus 
avoiding the need to take recourse to the language of das Man. Another way of 
putting it is to say that Dasein is made aware of something (of itself as an 
entity with the nature of Dasein), in such a way that the awareness is not 
mediated by anything to do with das Man. 
Second, the call is reticent" in the sense of "being silent". "The call does not 
say anything, it remains silent, in its appeal to Dasein's authentic self to come 
to the fore" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 318). That is, "[t]he call [of conscience] 
asserts nothing, gives no information about world events, has nothing to tell" 
(Heidegger, 1962, p. 318). This is a claim Heidegger justifies 
phenomenologically, by writing that this reticent "giving to understand" is 
already there in our day-to-day understanding of the voice of conscience, for if 
"the everyday interpretation knows a 'voice' of conscience, then one is not so 
much thinking of an utterance (for this is something which factically one never 
comes across)" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 316). But the silence of the call of 
conscience also serves as a way of distancing it from anything like das Man, 
because all actual language, any kind of conventional sign, is of necessity part 
of das Man. Again the phrase "becoming aware of is apt, as this too can occur 
in silence. 
35 Reticence is the customary translation of the German Schweigen as it is used by Heidegger 
in Being and Time, but it should be noted that Schweigen can also be translated as remaining 
silent, and that it, importantly, does not allow for "saying little", as the English word 
reticence does, but insists on no words being said at all. 
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Third, Heidegger states that "[t]he call is indeed not, and can never be, 
planned, prepared for, or voluntarily enacted from ourselves" (Heidegger, 
1962, p. 320). This is an essential part of any call that does not originate in das 
Man, as all planning, preparation or purposeful action would either require 
language or be based in previous experience, and would, as such, need to be in 
terms of das Man. What is more, planning and preparation involved a crucial 
continuity, one that, as we will see shortly, is antithetical to the interruption 
that characterizes the voice of conscience, which is essentially an interruption, 
a "turning away from the world" before a "turning back". 
Finally, as the voice of conscience is a voice which does not belong to all the 
other voices that come to us from das Man, it stands out. "[t]he caller is 
unfamiliar to the everyday they-self the  self of das Man]; it is something like 
an alien voice" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 321). This notion of "a different voice", one 
that is unlike all the others (and is recognized as such), is not unfamiliar, for 
instance, in the world of art, where an artist may stand out because they are 
different from the others and where the different quality of their work may 
"interrupt" the way we tend to look at art. The same is true for other 
situations, such as "a different voice" in a discussion about an issue, a voice that 
seems to "come from a different place" and that makes us take a different 
stance towards the issue under discussion. Thus, the voice of conscience is 
unlike any voice that would come from das Man, and is, as such, capable of 
bringing something genuinely different to one's attention. 
Thus we see that the call of conscience is a silent, un-planned-for "giving to 
understand" that is different from any call that may come from das Man. This 
description allows the call to exist prior to any differentiation into a call and 
someone being called, while at the same time enabling it to affect Dasein, so 
that it can play its role in bringing Dasein "back from lostness in das Man" 
(Heidegger, 1962, pp. 312-313). There is a communication ("the call") that 
originates in authentic Dasein ("uncanniness"), arising ("it calls") in a way that 
is prior to a differentiation between the caller and a listener ("the call as 
coming both from me and beyond me"), and that brings to Dasein's awareness 
("giving to understand") in an unspecified ("silent"), yet unmistakable way 
("alien voice") what kind of entity it really (authentically) is and has the 
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potential to be (becoming "who one is") and it brings this to Dasein's 
awareness purely in terms of Dasein itself ("for the sake of") and not in terms 
of anything else (there is neither a practical nor a theoretical "as"). 
As such the call gives expression to the authentic being-with I am after, given 
that it does justice to Dasein's individuality as well as its communal and the 
interpersonal aspects, that it shows the other the possibility of authentic 
existence and call them forth into taking responsibility for themselves. An 
account of authentic being-with in terms of the communal, collective, 
dimension is missing in this account, as the communal element that is present, 
das Man, still has only a negative function, in that it is what Dasein needs to be 
liberated from. It remains to be seen if I can pick up a positive characterization 
of the communal dimension of authentic being-with later in the chapter. Before 
that, I will press on with our search for an account of being-with learning to be 
authentic, both so as not to stray too far from the main task of constructing 
such an account and to see if an account of this learning process may shed 
more light on authentic being-with itself, including its communal dimension. 
6.2.1.3 What happens when "it calls" 
As we have seen, the call of conscience plays an important role in bringing 
Dasein back from lostness in das Man, as it shows Dasein the possibility of 
authentic existence. More precisely, the call of conscience shows, points out to, 
Dasein that it has the possibility of authentic existence, it appeals to Dasein to 
become authentic, it summons it to being authentic, and it calls Dasein forward 
into authentic existence. This is where the "silent", "un-planned-for" "giving to 
understand" that is different from any call that may come from das Man brings 
Dasein "back from lostness in das Man" (Heidegger, 1962, pp. 312-313). As 
Benjamin Crowe writes: "The 'voice of conscience' is a way of capturing the 
power of the unexpected to make possible a new future for an individual, a 
future that has been set free for the possibility of living one's own life in one's 
own unique [authentic] way" (Crowe, 2006, p. 187). 
We could say that Dasein needs to be shown the structure in itself which is 
already there, but which it does not yet understand itself to have. However, for 
such a communication (which shows Dasein the potential it has for being 
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authentic) to get through to Dasein is difficult, as Dasein normally (in its 
inauthentic mode) hears everything through das Man, when Dasein 
understands itself as either as a practical entity (ready-to-hand) or as a 
theoretical entity (present-at-hand). Therefore, being "brought back from 
lostness in das Man" involves an interruption in this listening to, being 
absorbed in, das Man: Dasein's "listening-away to das Man] must get broken 
off' (Heidegger, 1962, p. 316). Only then can Dasein be shown the potential it 
has for being authentic. 
But what must be interrupted is in this case not a certain kind of information 
but rather the way in which one understands things, it is not that new facts 
about oneself are called for but a radically different way of relating to oneself. 
Heidegger refers to this different way of relating to oneself as "another kind of 
hearing", as he writes that "the possibility of another kind of hearing which 
will interrupt [the listening away to das Man] must be given by Dasein itself. 
The possibility of its thus getting broken off lies in its being appealed to 
without mediation of  das Man]" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 316). 
The way this new kind of hearing is awakened is that "only the self of the they-
self gets appealed [anrufee] to and brought to listen" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 
317). That is, Dasein is appealed to in its authentic self, Dasein is being called on 
to be its authentic self, "it has been summoned [aufgerufen] to itself — that is, 
to its ownmost potentiality-for-being [i.e. being authentic] (Heidegger, 1962, 
p. 318). In other words, the call summons Dasein to be authentic. What 
Heidegger does here is take the ability of language to "get someone to be in a 
certain way", by reminding them of who they are and pointing out the 
implications of that, as, for example, one would by appealing to someone's 
goodness and calling forth the good person in them. That is, the voice "calls 
Dasein forth (and 'forward') [nachvornerufen] into its ownmost possibilities, as 
a summons to its ownmost potentiality-for-being-its-self' (Heidegger, 1962, p. 
318).  
54 Note that Heidegger's play on the common root rufen (to call) in the words "appeal", 
"summon", and "call forward" is lost in translation. 
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This appealing, summoning, and calling forward does, as we have seen, happen 
in a way that does not involve das Man. Because the call of conscience is in 
every way unlike a call coming from das Man, "[t]he sort of Dasein which is 
understood after the manner of the world [das Man] ... gets passed over ...; this 
is something of which the call to the self takes not the slightest cognizance" 
(Heidegger, 1962, p. 317). That is, the call appeals to (anrufen) something in 
Dasein that is not shaped by das Man. "Precisely in passing over das Man [...] 
the call pushes it into insignificance" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 317). 
As the call gets through, as it by-passes das Man, it affects Dasein in its 
authentic mode. This is a shaking up, as part of the awakening I mentioned in 
Section 3.6.1. Heidegger writes, "[i]n the tendency to disclosure which 
belongs to the call, lies the momentum of a push — of an abrupt arousal" 
(Heidegger, 1962, p. 316). Here the call, having by-passed das Man, having 
appealed to authentic Dasein, summons Dasein to itself, which involves having 
a different kind of hearing and a different kind of understanding itself. 
With a slightly confusing dual use of the word "self", Heidegger explains this 
moment of Dasein having found a different kind of hearing, and understanding 
itself not in terms of das Man, as one where Dasein's "self" is being addressed, 
but this "self" is different from the "they self"" [the self of das Man] which has 
been by-passed and pushed into insignificance. This we could say is the 
moment of Dasein, as we saw in the chapter on Heidegger's notion of 
authenticity, "giving itself up", where the self that is given up is the self of the 
"they self" [das Man]. Thus he writes that "because only the self of the they-
self gets appealed [anrufen] to and brought to listen, the 'they' collapses" 
(Heidegger, 1962, p. 317). 
Then, after the initial awakening and the subsequent "giving up" of the "they 
self" [das Man], there is the moment of Dasein finding its authentic self. As 
the "they" is "passed over", "pushed into insignificance" and caused to 
"collapse", "the [authentic] self, which the appeal has robbed of its lodgement 
and hiding-place in das Man], gets brought to itself by the call" (Heidegger, 
35 Note that "the they" is one of the ways das Man has been translated into English. 
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1962, p. 317). Here we find a description of something akin to a rebirth in 
which the self is robbed of its hiding place, where the word hiding place 
implies that for Dasein understanding itself in terms of das Man is a kind of 
escape, of hiding away from its true self. And Dasein is brought to itself; 
because the call of conscience makes it understand itself as "in its ownmost 
potentiality for being itself'. 
By seeing it does have this potentiality-for-being-its-self (and seeing how it 
tends to constantly take itself to be something it is not — i.e. understanding 
itself out of das Man) Dasein drops its inauthentic way of being and begins to 
live according to this potentiality-for-being-its-self, that is, according to its 
own true nature. That is, because part of the structure of Dasein is such that it 
is what it takes itself to be, a change in the way it takes itself signifies a change 
in the way it actually is. This is based in the notion that when a person 
understands themselves suddenly as very different from how they had seen 
themselves before, this will affect how they act, and that if a person sees and 
does things very differently, we could say that they are a different person. 
In sum, the call appeals to Dasein's authentic self, "passing over" the self of das 
Man, where this involves interrupting the way Dasein usually listens 
(interrupting Dasein's listening away to das Man), in order to awakening 
another kind of hearing (one that does not listen through das Man), so that the 
call can reach Dasein's authentic self and summon it to being its own authentic 
self (without mediation). In this the call passes over das Man, so that das Man 
is pushed into significance and collapses, which exposes Dasein's authentic self, 
which then sees itself as it really is, as a result of which it takes itself as it 
really is and becomes this authentic self, because it is what it takes itself to be. 
As we can see there is circularity in the above sequence: Dasein only hears the 
call of conscience in so far as the call itself has awakened the kind of hearing 
that is receptive to the call. Or, in order for the call to be able to appeal to 
Dasein's authentic self, it needs to pass over the self of das Man, which it can 
only do in so far as it manages to appeal to Dasein's authentic self in a way 
that is unmediated by das Man. This would constitute a real problem for an 
account of the process of becoming authentic, if this process was conceived in 
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terms of the kind of communication that occurs between entities that are 
externally related, because then it would be analogous to saying that the only 
way to enter a particular empty house is through a door that can be opened 
only from the inside. In the case of the process of becoming authentic, 
however, this presents not so much a problem as something that requires 
explication, as the process does not occur between entities that are externally 
related, but at the level of the a priori. What is more, as we will see in the next 
section, the characteristic of being-with of allowing for both individuality and 
the other as well as the collective being co-constitutive of the individual 
Dasein means that the purported circularity may actually evolve into a 
benevolent cycle of increasing authenticity. 
6.3 Being-with learning to be authentic 
6.3.1 From inauthentic to authentic being-with 
As my focus for the process of being-with becoming authentic I will take the 
way the other Dasein is experienced in the context of communication. I will 
begin by characterising the difference between the experience of the other 
Dasein inauthentically and authentically. This experiential difference gives us 
the "before" and "after" of the learning. I will then characterise the nature of 
the process that is involved in going from this "before" to the "after". 
Authentic being-with is a way of being related to other Daseins, where this 
relationship is experienced not in terms of understanding (how the other is 
perceived or how one acts in relation to them) or attunement (the way in which 
one is oneself - as well as the world and the other Dasein - given to experience 
emotionally) but in terms of communication. Such a way of being related 
communicatively needs, to recap from the previous sections, to allow for 
Dasein's individuality as well as for the ways in which the communal and the 
interpersonal are co-constitutive of this Dasein; it needs to express a concern 
for the other person's authentic existence and "hand them" the possibility of 
taking responsibility for themselves; it needs to give rise to a working together 
from out of a common world and a common good, where individuals 
experience themselves as sharing a common culture or a historical situation, 
but also a commitment on the part of each individual to the value of an 
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authentic way of life. I will attempt to capture the move to such an authentic 
being-with in terms of a shift in communication from inauthentic to authentic. 
Inauthentic being-with differentiates one Dasein from the other (for example, 
the speaker from the listener) and the individual from the collective. It, 
furthermore, articulates similarities and differences between individuals and 
between a given individual and a given collective. These similarities and 
differences are expressed in the form of propositions concerning individuals or 
collectives (articulating essence, properties and relations) or culturally or 
historically determined ways of behaving towards individuals or collectives 
(articulating norms and practices), thus taking the individual as either a 
theoretical or a practical entity. The prevailing structure of such 
communications is that of taking the individual or the collective as something, 
either practically (what Heidegger calls the hermeneutic "as") or theoretically 
(what Heidegger calls the apophantic "as"). The relationships between 
individuals are, as a result, articulated and communicated in terms of 
similarities and differences between them. The relationship between a given 
individual and a given collective is, as a result, articulated and communicated 
in terms of wholes and parts: is the individual part of the collective whole or is 
the collective an aggregation of individual wholes? 
Given the characteristic of Dasein that it tends to "internalize" the ways in 
which the culture they grow up in and those nearest to it communicate about 
it, we can see that inauthentic being-with is highly likely to convey to the 
individual Dasein an inauthentic way of being-with, in communicating to this 
Dasein that it is separate from other Daseins and the collective; that it is 
similar or different from other Daseins and stands in part-whole relationship 
to the collective; that it is a practical and theoretical entity. If we then add that 
the individual Dasein is likely to become what it takes itself to be, we can see 
how inauthentic being-with, in communicating to and about this Dasein, is 
likely to add to its propensity to be inauthentic in terms of being-with. What is 
more, the other Dasein or the collective will also be approached in the spirit of 
such an inauthentic being-with. Such communications are then likely to appeal 
to inauthentic being-with in the other, to the other as a separate person, and be 
characterized by comparison (identifying similarities and differences) and 
I 
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inclusion in or exclusion from a given collective (identifying wholes and parts). 
The way individuals will be related to is then in terms of their theoretical 
characteristics (essence, properties and relations) and their practical 
characteristics (instrumentally). 
A clear example of such inauthentic being-with is bullying in schools (on the 
part of both staff and students), where individuals are judged (theoretically) in 
terms of being different (from the bully) and similar (to other "lesser" 
individuals), as a result of which they are not admitted as part of the in-group 
and are delegated to the out-group with whom they are said to share 
characteristics (part and whole), on the basis of which they merit being treated 
(practically) in certain ways. Similarly, the disaffected youth (perhaps himself a 
bully) who has internalized being labelled by teachers (theoretically) and who 
has been treated as a troublesome youngster (practically), classified as 
belonging to a certain group of students (as part of a whole), and compared 
with studious students (similarities and differences). This youth is likely to 
begin to experience themselves as meriting being labelled and consequently 
treated as a member of a certain kind of group, thus internalizing being taken 
as a theoretical and practical entity, which is inauthentic. That is, the 
inauthentic way of being-with will have been internalized, even if the youth in 
question decides they are going to make an effort to attract another label and 
earn a different kind of treatment or if they object to "their group" being 
labelled and treated in certain ways, as when they challenge, for example, 
being labelled and treated as lazy as a result of coming from a certain ethnic 
background. 
Turning now to authentic being-with, we can see that it communicates in such 
a way that it is prior to a differentiation into someone calling and someone 
hearing, thus allowing for the co-existence of, on the one hand, individuality 
and, on the other hand, the interconnection between individuals 
(interpersonally or collectively). This kind of communication is itself not based 
in (reducible to) either propositional language or culturally determined ways of 
behaving towards individuals or collectives, even if such communication does 
also take place. It does not take the other Dasein as a certain thing, either 
practically or theoretically, but takes Dasein in terms of itself only, as having 
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its own "for the sake or, and as such, as "possibility". It is concerned with 
showing the other person (or the collective) the possibility of existence outside 
the realm of articulation in terms of similarity and difference, wholes and 
parts. In this it leaves it to the other (individual or collective) to come to their 
own understanding of themselves and to take the step of taking themselves in 
terms of themselves only. 
6.3.1. 1 From inauthentic to authentic personal relationships 
If we try to envisage what such a way of being related would look like, we 
could say that the person taking the other person in the spirit of authentic 
being-with communicates with them in such a way that they do not distance 
themselves from the other person, but talk to them in a way that expresses a 
shared humanity, even as they accept the other person as an independent 
person in their own right. The real meaning of their communication would be 
at a level that is pre-linguistic, as this meaning would not lie in the theoretical 
or practical meaning of their words or deeds as part of the public discourse of a 
shared culture, but in the silent awareness of a shared potentiality for being 
authentic that is communicated through, but not reducible to, the actual words 
and deeds. The other person would be communicated with completely in their 
own right, as "possibility", and not as a certain kind of person who falls in a 
certain category or merits a certain way of behaving towards because of falling 
in that category. It would, therefore, not be predictable for either party what 
the actual nature of the communication would be. The individual who is being 
addressed would, however, have the unmistakable sense of being spoken to in 
the depth of their "real self". And the one speaking would disclose, for 
themselves as well as the other, what it is to be an authentic human being, 
where this disclosure is new and unanticipated every time it occurs. 
To return to our example of the disaffected youth, let's say in conversation 
with a teacher, they would be approached as a fellow human-being, an equal in 
value, without labelling or categorizing them as being a member of a category 
of individual. What is more, the individual would not be approached as having 
certain (fixed) characteristics (properties and relations) or a fixed essence 
(being this or that kind of person). On the contrary, the individual would be 
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approached as "possibility", as open to being in many possible ways, and it 
would be left up to them to appropriate the actual possibility of being such a 
person who does not "come under" a certain fixed category of person. The 
communication would itself be characterized by open-endedness, where it is 
not decided in advance what will be communicated, giving space for both the 
individuals involved (youth and teacher alike) to "become who they are" in this 
particular situation. 
There will, indeed, be a "shared historical situation". For example, the youth's 
misconduct has raised the possibility of expulsion, which will, if it is 
appropriated jointly and authentically, give rise to a common world (both 
youth and teacher understanding what is at stake: the issue of authentic being 
as well as the threat of expulsion) with a common good (a shared 
understanding of the value of authentic being and of staying in school — if the 
latter is, indeed, the preferred option). This "shared historical situation" would 
transcend the conflicting discourses of the inauthentic teacher (representing, 
for example, middle-class culture and government policy) and the inauthentic 
youth (representing, say, working-class culture and a conceptualization of 
schooling as alienating and repressive) and, though the actual vocabulary of 
each may still be rooted in their different historical background, the spirit of 
their communication would reflect the "shared historical situation" of authentic 
being-with. 
In terms of what happens to the person being communicated to, the ways they 
have built up of understanding things and feeling about things will not 
immediately raise themselves up in relation to what is being communicated: in 
terms of the call of conscience, "the call" needs to gets through. In terms of our 
example, the youth will need to suspend listening in terms of the way in which 
their world has been articulated (e.g. teachers will never fully understand my 
world), and will need to do so "all the way down", in the sense that a mere 
suspending of one's prejudices is not good enough (i.e. it may be good enough 
for reaching an accommodation with the teacher but not for authentic being-
with). This means that they will need to listen without taking anything that is 
being communicated as articulating either an understanding of themselves or 
an emotional colouring of their world. 
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Such a way of listening may resemble a detached theoretical one, in that it 
means that they do not allow themselves to identify with the person who is 
being addressed or to identify emotionally by the way their predicament is 
looking, but this is not quite accurate. Rather, it is a listening without 
articulation of their own self or their affective world in terms of actuality (with 
the authentic mood of disconnection and nearness and the authentic 
understanding of oneself as possibility or temporality), which allows for their 
own self and the affective world they find themselves in to exist in terms of 
themselves only, which is in terms of possibility. With this comes a kind of 
objectivity ("yes, what is being said is about me, but it does not mean that I 
either accept or reject what is being said, because I have understood myself to 
be possibility and openness rather than a fixed entity") and calm ("yes, there 
may be all kinds of emotions that arise, but these are allowed to come and go, 
because I experience myself as inescapably tied to a past that makes me react 
to events in certain ways"). This is not to say that the factual content of the 
communication will be missed, just that the listener, the youth, does not get 
lost in the factual content, but remains open to being addressed as authentic 
Dasein throughout. 
This openness on the part of the youth will be either because what is being 
communicated takes them by surprise (a teacher who approaches them in a way 
which is unlike anything they had encountered before), thus circumventing the 
habitual ways of being received. Or it is because there is something in what is 
being said that makes these habitual ways fall into abeyance (their initial 
stance dissolves gradually as the youth is persistently being addressed in their 
authentic self). Or it is because the youth has already, from out of themselves, 
connected with some of what is being communicated and recognising it as 
something they need to approach without these habitual ways of receiving it 
(as when they have been waiting for a teacher to address them as they know 
themselves to be in their real self, and latch on to any hint of being addressed 
in this way, thus reinforcing any tendency there may be in the teacher to 
address them in their authentic self). 
Once this initial connection has been made, and provided the habitual ways of 
receiving the communication are not reactivated, the recipient of the 
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communication will increasingly listen in a way that does not take what is 
being communicated in terms of anything they already know, feel, believe, like 
or dislike. Here the youth (and the teacher, as it, per definition, takes two to 
move into new territory together) has moved out of the world as it had hitherto 
been articulated and is ready to disclose both the world (in attunement) and 
themselves (in understanding) in new and different ways. That is, the world is 
ready to take on a new colour, a different mood, and the self is ready to be 
experienced as a new kind of entity (as process rather than substance, as 
transcendence rather than immanence, as possibility rather than actuality). 
This is experienced as an awakening, an expansion of awareness and a 
silencing of the inner voices that would normally articulate what was being 
communicated in terms of a known world and a familiar self. By taking what is 
being communicated purely on its own terms, they begin to experience 
themselves in terms of themselves only, and do so out of the same silence and 
expanded awareness. Finally, they may inwardly be transformed in such a way 
that the way they experience their own being and that of the world (prior to 
any action or any particular conception) is changed, in that they experience 
themselves as authentic and have become able to act, perceive, feel and 
communicate from out of this newly-found, authentic mode of being. 
Importantly, the above process of one individual communicating with another 
individual or a collective being met with an appropriate reception of that 
communication carries in it another, equally important possibility. Rather than 
one Dasein showing another one the possibility of authentic existence, it may 
be the interaction between them that provides an impetus for change for both 
interlocutors, where this interactive movement for change is greater than the 
sum of the parts. Provided they each have something to start with, something 
that makes them realize the possibility of authentic existence (a sense of deep 
connection with the other, a sudden insight into themselves, an abiding sense 
of what is possible, a new-found openness due to having let go of many 
convictions and identification, to name a few), the individuals involved may 
well enter into a collective dynamic that goes beyond what any of the 
individuals involved may have come to on their own. It is this possibility of 
"synergy" that can be exploited in organizations - paradigmatically in schools. 
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6.3.1.2From inauthentic to authentic community 
This brings us to the communal dimension of authentic being-with. As an 
example of the process of going from inauthentic to authentic communal 
existence, I will look at how this communal existence is expressed in the 
culture of a school. The culture of a school can be taken as the articulation of 
the ways things are conceptualized and of the way things "are done" in the 
school community and it can be taken as involving the atmosphere, the 
prevalent moods that exist in the organization. In the context of the current 
discussion of being-with the emphasis will be on the way communication takes 
place at the communal level. 
In the inauthentic community the part-whole differentiation will mean that 
communication articulates differences between the part and the whole. Thus, 
there will be a boundary between those individuals who are part of the 
community and those who are not, there will be an articulation of the 
individual as a (subordinate) part of the whole or of the whole as being made 
up of individual wholes. Neither of the two allow for communication to be 
framed simultaneously in terms of the individual being a whole and of the 
communal and the interpersonal being co-constitutive of this individual, 
because in terms of theoretical and practical entities this would be internally 
contradictory. This means that if the individual is articulated as subordinate to 
the whole (as Heidegger himself can be said to have done in his discussion of 
"the people" as the site of authentic being-with — Section 6.1.2.3), there is no 
authentic concern for the flourishing of the individual. Similarly, if the concern 
is with the individual, without acknowledging how the communal is co-
original of this individual and, as a result, looking at the collective as a mere 
collection of individuals, there will be no authentic concern for the flourishing 
of the communal dimension. As a result, the individual, being articulated in 
terms of an individual essence with certain properties and relations, will not be 
given the possibility of the kinds of articulations that allow for their 
individuality being thought of as inseparable from the collective. 
For example, a pupil who, in the basis of their experience of life, may have a 
sense of being connected with other human beings will have certain avenues 
210 
articulated to give expression to such a sense of being connected, such as that 
of doing community service or being involved in charity work, both of which 
depend on the articulation of the individual who acts in relation to a collective 
whole which they articulate as separate from themselves (even if they 
subsequently discover that the people they are helping "are just like 
themselves"). But this relation to the communal is itself only one part of their 
life (for instance, once a week on a Friday afternoon), because their life is 
mostly articulated in terms of themselves as individual (being assessed 
individually for their school work, being told to worry about their own future, 
and so on) who stands in certain relationships to certain communal wholes 
(where the relationship to the family may even be one of the subordination of 
the individual to the family, in the case of, for example, clan-like families). 
Therefore, though the experience of communal involvement will go some way 
to answering the pupil's inner-felt connection with the collective, this very 
connection will be articulated in a way that is inauthentic. 
What is more, in such an inauthentic articulation of the relationship between 
the individual and the collective, there will be not only a continual tension 
between the individual and the collective, but also a tension between who is 
considered inside and outside of a given collective, where the relation to those 
outside the collective is framed in terms of separation and differentiation 
(articulating similarities and differences). This is seen as highly problematic in 
the case of, for example, gangs, where the family, the school, or the state all 
object to the individual subordinating their individuality to membership of the 
gang, but in essence sacrificing, for example, one's sense of self-worth for the 
sake of domestic peace (when, for example, placating an aggressive parent), 
sacrificing one's independence of mind for the sake of one's school (when, for 
example, inwardly going along with the world-view that holds together life at 
one's school) or the sacrificing one's life for one's country are all just as much 
inauthentic as is having one's head tattooed, and just as much conducive to the 
separation between groups. 
What tends to happen in the context of such a separatist and differentiating 
articulation of the relationship of one collective to another is that, in order to 
regain some sense of equilibrium, there are initiatives of reaching out to other 
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groups. Inter-faith conferences, coalition governments, the United Nations, 
inter-cultural exchanges of various kinds, and so on, are all examples of such 
inauthentic attempts to bring together what has first been articulated as apart. 
In the context of a school inauthentic attempts to bring into contact collectives 
that have previously been articulated as separate happen between the school as 
a whole and other schools (for example when a privileged school gets involved 
with a neighbouring under-privileged one), between staff and students (at 
certain social occasions) and between different groups of students within the 
school. Note that such meetings of collectives may in certain cases actually be 
done authentically, when collectives get together that have been separated on 
practical grounds (age, geographical location, function, and so on). There is, 
however, a case to be made that certain kinds of collectives are not formed on 
practical grounds and it is, therefore, much harder to see how they could get 
together in an authentic way, without relinquishing their collective identity 
first, such as in the case of groups based on belief systems and vested interests. 
In the following example of a school community becoming authentic, I assume 
that the differentiation in groups is mostly practical. 
To see how an authentic school community comes into being we need to look 
at both the whole and the individual within it. In the discussion of autonomy 
(Section 3.5) it was suggested that there could be such a thing as the education 
of the social relationship itself. It is in the process of the school community 
becoming authentic that we get closest to such a phenomenon, though the 
interaction between two individuals caring in an authentic way for each other, 
which I discussed in the previous section is also, in certain ways, an instance of 
a shared entity (the sum of the two interlocutors) becoming authentic in a way 
that is not reducible to the individuals involved. In the case of the community 
becoming authentic I am looking for a change from the community being 
articulated in terms of a tension between the individual and the collective to 
one where there is a listening as well as a voicing of the communal and the 
individual which lies beyond the communal-individual differentiation. 
Similarly, I am looking for a change from the community being articulated as 
separate and differentiated from other communities, as including and excluding 
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certain individuals, to one where there is a listening and a voicing of that 
which lies beyond such differentiations. 
The way this process is experienced is as the manifestation of a presence, of an 
atmosphere, which has an energy that is felt to originate both from within the 
group and from out of the energy's own source. It is experienced as something 
that is both open to those not present and protective of those who are present. 
It is experienced as facilitating the flowering of the individual in their 
individuality, while at the same time being indifferent to the actual, concrete, 
manifestation of an individual's individuality, in so far as this particular 
individuality does not impede the manifestation of the atmosphere of authentic 
community. That is, the individual can and needs to be open to both individual 
others and the collective without the defences of status, knowledge, position, 
strength, cleverness, and so on, keeping up a persona in terms of a theoretical 
or practical entity. This means that the individual, though their individuality 
manifests, is appealed to in the nothing, the emptiness of the core of their 
being — where this empty core is co-constituted by the possibility of 
communication and thus experienced by the individual in question as a deep 
and rich connectedness to the others. The moment of remaining in the 
possibility of communication (prior to any actual communication) as the empty 
core of Dasein connected with the whole of the community can be called 
communion. 
The process from abiding in the part/whole and inside/outside tensions to 
abiding in the possibility of communication from out of emptiness is one of a 
falling silent of articulation, an expanded awareness of the beings one is 
connected with, and a "being touched by", "filled by", "hearing of the presence, 
the energy, the atmosphere that manifests as both coming from and belonging 
beyond the actual group of individuals present and as existing as a 
manifestation of that group itself, where the energy touches the individual (is 
experienced by the individual as touching them) and affects the dynamic of the 
group (where individuals notice how the dynamic in the group changes, even if 
they cannot construct a clear causal account of the change) in a way that makes 
the group both amenable to individual flourishing and to communal coherence 
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in the form of mutual affection, solidarity, concern for the other person's 
authenticity and so on. 
I can illustrate the above process with an example of how a school leadership 
may go about affecting the culture of a school, so as to facilitate it becoming 
authentic (something they cannot cause but for which they can create 
favourable conditions). If, for example, the existing discourse in the school is 
one that conceives of the communal as the aggregate of individuals 
(manifesting, for example, in a lack of care for communal spaces and 
indifference to those who are experiencing difficulties inside or, indeed, outside 
the school), the leadership may question the assumptions that underlie the 
discourse in an open-minded way (questioning being one of the ways most 
suitable to turn people's attention to a certain region of existence with as little 
advanced articulation as possible). This would be done in a genuine spirit of 
inquiry among equals, so that the leadership do not to separate themselves off 
as having either a special status (even though in the eyes of the governors and 
the school inspectorate they do indeed have this special status) or a separate 
and set ideological position, both of which would lead to a performative 
contradiction between this separate status and position and the intention to 
facilitate the emergence of an atmosphere of individual flourishing and 
communal coherence. 
But, even when it is done in the right spirit, such an inquiry into the discourse 
of individuality is likely to be taken as coming from a separate group of people 
(the leadership) and representing an ideological position (one that would most 
likely be taken in a way that was "levelled off' and in terms of known positions, 
for example, as a woolly kind of communitariansism). The leadership would, 
therefore, need to ensure that the way the inquiry was framed was done in such 
a way that the automatic defences of the discourse they wanted to question did 
not become activated immediately, because the communication itself was taken 
as containing an articulation of the relationship between the individual and the 
collective, rather than as a bringing to one's awareness of the way this 
relationship was being articulated. 
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On the basis of my personal experience as a director at a secondary boarding 
school, this is very difficult to do, because even the very act of open 
questioning can easily be taken as articulating that which is being questioned. 
(It seems that very few individuals above a certain age are still unsuspicious of 
communications that come to them, and most will assume that the field of 
inquiry has been articulated and will suspect that what is being presented as 
open does, in fact, contain a hidden agenda, for example in the form of leading 
questions or other rhetorical strategies that are designed to lead to a certain 
conclusion.) It is also difficult, because it is all too easy to fool oneself into 
believing the questioning is open, where really one does have a vested interest 
in a certain outcome. What is more, every linguistic expression of such a 
bringing to one's awareness will contain, if not a fully-fledged articulation, 
then, at least a propensity to articulating the issue in a certain way. 
A leadership who are serious about bringing up the question of articulating the 
relationship between the individual and the communal in a way that is prior to 
any such articulation will, therefore, need to be extremely vigilant (aware) of 
the way in which they raise the question. They would ensure that all voices are 
allowed to speak, while at the same time exposing those voices that are 
exclusive in relation to other voices as violating those voices, and interfering 
where such exclusive voices are not open to being corrected by exposure 
(which combines self-awareness with being brought to the awareness of the 
community). But this can only be done against a backdrop of a way of listening 
that lets the voices of individuals stand out as individual voices. For this it is 
necessary that those involved can remain silent when others speak, where this 
silence goes beyond a mere absence of vocalization and includes an awareness 
and allowing to fall silent of any inner voices reacting to what is being said. 
Much of this can be simply brought to people's attention by pointing out to 
them how our "inner voices" tend to react to what is being said in terms of the 
way we have articulated the world. It can also be facilitated by preparing the 
ground for a communal inquiry by way of interpersonal encounters that are 
driven by a concern for the authenticity of the other and which thus begin to 
point out the mechanisms of reaction to the communications of the other in 
terms of our own articulation of the world. It can also be facilitated by 
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establishing an atmosphere of actual physical silence in the school at certain 
times, so that the individual can become aware of the voices that go on in their 
own heads as well as get a sense of the presence of others while not actually 
interacting with them verbally or in any other communicative way. Perhaps 
most importantly, there has to be an emotional atmosphere of safety and trust, 
so that the individual can let their guard down, be open to the gaze of others 
even as they themselves are discovering how they articulate the relationship 
between individual and community. 
In such an inquiry the voices of individuals will be brought to the awareness of 
the congregated individuals and exposed (in a non-judgemental way) at a 
communal level. Some of these voices will be in the process of discovering the 
way they articulate the world (in our example, the relationship between the 
individual and the school collective), some will be exposed as being exclusive 
of the voices of others (exposed for the benefit of their own awareness and that 
of others at the same time, where it is not shame — which requires a, now 
absent, judgemental articulation — but affection, perhaps laced with humour, 
and an appeal to their responsibility that turns the individual around, if, 
indeed, they allow themselves to be turned). And there is the bringing to 
awareness of the voice of the community as a whole which begins to manifest 
as the atmosphere, the energy, that allows for the individual to flourish and the 
collective to be sheltering, and expressive of solidarity in the way I mentioned 
earlier, where this energy, this atmosphere does have the two characteristics 
we found earlier of the authentic community: that of giving rise to a working 
together from out of a common world and a common good, where individuals 
experience themselves as sharing a common culture or a historical situation, 
but also a commitment on the part of each individual to the value of an 
authentic way of life. 
6.3.1.3Nature and the animal world 
There is a special case of authentic being-with that I have not mentioned up 
till this point, but which I can briefly mention, now that the contours of 
authentic being-with, both in terms of interpersonal and of communal 
relationships, are beginning to take shape. It is the relationship which 
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humanity, both as individuals and as a collective, has with the natural world 
and with animals. I do not have the space to do justice to so vast and important 
a topic here, but I can perhaps indicate how a process of being-with learning to 
be authentic may be the very process that will enable us to have a relationship 
with animals and the natural world (plants, rivers, landscapes, and so on) that 
is authentic. That is, rather than prescribing what an authentic relationship 
with nature is like, I will consider a process that may lead to such a 
relationship. For the sake of brevity, I will take the relationship of the 
individual with animals and the natural world rather than that of humanity as 
a collective, but a similar case can be constructed around the latter 
relationship. 
What was said in the previous two sections is that authentic being-with, 
conceived of in terms of communication, is a movement away from articulation 
(taking certain things as belonging together and other things as belonging 
apart) towards an experience of being-with (which we saw below refers to the 
individual existing "for its own sake" even as their interpersonal relationships 
and the collective are co-constitutive of this individual) which is not 
articulated but merely brought to one's awareness. 
The question of the individual's relationship with animals and the natural 
world involves asking after the extent to which their being-with is not only 
being-with other Daseins but also being-with animals and the natural world: 
to what extent are the individual's relationship with animals and the natural 
world co-constitutive of this individual, and to what extent are the whole of 
the animal kingdom and the natural world co-constitutive of this individual. It 
seems safe to say that the answer to both these questions is neither "totally" 
nor "not at all": the basic faculty of being-with extends beyond Dasein's but, 
where it does, the relationship is weaker than with other Dasein's. Our 
relationships with nature and animals are co-constitutive of our individuality, 
but to a lesser extent than our relationships with other human beings (which is 
not to say that our relationship with other Daseins does not necessarily occur 
on the basis of a substratum that consists of the natural world: cells, neurons, 
minerals, and the like) and we exist as part of the animal kingdom and the 
natural world but more fully as part of the human world (which is not to say 
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that we are at a physical level not a part of the natural world, but this is a 
different level from the communicative being-with dimension I am considering 
here). We can therefore say that being-with signifies not only the faculty of 
being-with (related to and part of) the human world but also animals and the 
natural world, even if the latter form is less complete. 
But, just as it was argued that authentic being-with in relation to other 
Daseins (individually and collectively) requires a suspension of the articulation 
of that relationship (especially in so far as this is in terms of differentiation and 
separation, part and whole), we can say that authentic being-with animals and 
the natural world requires a similar suspension of articulation. This means that 
we do not need to articulate in advance the character of our being-with nature 
and animals, but need to be able to suspend such an articulation until after an 
authentic being-with has been established in much the same way as that 
happens for being-with in relation to other Daseins. 
And, indeed, a description of authentic being-with in relation to the natural 
world and animals yields a rather familiar picture. I will take as an example the 
experience an individual may have when walking through the forest. There 
needs to be an initial connection that is made with the natural surroundings, 
perhaps the individual comes with an openness to the forest, perhaps 
something (a sudden silence when the wind drops) interrupts the individual's 
ability to articulate the things they experience, perhaps a prolonged stay wears 
away some of the initial ways of articulating the experience of being in the 
forest. Then the individual will increasingly look and listen in ways that do 
not take what they experience in terms of anything they already know, feel, 
believe, like or dislike. This enables them to disclose both the world around 
them and themselves in new and different ways: the forest takes on a new 
colour, a different mood, and the self is experienced in new ways. This is like 
an awakening, an expansion of awareness and a silencing of the inner voices 
that would normally articulate what was being experienced in terms of a 
known world and a familiar self. 
We could say that in this experience the forest begins to come alive, it is 
beginning to be experienced as a live entity, something that exists "for its own 
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sake", that senses and communicates. Though this is not the full sense of 
being-with we may find in relation to other human beings (provided we 
experience them in an authentic way), it is safe to say that we experience 
Dasein-like elements in nature (in a forest, but all the more so in animals). 
This process of being-with learning to be authentic in relation to the forest is 
experienced as, to use a phrase that was used earlier in connection with 
authentic community, a falling silent of articulation, an expanded awareness of 
the beings one is connected with, and a 'being touched by', 'filled by', 'hearing 
of the presence, the energy, the atmosphere that manifests in the forest. 
The result is, more often than not (provided the forest does not suddenly 
become a threatening place, for example, if one gets lost when night falls and it 
is cold) that one feels one's authentic self is being given the space to flourish, 
even as there is an indifference on the part of the forest to one's position in the 
world in terms of, to repeat again from before, status, knowledge, position, 
strength, guile, and so on. The individual needs to be open to the forest 
without keeping up a persona, which means that the individual can be appealed 
to in the emptiness at the core of their being, which enables a deep and rich 
connectedness to the forest, one that merits being designated as communion 
with nature. 
Note that such an experience of being-with becoming authentic in relation to 
nature, one that may result in the experience of communion with nature, is, as 
an authentic experience, one which happens at the level of the a priori, which 
means that it does not happen at the level of actual communication (as when 
one encourages a sapling to grow into a certain direction or an animal to 
behave in a certain way), or at the level of actual a practical or theoretical 
understanding of the natural world, or at the level of an actual emotional 
reaction to the natural world (even though some sentimental accounts of 
communion with nature would want to make one believe so). It is, therefore, 
not in contradiction to the fact that much of the time we may engage with the 
natural world in practical (building a log cabin) and theoretical (counting plant 
species) ways and have emotional reactions to it (being afraid of a thunder 
storm or moved by the sight of a duck and its ducklings). 
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What the authentic mode of being-with in relation to animals and the natural 
world does is allow us to understand our relationship with them in an 
authentic way, where the authentic relationship is that which originally 
enabled the inauthentic one (we can, for example, tame animals, because we 
share a large measure of being-with with them), and where the "right" kind of 
relationship is the one that does not "forget" the authentic relationship but 
where the authentic relationship occurs in parallel with the inauthentic one, 
with the authentic relationship having temporal priority in the sense that the 
"right" kind of inauthentic relationship needs to have been preceded by or 
transformed by an authentic one. This "right" kind of relationship is ultimately 
a matter of ethics, and it is implied in the above account that the ethical 
relationship to other human beings as well as the natural world and animals is 
one that is based in authentic being-with (a full justification of this claim is 
beyond the scope of this thesis). What is more, given that the authentic 
relationship is one that in actual reality (Heidegger would say "factually") 
needs to be arrived at through a process of learning to be authentic, it is this 
process of learning to be authentic that has the actual priority. 
6.3.2 The process of being-with learning to be authentic 
I will again try to further characterize the process of being-with learning to be 
authentic in contrast with the process of learning as we encountered it in the 
main theories of learning I looked at in Chapter 2. There we saw that learning 
is typically understood as a process of growth, increased integration and 
differentiation, which tends towards increased rigidity, where learning is 
always a modification the existing way of being of the learner, and where 
learning involves an intentional object. 
As with the processes of understanding and attunement becoming authentic, 
we have seen that the process of being-with becoming authentic is not one of 
growth. On the contrary, it is a process where an existing articulation of the 
world (of oneself and one's relationships with other individuals and the 
collective) "dissolves". This aspect of the process is often experienced as a 
falling silent, where a network of discursive articulation falls away. As 
Heidegger puts it in relation to hearing the call of conscience, "Dasein which 
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the call] summons is called back into the stillness of itself, and called back as 
something that is to become still. ... It takes the words away from the common-
sense idle talk of das Man" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 343). That is, rather than the 
increased integration and differentiation we associate with the individual's 
articulation of more and more of the world (if only by way of a growing 
vocabulary and linguistic sophistication), the process of being-with becoming 
authentic dissolves any articulation that has been arrived at. 
The increased rigidity associated with growing integration and differentiation 
is also not part of authentic being-with. It is the ability to relate authentically 
to entities as based in the openness of Dasein that is liberated by the 
dissolution of the articulation, where, as we saw in Chapter 3, the openness of 
Dasein has to be understood as an openness towards the being of the entity 
encountered rather than the actual ready-to-hand or present-at-hand entity. 
Importantly, this openness understands the Dasein it encounters in being-with 
as process, and the process of being-with becoming authentic can, therefore, be 
further characterized as one of letting go of a fixed, actual, articulation to an 
experience of a process which contains only possible articulations. This part of 
the process may well be experienced as a coming alive of the other person, the 
community and oneself as being-in-the-world, where this coming alive is a 
continuous movement. That is, rather than one's articulation of the being of 
the other person, the community, oneself or nature becoming more and more 
rigid, they are all experienced as processal in nature and, as such, being "alive". 
With regard to the notion that learning is always a modification of and, 
therefore, based in the existing way of being of the learner, we can say that 
being-with learning to be authentic is rather based in the relationship between 
the individuals, between the individual and the collective and, if we want to 
include animals and the natural world in our definition, between the individual 
and nature. That is, the location where the process of learning originates is the 
relationship itself, rather than the individual as it stands in relationship to 
something or other. Consequently, it needs to be said that it is the relationship 
(which I have characterized as one of co-constitution) that is the locus of the 
learning process. Seen from this perspective, one could say that the 
relationship that learns "contains" an individuality which exists "for its own 
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sake". This is another way of saying that, for this relationship-learning to 
happen in the right way, it needs to allow for the individuality "contained" in it 
to become itself in terms of itself. Or, any collective processes of learning are 
required to accommodate processes of individuals becoming truly individual in 
their own terms, where the individual learning process is based in the learning 
relationship. 
With regard to the idea that learning always includes an intentional object, we 
are, in the case of being-with learning to be authentic, dealing with a process 
that is essentially prior to any separation between subject and object. Even so, 
we can say that being-with learning to be authentic is a learning that occurs in 
relation to other Daseins, the collective and the natural world and animals. 
These are, however, not the intentional objects of learning in the sense that 
the learning involved would be about them. Dasein does not learn about the 
other person, the communal or nature, even if its being changes as a result of 
the process. The other person, the communal and nature do not appear as 
different (ready-to-hand or present-at-hand) entities as a result of the learning, 
rather the structure of Dasein's experience has changed and, as a result, the 
world as a whole appears different in a way that means that Dasein experiences 
the other person, the communal and nature in a different way, even as they 
appear in more or less the same ready-to-hand and present-at-hand way in that 
experience. That is to say, the notion of an intentional object only makes sense 
in the context of the ready-to-hand or present-at-hand but not in the context 
of authentic being-with. This is not to say that, as a result of authentic being-
with, Dasein's practical and theoretical engagement will not change, because, 
as such engagement will be rooted in authentic being-with, it will, for example, 
not lightly subordinate the other person, the communal or nature to practical 
instrumentality or theoretical categorization without being highly mindful to 
preserve their way of being for its own sake. 
6.4 Authentic being-with revisited 
At several points in this thesis it has been remarked that Heidegger's notion of 
being-with displays a number of shortcomings. Some of these shortcomings 
were addressed, when we looked at authentic interpersonal relationships and 
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the authentic community, but some remain, and I will turn to them now. In 
Section 3.6 it was suggested that, while it is not incoherent for Heidegger to 
argue that the verification and justification of authenticity is not a public or 
interpersonal affair, more can be said about the inter subjective dimension 
where the individuals involved are concerned with the possibility of authentic 
existence. Then, in Chapter 5 it was suggested that Dasein's authentic affective 
disposition lacked depth and coherence when taken in relation to other 
Daseins. I will now revisit these issues and attempt to shed light on them, so 
that a fuller and more coherent picture of authentic being-with may arise. 
6.4.1 The intersubjective validation of authentic being-with 
In Section 3.6, I looked at Lambert Zuidervaart's objection that Heidegger's 
account of authenticity does not do justice to the intersubjective dimension of 
his own notion of Dasein as a being who is partly constituted by being-with. 
But we saw that Zuidervaart's claim that authenticity should be publicly 
verifiable and justifiable could not be upheld, in the face of Heidegger's 
religiously tinted understanding of the notion of authenticity. However, the 
idea that public verifiability and justification are not necessary for a coherent 
notion of authenticity does not necessarily entail that Heidegger's account of 
authentic being-with is satisfactory in terms of how we deal with the question 
of the veracity of what is being put forward as authentic being-with. In other 
words, the claim that the ultimate assessment of the veracity of an authentic 
experience does not lie in the public domain does not mean that the 
intersubjective dimension of authentic being may not play a part, serve as a 
guide, in raising the right kind of question with regard to authentic being and 
making some tentative assessment of its authenticity and in suggesting a 
response to any perceived inauthenticity — all informed by a concern for the 
possibility of authentic existence rather than a wish to pass judgment. 
That is, it was suggested in Section 6.3.1.2 that questioning is one of the ways 
that is most suitable for turning people's attention to a particular region of 
existence, because it does not need to presuppose more than a minimum of 
advanced articulation of the region. There are other ways in which to simply 
draw attention to something, such as a simple "pointing out" that there is 
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something to consider in a particular region of experience, but I will take 
questioning as our example. I will, therefore, say that questioning may play an 
important role in the intersubjective assessment of authenticity. In terms of 
the criteria for assessing whether the authenticity of something needs to be 
questioned, we could say that this is best done by considering the coherence of 
what is said and done at the collective and individual levels. In other words, 
the authenticity of one aspect of being-with can be considered more likely 
(though not ascertained with certainty), in so far as is accompanied by and 
coherent with the other characteristics of authentic being-with I have 
identified. This is so, because a coherence approach to the veracity of 
something does not depend on establishing a foundation from which to argue 
the veracity of the issue in question, and, as Zuidervaart has pointed out, the 
experience of authenticity is one that denies establishing such a foundation — at 
least by a third person. Finally, the response to such a questioning in terms of 
coherence of any claims to authenticity is not primarily one of judgment but of 
furthering the cause of authenticity. One's response to uncovering possible 
inauthenticity on the part of someone is that of suggesting, embodying, 
disclosing, pointing out genuine ways of authentic being. 
I will take as our example the claim made by an individual, say a teacher who 
is trying to question certain aspects of the way the pupils in his class relate to 
each other, that the discussion she initiated concerning those aspects of the 
class's culture was characterized by authentic being-with. This could be a 
discussion we sat in on as a colleague, as part of a continuing professional 
development programme in our school — where, for the sake of the example, in 
this particular school it had become part of the teacher culture to look at 
learning in terms of authenticity, for instance, after having had a talk about it 
by a philosopher of education. Let's say we were discussing the session 
afterwards with the teacher, asking her how she felt things went, questioning 
and sharing our own observations with her, where relevant. In this our 
concern would be with the authenticity of the teacher, the pupils, and ourselves 
(note that this classroom observation would not have been part of a formal 
assessment, in which case the authenticity of the discussion should not be what 
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the teacher was assessed on). As stated above, the concern would not be one of 
arriving at a judgment, but of allowing authentic being-with to manifest. 
Something that would perhaps be one of our main concerns would be that 
there was a tangible "falling silent" in the group as a result of existing 
articulations dissolving, which involved an increased openness towards the 
other. Though we may have observed a certain attentive hush coming over the 
group and encouragement of individuals to give voice to their ways of seeing 
things, we would not necessarily take these things at face value, given that 
silence and openness may be affected. So we would look out for indications that 
the observed phenomena may not cohere with other aspects of authentic being-
with. For example, an absence of individuals and the group "coming alive" 
(when, say, the atmosphere becomes dull and individuals begin to merely 
repeat the positions they have assumed rather than publicly explore them) 
would be grounds for raising questions about the authenticity of the being-
with of the group or of certain individuals. 
But mere liveliness would not clinch it either, because, if it turned out that the 
liveliness of the group and individuals was very much the result of one 
individual bringing it about (as when pupils appear to have become dependent 
on a charismatic teacher to set their discussions alight), one would need to 
question the authenticity of it. That is, what one is looking for is the origin of 
this process of "coming alive" to lie in the relationships (of co-constitution) 
themselves (in the sense that "it" arises) rather than in any one or two 
individuals (who may, incidentally, be pupils as well as teachers). Simply 
asking the teacher to what extent she felt it was her presence that livened up 
the discussion would open up the issue, but only if we, as the outsider, were 
"with" her and were not approaching her as a practical object (steering her, 
shaping her, taking up a position relative to her — superior or inferior) or a 
theoretical object (identifying her as a certain type, who is responsive to a 
certain type of approach), but as openness and possibility. 
Then, one may, for example, have noticed that certain individuals appeared 
"alienated" from themselves; one has noticed that a certain pupil was trying 
very hard to be in a way that seemed to be based on what they think is 
225 
expected of them rather than coming about naturally. This would be a 
potentially important issue, on the grounds that the process of being-with 
becoming authentic allows for the individual who is "contained" in the 
relationship or the community to become themselves "for their own sake", 
something that is highly unlikely to be accompanied by the individual 
straining to be in a certain way. Any such observation may, for instance, lead 
to a more general discussion with the teacher of how pupils are forced into 
certain ways of being and how we, as adults, are perhaps in the same boat, still 
trying to live up to expectations we believe others have of us, or even sub-
consciously conveying such a way of being to the pupil. Here the discussion 
may become quite personal and, as before, it is important that one is "with" the 
teacher in this discussion, which may involve not only disclosing, however 
briefly, some of one's own struggles in this area, but also allowing for the 
teacher's uniquely personal way of being to come out and be "visible", without 
being judged in terms of what is and what is not desirable. 
If, for example, it has been mutually established that to some extent many 
pupils as well as the teacher seemed to be approaching the question of the 
class's culture at too superficial a level, one may raise the question whether the 
pupils and the teacher have not learned over time to approach themselves and 
each other as practical and theoretical entities, rather than as creatures with 
Dasein as their nature. This could then lead to a discussion about, for example, 
how schooling and education in general sees a fair bit of manipulation and 
exploitation of individuals (for example, where they are made to do things by 
way of reward and punishment, so as to become the kinds of citizens 
government aims to create) or a categorization of them that goes beyond the 
functional level (such functional categorizations could, for example, occur 
when there are separate male and female sanitary facilities) but includes 
emotional and psychological aspects (for example, where there is a typification 
of individuals, in combination with value judgments). 
Importantly, this kind of exploration should not become politicized, as when 
those "responsible" for the manipulation and categorization, let's say the 
government or the management with its targets, are made into a common 
enemy. Rather, they too need to be included in the "with" and the concern in 
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relation to them also needs to be with their authenticity — however impersonal 
such a concern becomes with remote politicians and faceless civil servants. The 
aim is to get a genuine understanding of the issue, rather than drawing up a 
plan of action, where the process towards this understanding is that of 
learning to be authentic. Any concrete actions or conceptualizations should be 
left to arise on their own after there has been a "falling silent", where existing 
articulations dissolve and an openness to the being of all involved, including 
managers and pupils, manifests (which is not to say that urgent practical 
issues, such as disruptions of the class or lack of necessary facilities are not 
dealt with in accordance with their "being" as authentic practical issues). 
Much of the way the discussion with the teacher is presented above may seem 
to be no more than good practice as it is set out in numerous manuals of 
coaching and classroom observation: one does not judge, listens with genuine 
interest, does not put oneself above the teacher, does not demonize others, 
allows for personal issues to come up where relevant, and so on. And this is 
correct, but the essence of authenticity lies in the spirit in which the 
communication takes place and not in the actual, concrete things one does or 
even in the way the situation is conceptualized. There is an inalienably 
intangible dimension to authenticity, which is due, as has been said before, to 
the fact that the process of becoming authentic occurs at the level of the a 
priori. And yet, it is said that, when there is an authentic being-with, 
something happens that is not like the mere implementation of good practice. 
The way to find out whether this is true is by trying it out for oneself. 
If we wanted to propose a positive alternative to Zuidervaart's charge that 
claims to authenticity should be publicly verifiable and justifiable, we could, 
perhaps, speak of a "validating consideration" that would draw attention to, 
point out, and question aspects of the claim to authenticity with reference to 
its coherence. We could use the word "validation" (in the sense of "making 
strong, healthy, effective and having value") instead of verification and 
justification. That is, the act of "validating" would have as its aim that of 
furthering the cause of authenticity, where there would be a "consideration" of 
the coherence of what is said and done by the individual claiming the 
authenticity, which was expressed through drawing attention to things, 
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pointing things out, and questioning, where the coherence appears to be 
lacking. But, of course, with such a validating consideration of claim to 
authenticity would come a certain affective disposition, which is what I will 
turn to next. 
6.4.2 The affective disposition of authentic being-with 
In Chapter 5, in the context of the moods of authenticity, it was said that 
Heidegger's description of Dasein having been individualized and experiencing 
the entities it encounters in the world in a mood of disconnection and nearness 
makes sense in relation to theoretical and practical entities but not necessarily 
in relation to other Daseins and creatures with some degree of the nature of 
Dasein, such as animals and the natural world. Now that we have looked in 
detail at the process of being-with becoming authentic, we can ask what kind 
of "affective disposition" would correspond with such a process. The question 
raised in Chapter 5 is what an individual feels, what he or she experiences at an 
emotional level, when participating in authentic being-with. But, because I 
have now constructed an account of the process that leads to such authentic 
being-with and because I am primarily interested in this process, I will attempt 
to further our understanding of the process of becoming authentic by 
considering the process of being-with becoming authentic in terms of the 
individual's affective disposition. 
As was suggested earlier in this chapter, authentic being-with is to be thought 
of not only in terms of the relationship between individuals but also in terms of 
a communal being together. What is more, it was said that being-with should 
probably be extended to include the relationship between human beings and 
animals and the natural world. In this section I will focus on the relationship 
between two individuals, which I earlier referred to as interpersonal or 
personal relationships. This is for convenience only and examples of communal 
relationships or relationships with nature could have equally been given. If 
that had been done, the outcome would have been similar in spirit but different 
in some of the details. For considerations of space, it is not possible to work 
out exactly what the affective disposition of authentic being-with would be life 
for all three, and the reader is, therefore, asked to accept that examples for the 
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remaining two would be similar enough, so as not to affect the main thrust of 
the argument. I will take as our example a mother listening to what her six-
year-old daughter has to say, as they are standing next to a river, having come 
to see if there are any ducks. 
Let us say that the mother has been having some problems with discipline at 
home (bed-time, tidiness - the usual), but the mother has also noticed that her 
daughter has become less cheerful recently and is wondering whether the 
pressures she is being put under at school, combined with the daily struggles 
at home, are beginning to dull the spark of enthusiasm and originality she has 
known her daughter to have always had. That is, the mother is concerned for 
the authenticity of her daughter, concerned that she should be able to be "who 
she really is" as well as flourish, grow into "who she can possibly be". And in 
this the mother is not taking herself out of the picture, as she is leaving open 
the possibility that her own ways of dealing with the discipline issues at home 
may be contributing to her daughter's increasing sombreness. 
While they are both turned towards the river, waiting to see if any ducks will 
appear, the girl begins to talk about what is on her mind. She is not directly 
addressing her mother, more thinking aloud, and begins to talk about school, 
her teacher, some of her class mates, and about herself. The mother senses that 
she is hearing some of the voices in her daughter that do not normally come 
out. As the mother listens, there is an increasing, a spreading, of her attention. 
This is experienced as a gradual spreading of silence, to the point where it 
"envelops" both the girl and the mother herself, even as there is talking going 
on. That is, with the spreading of this listening, which is also a spreading of 
the experience of silence, the separation between the mother and her daughter 
seems to disappear. "The mother is listening" becomes a "there is listening", 
which is the event of listening before there is a listener who articulates what is 
being said by the other person. At this level of listening the mother 
experiences "being one" with her daughter, which is really a feeling of unity, of 
her and her daughter co-constituting each other. But this oneness is not of two 
separate entities being welded together, which might feel comforting and 
secure, but also restricting and suffocating. Rather it is a feeling of being 
oneself in being one with the other, a feeling of freedom in being one. 
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Every now and then, while the girl is talking, the mother asks, in a few words 
only, some question, so as to encourage her daughter to keep talking. But even 
her own voice, asking her daughter to elaborate or continue, sounds different 
to her now, in that it too seems to come out of a silence and to never break that 
silence. Yet, at the same time that there is this feeling of unity, the very same 
silence brings out the "otherness" of the voice that is being heard. Less and 
less of what the mother hears is incorporated (assimilated and accommodated, 
to use constructivist terminology) into her existing ways of articulating 
things. She is listening to her daughter as if it is the first time she has ever 
heard her speak. More and more of what is unknown about her daughter is 
being disclosed, but it is not disclosed as facts pertaining to an actual being, 
but as possible ways of being which her daughter has and which manifest now, 
but which may well manifest very differently next time. It becomes clear to the 
mother (something which she experiences emotionally as a wish "to give" to 
the daughter), that what the girl needs, in order for her to be "who she really 
is" as well as "who she can possibly be", is to be allowed to be "openness and 
possibility" rather than an "actual" person (one with fixed characteristics and 
predictable ways of behaving). 
And the mother also understands that as "openness and possibility" her 
daughter will always be unknowable, unassimilable and essentially "other". At 
this point the mother wonders whether she herself is not putting pressure on 
her daughter to be in a certain way, to become a person whose actuality makes 
her more predictable and easier to deal with. The silence the mother is 
experiencing appears to have affected her daughter too, who appears to become 
more thoughtful and articulate, even as her sentences become more 
fragmentary, some of them left unfinished. At this point a deep and at the same 
time completely transparent feeling comes over the mother: it is this 
"otherness", this being always unknown (not because her actual nature has not 
yet been discovered, but because she is essentially "openness and possibility", 
rather than a fixed actuality), that the mother wishes to give to her daughter. 
And this "wishing to give" is the emotion she feels: it is a "wishing to give" the 
other her "otherness as openness and possibility". All through this simple 
conversation on the bank of the river neither the mother nor the daughter have 
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not lost contact with the river, and the mother feels the silence she has been 
experiencing is there in the trees as well and in the river itself. Then the girl's 
face lights up and she points towards the top end of the river: "look ducks!" 
In general terms, what we see the mother go through is the double movement 
of a dying towards the world (her old articulation of the being of her daughter) 
and a turning back ("wishing to give" her daughter the otherness which she 
already is but which she needs to recover), where the moment of dying 
towards is a falling silent and the turning back is the coming alive of the living 
being from who one is not separate. The affective disposition of authentic 
being-with can, therefore, be described (but, as was said in Section 1.4, the 
description here is no more than a gesture in the direction of a possibility that 
becomes meaningful only in its appropriation) as a feeling of oneness in silence 
(which is a feeling of attentive calm that is experienced as enveloping both the 
speaker and the listener and which takes away the separation between them), 
of "wishing to give the other their otherness" (which is reaching out to the 
other person in a way that one forgets one's own concerns and interests in 
order for the other one to be able to "be", where this "being" is felt to be all the 
other needs to do in order to be worthy of existence), of the other person as 
openness and possibility (which is a feeling of veneration, of humility in the 
face of the unknowability of the other and their sacred nature). 
If we wanted to reduce the above description of the affective disposition of 
authentic being-with to a few terms, we could consider Jean-Luc Nancy's 
suggestion that the answer is to be found in Heidegger's correspondence with 
Hannah Arendt in the years 1925-28, where, according to Nancy, the notion of 
love is the one that captures the affective disposition of authentic being-with: 
"In the correspondence, love is, indeed, qualified as the genuine space of a 'we' 
and of a world that can be 'ours,' and represents the genuine 'taking care' of the 
other" (Nancy, 2008, p. 14). As in the case of the mother and daughter in our 
example, this love entails being there with and for the other as they go 
through life as well as grasping, with them, what their possibilities are. "Thus, 
love is a mitglauben, a shared faith in the 'story of the other' and a mitergreifen, 
a shared grasp of the 'potential of the other"' (Nancy, 2008, p. 14). 
231 
But it is not our main concern to define the affective disposition of authentic 
being-with. Rather, it is our aim to bring to light the process which takes one 
from inauthentic to authentic existence. From this perspective the suggestion 
that the affective disposition of authentic Dasein centres on feelings of oneness, 
veneration, generosity, humility, concern, and so on, is less important than the 
characterization of the process itself, which I specified in Section 6.3.2. 
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7 Learning to be authentic and 
authentic learning 
I have now constructed an account of the process of learning to be authentic. I 
will summarize what has been said about this process at different points above. 
Then I will make any generalizations about the process that present 
themselves. 
With the main task of the thesis behind us, the remaining argument will take 
on a much more speculative tone. The assertions made will, from now on, lack 
the detailed exposition necessary for them to count as argued in a way that is 
cogent. Rather, what follows will be no more than a laying out of general 
directions in which the preceding chapters have steered us. It would require a 
disciplined follow up to validate the suggestions made in this chapter. 
In the second part of this chapter I will consider what this means for the 
process of learning as it is conceived of in the main theories of learning we 
looked at in Chapter 2. 
7.1 Authentic learning 
7.1.1 General first points 
In this Chapter I will attempt to outline what it means for learning as 
modification and growth, as it was presented in Chapter 2, to occur within the 
context of authentic existence. This will give us authentic learning. I will first 
consider the integration of learning as modification and growth with authentic 
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existence separately, as they occur in the three main areas of understanding, 
attunement and being-with. Then, in Section 7.2, I will indicate the way in 
which such an integration is similar in all three areas, to arrive at our most 
general characterization of learning to be authentic and authentic learning. 
7.1.2 Authentic learning to understand 
Understanding refers to the way in which Dasein is directed towards things, 
the way it gains access to things and the way its engagement with things is 
guided. It can be said to comprise both action and perception. The process of 
understanding learning to be authentic begins with inauthentic understanding, 
when Dasein understands itself non-reflectively from out of the entities it is 
engaged with and does so in terms of practical and/or theoretical entities. 
That is, the entity Dasein is engaged with "gives" it its self-understanding, just 
as Dasein "gives" the entity its being. Dasein has, of course, also a reflective, 
explicit, self-understanding, but this is, essentially, a theoretical self-
understanding and, as such, not the starting point for the process of becoming 
authentic, but a special case of theoretical understanding. 
The very beginning of the process of understanding becoming authentic 
involves a moment of "breaking through", which can occur because 
understanding finds itself face-to-face with something it notices it cannot 
possibly resolve, because a certain affective disposition arises, or because of a 
communication by another Dasein. All these may awaken a sense of the 
limitations of Dasein's current understanding (of itself and of the entities it 
finds in the world) as well as a sense that these limitations are self-imposed 
and, as such, may conceal possible other ways of understanding. This marks 
the beginning of the process where Dasein's inauthentic understanding of itself 
becomes transparent, is awakened to itself. 
In general terms, the process of understanding becoming authentic can be 
described as one of a mutually reinforcing process of understanding becoming 
non-reflectively aware of itself as projection and letting go of existing 
projections. This returns it to a point where understanding is itself understood 
as arising out of openness and any actual understanding is understood as 
possibility. At this point Dasein is openness and possibility. Within this 
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openness and possibility understanding may arise (quite impersonally) of 
another Dasein as one with the Dasein who engages with it and yet as an end 
in itself. Understanding of a practical or a theoretical entity may arise that is 
based in an openness towards that entity that is prior to any practical or 
theoretical concern, and that genuinely constitutes Dasein's own 
understanding rather than an understanding that originates in das Man. 
What was at first experienced as the whole of understanding opens up 
(becomes non-reflectively self-aware) while this particular understanding 
quietens down (lets go of its projections), to the point where it becomes 
completely silent (experiencing a kind of existential death), at which point 
there is just openness and possibility, from which understanding may arise 
again (impersonally), but then as only a part of the whole of experience, always 
leaving some of the openness empty (so that communion with other Dasein's 
may occur), and always temporarily (being ready to take back and repeat), 
before quieting down again (so that Dasein may genuinely reconnect with the 
entity). 
This process of understanding opening up and quieting down to become 
complete silence and openness, from which understanding may arise again 
(temporarily and leaving some of the openness empty), before quieting down 
again can be a seminal event, iterative and cumulative. It can be a seminal 
event in that the openness comes into being and stays with the individual. It 
can be iterative in that the process of understanding arising is followed by a 
quieting down. It can be cumulative in that the openness and silence may 
expand and grow in relation to the understanding emerging in it. In each of 
these cases the process is the same, but the meaning of it is somewhat different. 
The initial, seminal, event of the openness coming into being would (if it is not 
lost again completely, where the individual becomes once more fully absorbed 
by inauthentic understanding) allow for any subsequent understandings to 
occur from within this openness without ever losing the sense of openness, 
which, it turn, would allow for any subsequent growth and expansion of the 
openness. 
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We saw in Chapter 4 that the process of understanding becoming authentic 
differs from the process of learning as it is found in some of the main theories 
of learning: the process of understanding becoming authentic is not one of 
increased integration, differentiation and rigidity, but one of dissolving 
(quieting down of) what has been constituted; the process is essentially 
discontinuous, in that the end result (emptiness) cannot be said to be based in 
the initial state of there being a certain understanding of being; the process is 
prior to there being a subject or an object moment in the intentional act, in 
that it happens at a level that is prior to action and perception, in that the 
entity that is learning coincides with what it is learning about, in that this 
letting go of an understanding of being is experienced as discontinuity and as a 
falling away. 
Though the two processes are not the same process, they can be said to be 
compatible and able to exist side by side. This is because the process of 
understanding opening up and quieting down is able to accommodate the 
process of learning as we have found it in some of the main theories of 
learning. The process of opening up and quieting down liberates, awakens a 
wider non-reflective self-awareness, within which the processes of integration 
and differentiation described by the theories of learning can occur. The process 
of letting go of an understanding can be thought of in terms of a dissolution of 
this understanding, where it remains possible to reconstitutes the 
understanding on the basis of the notion that understanding does not consist 
of a representation but of an intentional act which is carried out in a specific 
way, where the act is built up again every time the understanding manifests. In 
the case of an understanding having dissolved completely, it could be said that 
the complete dissolution consisted in the understanding being open and 
remaining open to the being of the entity involved in the situation, and that, 
once it resolved on such a being, the attitudes, knowledge, ways of acting, and 
so on, would re-constitute themselves. 
Though it is not possible in the space remaining in this thesis to do justice to 
this idea of an understanding being able to re-constitute itself after having 
quietened down, a few things can be said in defence of it. If, as was suggested 
in Chapter 2, association is the main mechanism driving learning as it is 
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envisaged in the main theories of learning (once events occur together — two 
events happening simultaneously or following each other chronologically —
they are more likely to occur together again in the future), then a complex way 
of being may be built up out of many simple events occurring together. For 
example, when a sequence of movements (for example, drawing short lines on 
paper) constitutes one action (writing a word) that is made up out of those 
smaller movements, the larger action may be dropped, even forgotten, without 
preventing a future re-constitution of this action out of the smaller 
movements. What would happen in such a re-constitution would be that one 
small movement would call up, by way of association, another one, which 
would, in turn call up yet another movement, and so on. This would not only 
be a process that took place "internal" to the person, but would also take place 
in relation to the environment, in the sense that elements of the entity one was 
engaging with (for example, pen and paper) and the situation in which one 
found oneself (for example, a classroom) would also call up, by way of 
association, certain ways of acting. 
With respect to the being of entities, which is the level at which the process of 
learning to be authentic happens, the issue would then be one of the act of 
taking something as having a certain kind of being initiating the process of the 
way of understanding the entity in question re-constituting itself. For 
example, a teacher could, on this account, allow her understanding of a certain 
pupil to dissolve, with the result of opening up towards the being of the pupil 
as an entity with the nature of Dasein. This would constitute the dissolution 
(letting go) of the act of being towards the pupil in a certain way, with the 
result that the pupil was understood as openness and possibility. If, a certain 
action was then called for (for example, a report about the pupil had to be 
written), the theoretical way of taking the pupil would re-constitute itself (the 
teacher would remember that certain forms needed filling in, that a certain 
kind of language needed to be used in that form, that certain events needed to 
be reported, and so on). 
Importantly, such a theoretical or practical way of taking the pupil would 
occur within a wider field of openness (the non-reflective self-awareness that 
constitutes transparency) which would never be fully taken over by the actual 
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way of being towards the entity theoretically or practically. This would allow 
for the re-constitution of an understanding to take place within the openness, 
where the effect of the openness (the non-reflective self-awareness) was never 
absent. But, because such a process of re-constitution was subject to 
modification as found in the main theories of learning (the process perspective 
on understanding allows for that understanding to learn, be modified, as it re-
constitutes itself), there could, indeed be such learning within the openness of 
authentic existence. This would mean that any subsequent learning (in the 
sense of the further construction of an actual way of being via the mechanism 
of, for example, association) could happen in a way that was "informed by" the 
openness or transparency. This would constitute authentic learning, a learning 
according to the mechanisms described in Chapter 2, but always informed by, 
in the spirit of, the openness that characterizes authentic existence. 
For example, a pupil in a gardening project who had hitherto handled (which 
represents a practical understanding) plants much like tools or toys, like 
inanimate objects, may have learned to prune a climbing plant in the school 
yard. The skill involved was always displayed by this pupil in a way that, to 
the experienced gardener, lacked sensitivity: the boy did not have green 
fingers. Then the boy, perhaps because he was made aware by the teacher of 
his mechanical way of approaching the plant, has a moment in which his 
understanding of the plant as a practical object dissolves. There is a moment in 
which his movements fall silent and he just stands there and looks at the plant. 
Then, instead of cutting, he begins to feel the stems and the leaves, as if 
noticing the plant for the first time. At this moment the practical 
understanding of pruning he had acquired dissolves and he opens up towards 
the plant but also to his own being, the world around him, in a way that is 
non-reflective. 
Though it may well look as though he is fully absorbed in the plant, because 
that is where his eyes and body are turned towards, he is, nevertheless, 
opening up towards the whole of life as his ways of engaging with the plant 
become transparent to him. He begins to get a sense for the plant as a being 
with, to some extent, the nature of Dasein. As he takes up the activity of 
pruning again, it re-constitutes itself again, but does so in a way that is 
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slightly different - for example, he still cuts in the same place, as he has been 
taught, but with more care and awareness of the plant. Then, as the teacher 
notices the boy's increased sensitivity, he decides to show the boy how to 
prune a rosebush, something with which he entrusts only the most careful 
pupils. Now the boy has to learn a new skill, even if it builds upon what he has 
learned in the context of pruning the climber. As he looks on as the teacher 
shows him how to prune the rosebush, his whole way of looking is informed 
by, occurs within, the openness he has found. The new skills involved (for 
example, how to hold a thorny stem) are developed in a way that is authentic 
and, as such, constitute authentic learning. 
To recap, the full development of this learning would, as said, begin with a 
non-reflective awareness of the way in which the boy approached the climber. 
This awareness would spread and be accompanied by a letting go of the way he 
used to approach the plant, to the point where he was just open towards the 
being of the plant. Then, as his pruning skills re-constituted themselves in 
relation to the plant, they did so in a way that meant that the re-constituted 
way of handling it was affected by the openness towards the plant itself and 
that never absorbed him completely, with the result that some of the openness 
remained even as he once more applied himself to the task at hand. Indeed, this 
openness remained even as he turned towards the rosebush. Perhaps at this 
point all his understanding of pruning again dissolved, leaving him in complete 
openness towards the bush. At any rate, as he first observed his teacher prune 
and then applied the secateurs himself, the new skill remained "within" and 
informed by the openness towards the being of things. Indeed, as the afternoon 
progressed, the openness towards the being of things only grew and what 
started as the non-reflective awareness of his way of pruning expanded so as to 
become a field of transparency much greater than any of his ways of acting, 
and within this field ways of engaging with things (ways of understanding) 
would rise up and die down again. 
I may be instructive to look once again at examples of educational approaches 
which could be said to be similar to the approach advocated here. In Paulo 
Freire's Pedagogy of the Oppressed, to take an example of a critical pedagogy, 
there is a similar emphasis on the learner being liberated from the ways of 
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understanding he or she has acquired over time, which are inauthentic". For 
Freire this means that the "consciousness" of the oppressor is internalised by 
the oppressed. So for the learner, the oppressed, the task is that of liberating 
him or herself from the alien consciousness imposed on him or her. What is 
more, as I do in this thesis, Freire emphasises the importance of understanding 
that the learners are active participants in the learning process, writing that 
"[a]ttempting to liberate the oppressed without their reflective participation 
in the act of liberation is to treat them as objects which must be saved from a 
burning building" (Freire, 1970/1996, p. 47). And, again, "political action on 
the side of the oppressed must be pedagogical action in the authentic sense of 
the word, and, therefore, action with the oppressed" (Freire, 1970/1996, p. 48). 
Additionally, this active participation is, according to Freire, achieved through 
dialogue: "The correct method lies in dialogue. The conviction of the 
oppressed that they must fight for their liberation is not a gift bestowed by the 
revolutionary leadership" (Freire, 1970/1996, p. 49). So it's easy to see that 
this process of liberation from the structures of domination which the 
oppressed have been subjected to and have, to a large extent, internalised, is 
similar to the learning to be authentic which is promoted in this thesis, in that 
it involves a process that occurs in the relationship - which is characterised by 
equality - between the learner and the educator. 
But there is an important difference in the actual process of liberation itself, 
which is conceptualised in a different way. For Freire the process itself is one 
of "conscientization". Cornel West describes conscientization as a process 
which "embraces a critical demystifying moment in which the structures of 
domination are laid bare and political engagement is imperative" (West, 1993). 
That is, the learner is to become aware of the structures which keep him or her 
prisoner. But when we look at the nature of the awareness (conscientization), 
this awareness is the result of a process of reflection. Thus Freire writes that 
liberation "can be done only by means of [...] reflection and action upon the 
56 Note that Freire uses the term "authentic" in his writing, albeit in a different way from 
which it is used in this thesis (Freire, 1970/ 1996) - where Freire's use of the term is as much 
Hegelian as Heideggerian. I will use the terms "inauthentic" and "authentic" here in the sense 
that they have been developed in this thesis, and refrain from commenting on Freire's notion 
of authenticity, which I find to be internally incoherent. 
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world in order to transform it" (Freire, 1970/1996, p. 33). In this thesis 
reflection has been described as involving an object of learning which is taken 
as present at hand, as a theoretical entity. That is, the learner takes both him 
or herself and the society they live in as theoretical entities, and then acts in 
relation to these entities. Therefore, Freire's approach puts the process of 
liberation at the ontic rather than the ontological level, the actual rather than 
the a priori level, yielding a qualitatively different process from the one 
described in this thesis (see, Section 3.6.1). 
We find a similar emphasis on reflection (and, consequently, on understanding 
the learner and their social and biographical contexts in ontic rather than 
ontological terms) in the notion of the reflexive teacher (Moore, 2012, pp. 124-
127). Reflexivity "aims to promote [...] understandings of experiences and 
events through, to an extent, their recontextualisation within their wider 
social and biographical contexts" (Moore, 2012, p. 124). Here too the 
understanding is "theoretical" in the sense it has been used in this thesis. The 
teacher takes him or her own self as a "theoretical object" and seeks to 
understand this object in relation to his or her own biography and the wider 
social context of the education they are involved in. This approach, while 
certainly worth-while, shares many of its characteristics with the notion of 
autonomy, as I discussed it in Section 3.5.4, and is, with its emphasis on 
reflective awareness, very different from the process of understanding becoming 
non-reflectively aware of itself as projection and letting go of existing 
projections, as it has been put forward as the process of understanding 
learning to be authentic. 
But reflexivity does incorporate one aspect of Heidegger's notion of practical 
understanding and uses it in a productive way. This is the idea that ultimately 
our practical actions need to be understood in terms of our self-understanding 
(Section 4.1.3). For the teacher this means that the way they understand the 
classroom situation and their role as teachers is ultimately based in their self-
understanding. It follows that, if the teacher wants to understand his or her 
practice, they need to relate what they encounter in their practice to their self-
understanding. But, for this understanding of practice to become truly 
authentic in the way it has been set out in this thesis, the nature of this 
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understanding would have to consist in a non-reflective letting go and opening 
up, rather than a reflection on actual, i.e. present-at-hand, elements. 
7.1.3 Authentic learning to be attuned 
We saw in Chapter 5 how the process of attunement learning to be authentic 
takes place, where attunement refers to the way moods and emotions disclose 
the world as a certain kind of world and Dasein as a certain kind of individual 
Dasein. Attunement learning to be authentic begins with Dasein being in a 
mood that connects it with the world, after which there is a moment of 
"staying with", where one finds oneself in a world that predates one and with a 
personality that is not of one's own making, and where one's understanding of 
the things in the world is ultimately in terms of one's own existential death. 
This involves a reciprocal movement of increased non-reflective self-awareness 
of oneself as individualized transcendence and the disclosure of the 
nothingness of the world from which the entities one encounters emerge. In 
response to the feelings of urgency, longing and curiosity that are awakened 
by the increasing contact with the things one is engaging with, one lets go of 
the mood one was in. As a result, one's relationship with the things and people 
one encounters is that of "letting things be" and immediacy: practical and 
theoretical things in the world are experienced as detached and near, and one's 
relationship with other individuals is one of oneness in silence, of "wishing to 
give the other their otherness", of veneration and humility. This movement of 
learning is experienced as one of spreading, where the awareness one has of 
one's mood grows until it encompasses the whole of one's being-in-the-world. 
This process of attunement becoming authentic differs from the process of 
learning as it is found in some of the main theories of learning: the process of 
attunement becoming authentic is not one of increased integration, 
differentiation and rigidity, but one of letting go of the mood one found oneself 
in; the process is essentially discontinuous, in that the end result (emptiness) 
cannot be said to be a modification of a previous way of being attuned 
emotionally; the process is prior to there being a subject or an object moment 
in the intentional act, in that it happens at a level that is prior there being a 
separation between the individual having certain feelings and that towards 
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which the individual has the feeling, in that attunement gives both the subject 
and the object as coloured by a certain emotional content, in that this letting 
go of a mood is experienced as discontinuity and as a letting go. 
But, whereas we have an account of the process of attunement learning to be 
authentic, we do not yet have an account of the process of learning to be 
attuned in the same way as we have had detailed accounts of learning that are 
clearly relevant to the faculty of understanding. That this is so may well be 
due to a general lack of accounts of emotional learning that take emotion itself 
as that which learns, rather than postulating a self which has emotions and 
which learns to deal with them in an intelligent way. For example, The 
Encyclopaedic Dictionary of Psychology defines emotional intelligence as the way 
in which "people attend to, process and utilize affect-laden information" and as 
"the ability to understand the emotions and mental states in one's own self and 
in other people" (Davey, 2005). Paraphrasing from Daniel Goleman's 1995 
book Emotional Intelligence, we find that emotional intelligence involves 
learning to read one's emotions and recognize their impact, to use gut 
feelings to guide decisions, to control one's emotions and impulses, to adapt to 
changing circumstances, to sense, understand, and react to others' emotions, to 
inspire and influence others. 
What stands out in the above descriptions of emotional intelligence is that it is 
in many ways what I have been calling "understanding" that learns, rather 
than the faculty of attunement itself. That is, learning to read, recognize, 
control, sense, understand, and so on, are all processes take the emotion as the 
object of learning and thus represent what I have been calling understanding 
learning as modification and growth in relation to one's emotions. Though not all 
approaches to emotional intelligence may take such an exclusively 
"understanding" perspective (for example, by focussing on traits and the 
personality aspect of emotional intelligence), the examples above serve to show 
that an account of emotions learning is by no means easily found. What I will 
do is present in broad terms certain aspects of what could become a 
phenomenological account of emotional learning, so that I can then take this as 
a starting point to see how it can be integrated with the account of attunement 
learning to be authentic summarized at the beginning of this section. To 
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construct this account I will make use of the assumptions about learning 
shared by the main theories of learning as modification and growth I referred to 
in Chapter 2. It is, however, not claimed that the resulting account of 
emotional learning is comprehensive or, indeed, the only possible one, but 
rather that it has enough validity to serve as a starting point for a discussion of 
authentic learning to be attuned. 
Taking emotion as a moving force that arises in the individual as 
transcendence (thus colouring both self and world), I can begin to suggest 
ways in which such a moving force itself may become more and more mature 
as a result of the right kind of experience (experience that actually leads to 
greater maturity). That is, I will take the process of emotion learning, as a 
process of emotional maturation, which gives us the "emotionally mature 
person" as a guiding concept with regard to the direction into which emotional 
learning needs to be seen to moves'. I will take as my unit of analysis the 
individual who finds him or herself in a certain situation, where emotions arise 
"in" the individual, meaning that their sense of self and world is coloured 
emotionally in a certain way, and where this "arising" of the emotions is itself a 
movement on the part of the individual. I will take, as my examples, emotions 
that are directed at certain events, entities or situations, on the assumption 
that what holds true for these holds true a fortiori for moods and atmosphere. 
It will be taken as one of the basic characteristic of emotions that they 
communicate themselves by resonating in the person who "receives" the 
communication (for example, the sadness the pupil is feeling at having received 
a bad mark is experienced as sadness "in" the teacher by the teacher, even 
though the teacher is well aware that this is not her own but the pupil's 
sadness, with the result that the teacher is experiencing the pupil as sad). 
Because of this last point and because of the general nature of our discussion, 
our following examples will not always distinguish between the emotion 
arising in a certain person and the same emotion being picked up by another 
person. 
97 Note that the approach here is hermeneutic in the sense explained in Chapter 1. 
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In general terms, I am taking the notion of emotion as that which constitutes 
either the actual movement the individual makes (for example, raising their 
hands to protect their face against an approaching projectile or "shrinking" 
with fear) or as that in response to which the individual is moved to act in a 
certain way (for example, experiencing romantic attraction and subsequently 
deciding to approach the other person or feeling indignation at a television 
programme and subsequently writing a letter to the BBC). The experience of 
having an emotional feeling is, therefore, either an integral but secondary part 
of the emotional response (when the emotion itself is the action) or that in 
response to which one is moved to act (even if one does not act but allows the 
emotion to abate un-responded to). As with the distinction between the 
individual in whom the emotion arises and the one who picks up the emotion, 
the distinction between the emotion as in itself an act and the emotion as an 
inner experience (a feeling) that may move one to act will remain blurred in 
our examples, because both distinctions are thought to be secondary and not 
directly relevant in the context of the account of emotions themselves learning 
I am trying to bring to light. 
The first aspect of emotions themselves learning is that of a movement 
towards the emotions being attuned to more and more different situations. 
This is a clearly cumulative aspect of such learning, where, as a result of the 
right kind of experience, one's emotional responses have become attuned to 
more and more situations. This being attuned means that one is able to 
anticipate probable or possible ramifications of a situation at the level of 
emotion. For example, having told different parents over the years that their 
child will have to repeat a class may have attuned the teacher to that kind of 
situation, in that he or she has developed a sense for the emotions that are 
likely to come up for the parents. This will enable the teacher to not only 
follow what is happening for the parents in a way that appreciates the meaning 
of their emotions better (as similar experiences will have enriched their sense 
of the possible meaning the situation may have for the parents) but also to open 
up possibilities for these parents, for example by showing them ways to feel 
that they had not yet discovered for themselves (for example, that repeating a 
class is not necessarily a humiliation but can be an acknowledgement of a 
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developmental needs of the child). The ability to bridge different cultural 
experiences of the same event falls in this category. 
This aspect of emotional learning has clear similarities with the notion of 
growth we encountered in Chapter 2, but, rather than the word growth, the 
word "depth" may be the more appropriate one. That is, this increased sense of 
the possible meaning of situations is not a kind of practical or theoretical 
knowledge but rather a "depth" of meaning that is experienced, where the 
possible meanings of the situation that may be anticipated or opened up are 
experienced as emotional depth. The emotion that is there at a given moment 
is able to resonate through the individual in ways that have been opened up as 
a result of previous experience (when there was a temporal unfolding of the 
emotional meaning of a similar situation), where this resonance is now 
experienced in more of a spatial sense, as the potential development of the 
given situation as it is experienced emotionally. This resonance is experienced 
as the potential emotional meaning of the situation and as an openness for the 
individuals involved to discover this meaning for themselves. One could say 
that the increased sense of the possible emotional meaning of a situation allows 
for the actual emotion to manifest that would otherwise perhaps remain hidden 
or be slow to spread out into possible emotional space. 
It should be noted that it is not always the case that an individual who has 
experienced many different kinds of emotional situations is able to allow for 
emotions to manifest as they are. Indeed, the individual may have certain fears 
or dislikes, may find pleasure in the experience of certain emotions, may be 
committed to certain emotions in ways that distort what emotions can 
manifest and the depth at which they are allowed to be felt. This is not only a 
case of blocking certain emotions but also of imposing them. So we can say 
that the above description of an increase in the awareness of the possible 
emotional ramifications of a given situation as a result of experience does not 
automatically imply that emotions are, to return to a phrase I used in the 
context of authentic attunement, "let be". 
This then gives us the first element of authentic learning to be attuned, where 
the process of the increase in the depth of emotional experience can occur in a 
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way that is authentic, when the emotions arising are held with a sense of 
detachment and nearness, or in a way that is inauthentic, when emotions 
themselves emerge in an inauthentic mood (revealing these emotions as, for 
example, attractive or threatening, good or bad). As a result of inauthentic 
emotional learning the depth of emotional experience will resist and promote 
emotions in a way that is both sophisticated (for example, by ostensibly 
allowing a particular emotion to manifest but actually shielding oneself from 
it) and resilient, as these resistances and preferences will have been reinforced 
many times and in many different ways, leading to a web of responses that is 
not easy to circumvent. Authentic emotional depth, however, involves, as we 
saw in Chapter 5, a combination of openness to things as they present 
themselves and the ability to respond emotionally in a way that is 
commensurate with this entity involved. 
The second aspect of emotions themselves learning is that of a movement away 
from emotions manifesting in a way that is "blatant", when the emotion comes 
out fully, to one where emotions manifest in a way that is measured 
(proportionate and discriminating), in a way that is commensurate with the 
situation and with the cues that set it off. In its blatant form the emotion 
comes out in such a way that, once it has been triggered, the emotion loses its 
link with the situation and simply manifests fully. In its measured form the 
emotion, rather than taking the cue and becoming self-absorbed, comes out in 
a way that retains the relationship with the situation that triggered it. This is 
not to say that the measured emotional response is necessarily less intense, but 
it does mean that it is clearly directed (for example, it does not spread its anger 
indiscriminately to whoever happens to be at hand) and proportionate (for 
example, a pupil who has not done his homework does not elicit a fire and 
brimstone sermon from the teacher). 
Though the description of a "measured response" may suggest that I am 
talking about control, this is not the case so long as it is authentic, as it is the 
emotion itself that responds in a way that is proportionate, by remaining in 
touch with the situation that triggered it. Similarly, the notion of 
discrimination may suggest that there is a self that directs the emotion 
towards its target, but, again, it is the emotion itself that remains in touch with 
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both itself (note that a minimum of non-reflective self-awareness is necessary 
here) and the situation that triggered it, so that, in case it began to spill over 
into other situations (for example, the teacher has been angry with one pupil 
and this anger is now threatening to be directed at another) the emotion itself 
will awaken to the fact that it is, as it were, "barking up the wrong tree". 
The inauthentic form of such measured emotional responses is one that is not 
the result of the emotion remaining itself open to the situation as it changes 
but, rather, the result of the response being controlled in a way that is 
reflective, where the faculty of understanding takes the emotion that is 
experienced and acts in a way that is calculating and measuring. This is a case 
of the kind of critical rationality I discussed in Section 3.5.4 seemingly taking 
the emotion under its control (for example, by deciding to vent one's anger at 
the pupil who "deserves it" but present a smiling face to the one who has been 
good). Though the attempt to take control of one's emotions is probably 
usually well-intentioned, it is deeply self-contradictory, as it is not really 
possible to take control of an emotion, because, as we saw in Chapter 5, the 
emotion is that which first gives us the possibility of the experience of the 
things we experience in the way we do; what can be controlled is one's actions. 
To say that the attempt to control one's emotions is inauthentic is not to 
suggest that people should not control their actions, for example, in the case of 
a teacher who gets angry and ready to lash out at a pupil. But it should be 
understood that the control of one's actions in the face of an emotion is at best 
a temporary solution (however necessary), and that, if the emotion itself does 
not subside, it will frame future situations in such ways that the emotion will 
transpire in some way or other, purely as a function of its characteristic of 
colouring both the self and the world one finds oneself in. 
The authentic version of the emotional response being measured 
(proportionate and discriminate) happens as a result of the individual having 
remained in contact with the situation, because the individual has not become 
absorbed in the emotion as it was first triggered, where this is not the result of 
the individual separating themselves from the emotion in such a way that the 
emotion becomes a practical or theoretical object. Rather, such a lack of 
absorption is there in the affective disposition of detachment and nearness we 
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already encountered in the previous point I made about authentic learning to 
be attuned. We thus have a mode of being in which the individual is non-
reflectively self-aware of itself as capable of being emotionally attuned while 
there is an actual way of being emotionally attuned in operation. 
What happens in this situation is that the active emotion is first allowed to 
simply be what it is, but that it is then likely to quieten down, especially in so 
far as it is experienced in relation to another person (as we saw in Section 6.4.2 
the affective disposition of authentic being-with tends towards an openness in 
silence) and to "want to give the other their otherness". The result of this will 
be that the other person is allowed to manifest as themselves anew, which 
means that the individual experiencing the emotion in relation to them will 
keep contact with them in the sense that the emotion is allowed to arise but 
also subside quickly again. Note that this is true of both unpleasant feelings 
(for example, getting angry with a pupil one is fond of) and pleasant ones (for 
example, being proud of the good grades one's child has received at school). 
The second aspect of emotions themselves learning is that of a movement away 
from emotions arising in response to clear cues to the arising in response to 
ever subtler cues, as the individual is being increasingly able to pick up 
emotionally salient information in a situation. It represents the sensitivity and 
subtlety that mature people may display where their less mature counterparts 
are only responsive to more overt cues. Again, this is not a function of the 
development of a more acute perceptual or cognitive apparatus, though one is 
unlikely to develop without the other, but a genuine maturation of the 
emotional faculty itself. The meaning of emotional cues (for example, a pupil is 
observed as they receive a bad mark) is picked up in a way that is more subtle, 
because they resonate, in the individual, with a more diversified (differentiated 
and integrated) inner experience. This ability to read subtle emotional cues is 
sometimes experienced as being able to read the whole of how another person 
is feeling from their face and posture. It is based in the basic characteristic of 
emotional communication, mentioned earlier, that emotions communicate 
themselves by resonating in the person who receives the communication. This 
ability becomes increasingly mature, to the extent that the emotion is allowed 
to resonate with ever deeper experience in a way that is proportionate to the 
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situation (for example, the pupil is sad, but it is not the end of the world for 
her) and discriminate (the pupil is sad, but the sadness seems to be about more 
than just the grade). 
In the case of the emotion revealing the meaning of the situation, the emotion 
unfolds but the automatic (physical) actions that may have defined the 
emotions in the evolutionary past do not arise with the emotion unless this is 
what is called for (as when there is the projectile flying towards one and one 
ducks, or when the door in the burning house is stuck and one's anger gives 
one the strength to open it), where the ability to sense if and when an actual 
physical response is called for resides in the totality of the situation as it 
involves an understanding of the situation as well as a way of being connected 
with others through being-with (knowing when to act in response to what the 
other person is feeling). 
But in either case (whether one needs to actually respond or not) the emotion 
one experiences needs to come out, manifest, less and less, and one can stay 
increasingly close to equanimity: one does not need to pick up the full force of 
despair the other person is feeling in order to know what to do, just a whiff of 
it is enough; one does not need to feel full-blown boredom, in order for one to 
know that it is time to switch off the television. This means that one does not 
"go through" the whole of the emotion, but is touched by it, enough for one to 
either act in response (instantly knowing the pupil is depressed and requires 
one to act by, for example, referring them to the school counsellor), allow the 
emotion to take one with it (as when the father needs but to see the look in the 
eyes of his son to be drawn into the emotion of celebrating in jubilant terms 
that his son has passed the exam), or simply take in the meaning of the 
situation without, as yet, doing anything (as when the way a parent sighs 
while they are explaining how the home situation of the pupil has recently 
changed is enough for the teacher to grasp its meaning). 
That this ability to respond to increasingly subtle emotional cues develops 
does not mean that one begins to jump to conclusions, after all one may be 
wrong, but simply that the emotion itself does not need to manifest fully for it 
to do its work. This does, likewise, not lead to a flattened experience of life, as 
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it happens authentically within the emptiness of possible emotional experience, 
which is in itself much fuller than any actual emotional experience and which 
(as the experience of wonder in relation to practical or theoretical entities and 
the emotion of affection, solidarity and love in relation to living creatures) still 
has its own experience of being authentically attuned. 
We now have three aspects of emotional learning as modification and growth. 
First, the individual will have more emotional depth, an enriched their sense of 
the possible meaning the situation may have, so that they can anticipate and 
open up these meanings, where this will occur in a way that is authentic, so 
long as the emotions arising themselves are held in a wider mood of 
detachment and nearness. Second, emotional response is increasingly measured 
(proportionate and directed) by retaining contact with the situation and the 
cues that triggered it. Third, the emotional meaning of a situation is picked up 
with increasing subtlety, leaving the individual ever closer to emotional 
equilibrium, even if they sometimes still respond with full emotion. 
As a result of the above, associations between emotions, situations, events, 
people and practical or theoretical entities are increasingly experienced in 
terms of possibility. On the one hand, this manifests as tentativeness and 
represents an emotional tentativeness that corresponds with the 
understanding that the associations one has learned to make (for example, 
between school and the feeling of being repressed) may turn out invalid in a 
new situation (after having moved to a different school) or for different people 
(the other pupil may experience the same school as liberating). On the other 
hand, this very same tentativeness, so long as it is emotional and not merely 
based in understanding, also brings with it a clear decisiveness, as emotional 
cues that require a response will be taken as such and not be drowned out by a 
general noise of confused emotional responses that shoot off in all directions. 
This combination of tentativeness and decisiveness corresponds with the 
aspect of authentic attunement I mentioned in Chapter 5 of the individual 
having the potential to respond emotionally if necessary, but, doing so in a 
way that does not remain identified with that response, or that expends energy 
unnecessary, even if they act practically or theoretically. 
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What is more, the space which the emotions created for themselves when they 
arose but then abandoned remains (in a way that is similar to the way in which 
the possible ramification of emotional situations remained after their moment 
had passed) as openness and possibility. This openness and possibility 
strengthens one's ability to remain in contact with a situation even as an 
emotion arises. What is more, it increasingly allows the emotion to let go of 
itself, if it senses that it has become disproportionate or indiscriminate. What 
allows the emotion to subside is the emptiness that has built up around it, 
which is experienced by the individual as being "themselves" more 
authentically than the emotion itself, where otherwise the absorption in the 
emotion may have involved identification and an accompanying unwillingness 
to let go of it as itself. The fact that, as a result of authentic experience (which 
involves letting be as well as letting go of the emotion as it arises within the 
nothingness of self and world), the individual is increasingly able to respond in 
a way that is measured is, therefore, the result of a steady expansion of the 
openness of authentic attunement. 
This expanding sense of inner space within which emotions come and go, but 
where the space is experienced as more genuinely oneself than the emotions, is 
a form of growth that is experiential and yet not represented in accounts of 
learning as modification and growth. The importance of the growth of this sense 
of inner space over the years is that it comes to anchor the sense of self that 
arises when the individual "turns back" to the world after having "turned 
away". This sense of self is then anchored ever more solidly in the emptiness 
left behind by the emotions that have come and gone. In this emptiness also 
lies the depth of emotional experience in the form of the possible meanings of 
the situation that may be anticipated or opened up. The self that grows over 
the years is then one of openness and possibility, where both gain in strength, 
as the growing openness can accommodate more and different emotions and 
the growing ramifications of possible emotions represent more possible ways 
of responding. The individual will, as a result, have inner strength and 
resourcefulness combined with genuine openness and humility, as well as the 
capacity to relate to other living beings, which require the individual to take 
them as openness and possibility. 
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7.1.4 Authentic learning to be-with 
In Chapter 6 we saw how the communal as well as the interpersonal are co-
constitutive of Dasein. This faculty of being connected with other Daseins 
Heidegger calls being-with and, in the context of the question of authentic 
learning I have taken, being-with is expressed in the faculty of communication, 
which, as inauthentic, consists in the articulation of experience. That is, I will 
consider what it means for learning as modification and growth to happen in a 
way that is authentic, in so far as it leads to the articulation of experience. 
Being-with is itself the basis from which both language and culture spring, 
where Heidegger calls the state of "being lost" in the fruits of being-with 
(language and culture) "falling", which he contrasts with being grounded in 
authentic being-with. But, as has been said before, after the movement of 
"turning away" from the world (from language and culture) there is a "turning 
back". So the question I will address now is what such a "turning back" 
involves if and when it itself occurs in a way that is authentic. 
As I argued in Chapter 6, the process of being-with becoming authentic begins 
with a communication, "a call" that originates in authentic Dasein. It is itself 
not a communication about practical or theoretical things, even if such 
communication may also take place. The call is directed at Dasein and appeals 
to Dasein to become authentic. It communicates in such a way that it is prior 
to a differentiation into someone calling and someone hearing. It is itself not 
based in (reducible to) either propositional language or culturally determined 
ways of behaving towards individuals or collectives. The call does not 
articulate, because articulation involves taking things as certain things, and 
Dasein can be understood in terms of itself only, having its own "for the sake 
of'. The call brings to Dasein's awareness what kind of entity Dasein really is, 
that it has the potential to becoming "who it really is", and it does this purely 
in terms of Dasein itself and not in terms of anything else (there is neither a 
practical nor a theoretical "as"). This kind of communication allows for the co-
existence of individuality and the interconnection between individuals 
(interpersonally or collectively). 
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The process of being-with learning to be authentic is, therefore, one of Dasein 
going from hearing the call in terms of articulation (as indicating how certain 
things belong together and other things belong apart) to hearing it as a pure 
pointing out of the possibility of authentic existence as it is already there in 
Dasein itself. This is a reciprocal process of the call breaking through the 
hearing in terms of articulation and the awakening of a new kind of hearing 
(which does not hear in terms of articulation). One way of putting this is to say 
that the call, "passes over" the self of das Man, where this involves interrupting 
the way Dasein usually listens (so that the habitual ways of receiving the 
communication are not reactivated), which awakens another kind of listening 
(one that does not take what is being communicated in terms of anything they 
already know, feel, believe, like or dislike), so that the call can get through to 
Dasein's authentic self and appeal to it to be its own authentic self (without the 
appeal being mediated and distorted by das Man), with the result that das Man 
is pushed into significance and dissolves, exposing Dasein's authentic self, 
which then experiences itself and the other Dasein as they really are 
(individualized as well as one with the other and the collective), as a result of 
which it takes itself as it really is and becomes this authentic self. This process 
of being-with becoming authentic is experienced as an awakening, an 
expansion of awareness and a silencing of the inner voices that would normally 
articulate what was being communicated in terms of a known world and a 
familiar self. 
The process of the individual learning to be-with in a way that is authentic is 
one where the individual learns to articulate experience in terms of language 
and cultural practices in a way that is informed by authentic being-with. This 
process of learning to articulate experience in terms of language and cultural 
practices is, both with regard to the inauthentic and the authentic mode, best 
described as one of growing participation or enculturation. This growing 
participation leads to an increasingly integrated and differentiated articulation 
of the experience one is participating in. If we put it in terms of the faculty of 
understanding, we would say that the individual has an increasingly detailed 
and generalizable understanding of the way things are perceived and done in a 
particular cultural setting and of how this understanding is expressed in way 
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that are appropriate. If we put it in terms of the faculty of attunement, we 
would say that the individual had an increasingly detailed sense for the 
affective significance of the different elements that made up the situation and 
of the situation as a whole, helping them respond in ways that are appropriate. 
Illuminating though these ways of putting it may be, we need to get the 
process in view in terms of being-with rather than understanding or 
attunement. 
When I consider the process of authentic enculturation (growing participation) 
I will not distinguish between the novice (the one being enculturated) and the 
expert (the one structuring, modelling and bridging the practices the novice is 
being enculturated into), because the process is, for the purpose of this 
discussion, symmetrical. It begins with a moment where the other person 
(whether that be the novice or the expert) is simply there, where the focus is 
on the other person without taking that person as engaged in any kind of 
practice. Here the person is, to borrow from our discussion of attunement, "the 
bare that it is' in the nothing of the world", the person is who they are in 
terms of themselves only. In terms of the experience of being-with, I said in 
Chapter 6 that this meant that the person was experienced as "other", as 
existing in terms of him or herself only. At the same time, the person is 
experienced as "one with oneself', as co-constituting oneself, or, again 
borrowing from attunement, with a sense of affection, solidarity and love. This 
is the moment at the beginning of enculturation, where two or more 
individuals may just take a moment to connect and acknowledge each other 
prior to any engagement with theoretical or practical entities. 
Once the actual process of enculturation gets underway it will need to be 
guided by, articulated in line with, or done in an atmosphere that is attuned to 
authentic existence. This means that all throughout one takes every Dasein 
(oneself and the other individual, as well as outsiders and those creatures from 
the natural world which one takes as having the nature of Dasein) in the spirit 
of oneness and otherness first, even if at certain points this Dasein needs to 
become articulated linguistically or in terms of the cultural practice one is 
participating in. Here we again encounter the principle that the authentic way 
of engaging with an entity or a situation embeds the inauthentic one, in the 
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sense that the former is larger than the latter and guides it. This is true even 
in relation to theoretical or practical entities, in that the non-articulating 
contact with the entity embeds the process of increasingly detailed and 
generalizable articulation. 
What this means is that, whenever one's engagement with a Dasein (including, 
in certain ways, creatures from the natural world) is being articulated (for 
example, when certain symptoms are linked with a certain neurotic tendency 
in the context of a psychology lesson) in terms of how to perceive, act in 
response to, and capture in language, there is "a call", a voice that discloses the 
Dasein in terms of itself only (that is, incapable of being captured in any 
articulation) and appeals to the authentic being in oneself to "hand" that 
Dasein its authenticity. This is true even if, as in our example, it concerns a 
lesson where there is no live neurotic Dasein who is being studied, but merely 
a depersonalized case study and a list of symptoms; in such a case it is still 
authentic Dasein who is the intentional object of the learning as modification 
and growth, even if it involves what in phenomenology is called "empty 
intending". 
The result of this holding the inauthentic articulation as embedded in 
authentic being-with is that, to stay with our example, the diagnosis of 
neuroticism and the knowledge of how and when to apply the symptoms is 
held in a way that is highly tentative. At the same time this very tentativeness 
is the ground from which decisiveness can grow, because once the decision has 
been made as to what the being of the entity involved is, many of the dilemmas 
that would otherwise have to be dealt with are resolved. For example, if, after 
having been very tentative in one's theoretical and practical articulations of a 
certain pupil, once one decides that a situation involving the pupil has to be 
dealt with in a way that takes the pupil as a practical entity, questions as to 
whether one should, for example, first do a formal assessment disappear and 
one simply acts in accordance to the being of the entity, albeit in such a way 
that still keeps in mind the nature of the individual as a Dasein and that is 
open to revising itself, if it turns out that another approach is asked for. 
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The person cannot be articulated in a way that is commensurate with their 
nature, because they exist primarily as "other", that is, in terms of themselves 
only. So, if it is done, it should be done tentatively in terms of possibility and 
in a way that only becomes actual, when the whole of one's being understands, 
feels and is obliged by the circumstances to make a decisive leap into 
articulating the being of the other person. This may not be as dramatic as it 
sounds here, as, for example, when one learns to plan a public health campaign, 
which one understands requires large scale planning that is done in a way that 
deals with individuals statistically (for example, the aim is to save 10000 lives, 
where it is relatively unimportant whose lives they are within a given 
population) and that is done in the context of existing discourses, practices and 
institutions. The person or the community which is the intentional object in 
this learning is articulated in a way that is decisively theoretical, even if it is 
always understood that they are in themselves "other". 
Another aspect of authentic enculturation is that the other person and the 
community is taken as co-constitutive of oneself even if their being is 
articulated in a way that is inauthentic. Yet, at the same time one also exists 
for oneself as for the sake of other Daseins. This is a kind of co-constituency of 
one in terms of the other that loses its paradoxical nature only in the 
individual who no longer articulates him or herself in terms of the culture and 
language he or she is part of. That is, if one takes oneself in cultural and 
linguistic terms (articulates who one is) and the other is co-constitutive of one, 
this other becomes articulated in these same terms. Conversely, if one takes 
oneself as existing for the sake of the other Dasein and takes the other Dasein 
in terms of its cultural and linguistic terms, one becomes oneself articulated in 
the terms of the other. Because each articulation is particular, it is not possible 
for both to be articulated in terms of the other at the same time. Such a 
problem does, however, not arise if the articulation is left silent, because two 
silences can each be taken as being part of the other without this becoming a 
contradiction. 
But a learning as modification and growth that occurs for an individual who is in 
themselves not articulated is possible only if the functional existence of that 
individual, their role, their profile as defined in terms of the language and 
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culture they are being enculturated into, is appropriated in a way that is 
wholly impersonal. What would happen, if the individual enters a situation 
where the role they have been enculturated into is called for, is that the voice 
that articulates the situation in line with the relevant language and cultural 
practices arises in the same impersonal way as does the voice that calls Dasein 
to its authentic existence. The place from which this voice originates is Dasein 
as openness, as possibility. The learning as modification and growth happens, as a 
result within a context of the nothingness of the individual, where there is no 
self that learns but rather a process of learning as modification and growth that 
creates a self at the same time as it creates the intentional object of that 
learning, where the self that is created is merely a functional self, a role and 
profile that exists within a larger absence of identity. 
Here too we find a tentativeness, but now in relation to the very self that 
makes up one's identity within the cultural practices and language, where, 
again, there may be a decisive assumption of the role when that is called for, 
but in such a way that is not personal, merely functional. This is, in some 
ways, the very picture of the impartial practitioner or functionary. But in the 
case of having learned in an authentic way to fulfil the function, the functional 
identity is embedded in a larger, authentic silence which articulates neither the 
self of the individual, nor that of those he or she engages with, but engages 
with them in a way that expresses the authentic affective dispositions of 
oneness and otherness, of affection, solidarity and love. 
The result of this learning being embedded in the silence of authentic being-
with is that the articulations that are appropriated and later applied are 
informed by authentic being-with. Initially this will mean that there is 
considerable tension between the way the culture and language articulates 
experiences (entities, events and situations), because the culture and language 
reflect the extent to which the individuals and groups involved are inauthentic. 
For example, the individual may be articulated as a substance rather than a 
process and all learning may be articulated in terms of modification and 
growth. This tension will make it more difficult for the individual in their 
functional capacity to retain contact with their authentic understanding of the 
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situation, but the tentative nature of the way they articulate will make it 
possible, at least in principle. 
What this tension highlights, though, is the importance of educational 
cultures, the local cultures in families and schools, in enabling the individual to 
establish their ways of articulating experience in such a way that such tensions 
between the actual articulation as constrained by culture and language and the 
way experience would be articulated in a world where all articulation occurred 
under the auspices of authentic awareness are kept to a minimum. A context 
where the practices individuals have appropriated are looked upon as arising in 
an impersonal way from within the silence of the authentic individual is very 
different from one where these practices are taken as constituting the whole 
individual. 
Apart from the role of educational settings of enabling authentic being-with to 
take root in the individual, by minimizing the tension between authentic 
existence and the inauthentic articulation of experience, there is also a role in 
changing the culture and language itself. Such change is necessarily gradual 
and on-going, but nevertheless an important part of human existence. As 
individuals become firmly rooted in authentic existence, they will eventually 
be in a position to partake in a transformation of the cultural and linguistic 
practices of a community. As teachers, parents, colleagues, managers, 
academics, politicians, and so on, they will be able to reform one or two bits of 
the culture or language so that it may facilitate rather than obstruct 
individuals discovering authentic ways of being. 
7.2 Learning to be authentic and authentic learning 
I will conclude the thesis by giving a general characterization of the process of 
learning to be authentic and authentic learning. I will do this by setting out what 
the formal characteristics are that these processes display in the three basic 
faculties of Dasein. 
The process of learning to be authentic has a starting point: for understanding 
this is the moment one does not commit to a projection of the being of an 
entity; for attunement this is the moment one "stays with" the mood one is in 
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even as one is moved to act in response; for being-with this is an interruption 
in the way one has been listening to things by way of das Man. 
This starting point then sets in motion a process that is reciprocal, where 
there is a mutual reinforcement of two different elements: for understanding 
there is an increase in the "transparency" of understanding coupled with an 
increase in Dasein's projection of its understanding onto temporality; for 
attunement there is an increase in non-reflective self-awareness coupled with 
an increase in the way entities are encountered from within the nothing of the 
world; for being-with there is an increasing awareness of the "call of 
conscience" coming both from oneself and from beyond oneself, which is 
coupled with Dasein hearing this call increasingly in terms of itself and not in 
terms of das Man. 
The result of this mutually reinforcing process is that Dasein lets go of some of 
the existing structures of its way of experiencing itself and the entities it 
encounters: it lets go of its existing understanding of the being of entities it is 
engaged with and, rather than understanding these entities in terms of its 
projections, understands them in terms of temporality, of the process that 
projects itself; it lets go of the moods that were defining both itself and the 
world in certain emotional terms and allows the entities to emerge from out of 
the nothing of the world in a way that is immediate; it lets go of the linguistic 
and cultural practices that were mediating its contact and communication with 
itself and the entities it encounters in the world and re-establishes such a 
direct contact through silence. 
The outcome of this letting go is that Dasein becomes able to experience both 
itself and the entities it encounters in a way that it commensurate to their 
being. To use the phrase I used in the introduction, Dasein acquires "a sense 
for the being of the entities themselves". With regard to itself, Dasein 
encounters itself increasingly as an end in itself: as a process of temporality, as 
transcendence, as existing both in terms of itself and in such a way that the 
other person and the communal are co-constitutive of it. Dasein also begins to 
experience the processes that constitute it as arising in a way that is prior to 
any division between subject and object: temporality temporalizes itself; any 
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mood or emotion arises in such a way that it colours both self and world; the 
call that appeals to Dasein to be authentic arises in a way that is impersonal. 
With regard to the entities it encounters in the world, Dasein is able to 
disclose these entities in terms of their possibilities: as theoretical or practical 
entities, or as entities with the nature of Dasein itself; in terms of a mood and 
emotions that are appropriate to the situation Dasein is in; in terms of the 
possibility of authentic existence for both Dasein itself and the other Dasein, 
including in certain ways creatures from the natural world. 
In even more general terms, we can say that learning to be authentic is a 
process that begins when Dasein's inauthentic way of being is left as 
possibility (so that it is not committed to), as prior to either the subject or 
object pole of intentionality (so that it is not moved away from), and as open to 
the possibility of being affected from without it (so that it is ready to be 
appealed to). There is then a process of, on the one hand, a growing non-
reflective self-awareness (transparency, non-reflective self-awareness of mood, 
and the voice of conscience calling) and, on the other hand, the awakening of 
another way of being (projecting the being of entities onto temporality, 
encountering entities from out of the nothing of the world, listening in a way 
that is not mediated by the cultural and linguistic practices of one's 
community). The result of which is a "dying towards" one's inauthentic way of 
being, a "turning away", a "letting go" of the existing structures of experience 
(of the projections of understanding so that things can be understood in terms 
of temporality; of one's defining moods, so that things can "let be"; of the 
linguistic and cultural practices, to make way for silence). This is then 
followed by a self-understanding that understands oneself in terms of oneself 
(as process, transcendence and being-with) and as existing prior to there being 
either a self or a world (as temporality, attunement and a voice, all of which are 
self-arising) and by an understanding of the entities one encounters in the 
world in terms of their being (theoretical, practical or with the nature of 
Dasein), in terms of an affective disposition that is appropriate to the situation, 
and as potentially authentic. 
At this point, when the process of learning to be authentic has run its course and 
there is authentic existence, the process of authentic learning can begin. This is 
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a process of learning as modification and growth that is guided by, articulated 
in line with, or done in an atmosphere that is attuned by authentic existence. 
Its starting point is the moment after the existing structures of experience 
have been relinquished and there is an authentic engagement with both oneself 
and the entities one encounters in the world. That is, the entity which is the 
object of the learning is disclosed first in terms of temporality, in an 
atmosphere of detachment and nearness, in the silence of being connected in a 
way that is not mediated by das Man. The process that ensues is, like the 
process of learning to be authentic, a reciprocal, mutually reinforcing one: there 
is a spreading of the awareness that comes with transparency, while there is 
the growth, integration and differentiation of knowledge and skills; there is a 
growing sense of inner space, of the emptiness left behind by moods that have 
subsided, while there is an ever expanding sense of what the emotional 
meaning of different situations can be; there is the ever expanding silence of 
authentic being-with other creatures with remains non-articulated, while there 
is the increasingly detailed and generalized articulation of one's experience in 
terms of the linguistic and cultural practices of one's community. 
The result of this is that the capacities that emerge as a result of this learning 
as modification and growth are embedded within a larger, authentic experience 
of oneself and of the events, entities and situations involved in that learning. 
What is learned in this way is held in a way that is at once tentative and 
capable of clear decision: the being of an entity as it is projected is understood 
as possible, and yet where necessary action will be resolute; the emotional 
meaning of situations may or may not apply, and yet where necessary one's 
response will be decisive; the ways of articulation that come with the role and 
function one has been enculturated into may or may not be the right one, but 
where needed one is able to articulate with clarity. 
With this description of learning to be authentic and authentic learning we have 
arrived at a state of affairs where we can begin to address the challenge facing 
education in the present day, as set out in Chapter 1. Such learning would, I 
said, be able to do justice to the being of the entities we encountered in the life 
world, human beings, but also animals, the environment and life as a whole. I 
then said that "a sense for the being of the entities themselves" was what was 
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called for. And I said that this learning could not be fragmented, either inside 
the individual or as broken up into separate elements in the whole of a course 
of learning. We can now see more clearly why it is that this fragmentation 
poses a problem, beyond the practical problems it poses: life and living beings 
have wholeness as their very being, so that it cannot be understood in terms of 
anything other than itself, and it is itself only in so far as we understand that 
we are as much a part of it as it is a part of us, and this understanding is not a 
cognitive one but one that is felt as affection, solidarity and love, even as it 
communicates in silence. 
263 
Bibliography 
Ball, S. J. (2004). 'Performativities and fabrications in the education economy: 
Towards a performative society'. In S. J. Ball (Ed.), The RoutledgeFalmer 
Reader in Sociology of Education (pp. 143-156). London: 
RoutledgeFalmer. 
Blattner, W. (2006). Heidegger's "Being and Time". London: Continuum 
International Publishing Group. 
Bonnett, M. (1986). 'Personal authenticity and public standards: Towards the 
transcendence of a dualism'. In D. E. Cooper (Ed.), Education, values and 
mind: Essays for R. S. Peters (pp. 111-134). London: Routledge & Keegan 
Paul. 
Bonnett, M. (2002). 'Education as a form of the poetic: A Heideggerian 
approach to learning and the teacher-pupil relationship'. In M. Peters 
(Ed.), Heidegger, Education, and Modernity (pp. 229-245). Oxford: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 
Bonnett, M. and Cuypers, S. (2003). 'Autonomy and authenticity in education'. 
In N. Blake, P. Smeyers, R. Smith and P. Standish (Eds), The Blackwell 
Guide to the Philosophy of Education (pp. 326-341). Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing. 
Bouton, M. E. (2007). Learning and behaviour: A contemporary synthesis. 
Sunderland, Massachusetts: Sinauer Associates. 
Capobianco, R. (2007). 'From Angst to Astonishment: Heidegger on the 
Defining Mood of Dasein's Authentic Existence'. Review of Existential 
Psychology and Psychiatry. 
Caputo, J. D. (1986). The mystical element in Heidegger's thought. New York: 
Fordham University Press. 
Cooper, D. E. (1983). Authenticity and learning• Nietzsche's educational philosophy. 
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
264 
Cooper, D. E. (2002). 'Truth, science, thinking, and distress'. In M. Peters 
(Ed.), Heidegger, education, and modernity (pp. 47-65). Oxford: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers. 
Critchley, S. (2008). 'Heidegger for beginners'. In S. Levine (Ed.), On 
Heidegger's Being and Time (pp. 9-56). London: Routledge. 
Crowe, B. D. (2006). Heidegger's religious origins: Destruction and authenticity. 
Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. 
Crowe, B. D. (2008). Heidegger's phenomenology of religion: Realism and cultural 
criticism. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. 
Dahlstrom, D. 0. (2001). Heidegger's Concept of Truth. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Davey, G. (2005). Emotional intelligence. In G. Davey (ed), Encyclopaedic 
Dictionary of Psychology: Hodder-Arnold. 
de Beistegui, M. (2005). The new Heidegger. London: Continuum International. 
De Nys, M. (2009). Considering transcendence: Elements of a philosophical theology. 
Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. 
Dearden, R. F. (1972). 'Autonomy and education'. In R. F. H. Dearden, P.; 
Peters, R. S. (Ed.), Education and the development of reason. London: 
Routledge & Keegan Paul. 
DfES. (2003). Every child matters. Norwich: TSO. 
Dreyfus, H. L. (1991). Being-in-the-World: A commentary on Heidegger's Being 
and Time, Division I. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. 
Dunne, J. (1993). Back to the rough ground: 'Phronesis' and 'Techne' in modern 
philosophy and in Aristotle. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame 
Press. 
Forman, R. K. C. (1998). 'What does mysticism have to teach us about 
consciousness?'. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 5 (2), 185-201. 
Frankfurt, H. G. (1999). Necessity, volition, and love. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Freire, P. (1970/1996). Pedagogy of the Oppressed. (M. Bergman Ramos, Trans.). 
(2 Ed.). London Penguin Books. 
Freire, P. (2004). Pedagogy of indignation. Boulder, Colorado: Paradigm. 
Fuster, J., M. (2003). Cortex and mind: unifting cognition. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
265 
Grondin, J. (1994). Introduction into philosophical hermeneutics. (J. Weinsheimer, 
Trans.). New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Guignon, C. (2000). 'Philosophy and authenticity: Heidegger's search for a 
ground for philosophizing'. In M. A. Wrathall and J. Malpas (Eds), 
Heidegger, authenticity and modernity: (pp. 79-103). Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: The MIT Press. 
Gur-Ze'ev, I. (2002). 'Martin Heidegger, transcendence, and the possibility of 
counter education'. In M. Peters (Ed.), Heidegger, education, and 
modernity (pp. 65-81). Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 
Hager, P. (2005a). 'New Approaches in the Philosophy of Learning'. 
Educational Philosophy and Theory, 37 (5), 633-634. 
Hager, P. (2005b). 'Philosophical Accounts of Learning'. Educational Philosophy 
and Theory, 37 (5), 649-666. 
Hager, P. (2008). 'Learning and Metaphors'. Medical Teacher, 30 (7), 679-686. 
Heidegger, M. (1925). Logik: Die Frage nach der Wahrheit. (Vol. 21). Frankfurt 
am Main: Vittorio Klostermann. 
Heidegger, M. (1958). What is Philosophy? (W. Kluback and J. T. Wilde, 
Trans.). New Haven: New Haven College and University Press. 
Heidegger, M. (1962). Being and Time. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 
Heidegger, M. (1982). The basic problems of phenomenology. (A. Hofstadter, 
Trans.). Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. 
Heidegger, M. (1985). History of the concept of time: Prolegomona. (T. Kisiel, 
Trans.). Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. 
Heidegger, M. (1995a). The fundamental concepts of metaphysics: World, finitude, 
solitude. (W. McNeil and N. Walker, Trans.). Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press. 
Heidegger, M. (1995b). Ontologie: Hermeneutik der Faktizitaet. (Vol. 63). 
Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann. 
Heidegger, M. (1998a). 'Comments on Karl Jaspers's Psychology of Worldviews' . 
In W. McNeill (Ed.), Pathmarks (pp. 1-39). Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Heidegger, M. (1998b). 'What is Metaphysics?'. In W. McNeill (Ed.), 
Pathmarks (pp. 82-97). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Heidegger, M. (2000). Elucidations of Hoelderlin's Poetry. (K. Hoeller, Trans.). 
New York: Humanity Books. 
266 
Heidegger, M. (2004). The phenomenology of religious life. Bloomington & 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. 
Ireson, J. (2008). Learners, Learning and educational activity. London: Routledge. 
Kisiel, T. (1993). The genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time. Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
Levine, S. (Ed.) (2008), On Heidegger's Being and Time. London: Routlledge. 
MacIntyre, A. (1981). After Virtue. London: Duckworth. 
Manukata, Y. and Pfaffly, J. (2004). 'Hebbian learning and development'. 
Developmental Science, 7 (2), 141-148. 
Marton, F. and Booth, S. (1997). Learning and awareness. Mahwah, New Jersey: 
Laurence Erlbaum Associates 
McNeill, W. (2006). The time of life: Heidegger and ethos. Albany: State 
University of New York Press. 
Meighan, R. and Siraj-Blatchford, I. (2003). A sociology of education. London, 
New York: Continuum. 
Moore, A. (2012). Teaching and curriculum: Pedagogy, curriculum and culture. (2 
Ed.). Oxon: Routledge. 
Murray Thomas, R. (2005). Comparing theories of child development. Belmont: 
Thomson Wadsworth. 
Nancy, J.-L. (2008). 'The being-with of being-there'. Continental Philosophy 
Review, (41), 1-15. 
Peters, R. S. (1966). Ethics and education. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 
Piaget, J. (2001). The psychology of intelligence. Abbingdon. 
Priest, G. (2002). Beyond the limits of thought. Oxford: Claredon Press - Oxford. 
Ratcliffe, M. (2002). 'Heidegger's attunement and the neuropsychology of 
emotion'. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 1, 287-312. 
Ratcliffe, M. (2008). Feelings of being: phenomenology, psychiatry and the sense of 
reality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Schatzki, T. R. (1992). 'Early Heidegger on Being, the Clearing, and Realism'. 
In H. L. Dreyfus and H. Hall (Eds), Heidegger: A critical reader (pp. 81-
99). Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd. 
Schuermann, R. (2008). 'Heidegger's Being and Time'. In S. Levine (Ed.), On 
Heidegger's Being and Time (pp. 56-132). London: Routledge. 
267 
SOED. (2007). In L. Brown (ed), Shorter Oxford English Dictionary. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Sokolowski, R. (2000). Introduction to phenomenology. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Sorial, S. (2005). Heidegger and the Problem of Individuation: Mitsein (being-with), 
Ethics and Responsibility. University of New South Wales Sydney. 
Thomson, I. D. (2004). 'Heidegger's perfectionist philosophy of education in 
Being and Time'. Continental Philosophy Review, 37, 439-467. 
Van Geert, P. (1998). 'A dynamic systems model of basic developmental 
mechanisms: Piaget, Vygotsky and beyond'. Psychological Review, 104 
(4). 
Van Geert, P. (2000). 'The dynamics of general developmental mechanisms: 
From Piaget and Vygotsky to dynamic systems models'. Current 
Directions in Psychological Science, 9 (2), 64-68. 
Vandenberg, D. (1971). Being and education: An essay in existential phenomenology. 
Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall. 
Volpi, F. (1996). 'Dasein as praxis: the Heidggerian assimilation and 
radicalization of the practical philosophy of Aristotle'. In C. Macann 
(Ed.), Critical Heidegger (pp. 27-67). London and New York: Routledge. 
West, C. (1993). 'Preface'. In P. McLaren and P. Leonard (Eds), Paulo Freire: A 
critical encounter (pp. xiii-xiv). London: Routledge. 
White, J. (2008). Aims as policy in English primary education: Primary review, 
Faculty of Education, University of Cambridge. 
Winch, C. (1998). The philosophy of human learning. London: Routledge. 
Winch, C. (2006). Education, autonomy and critical thinking. London: Routledge. 
Yalom, I. D. (2008). Staring at the sun: Overcoming the terror of death. San 
Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
Yuan-wu. (1977). The blue clip' record. (T. C. Cleary, J. C., Trans.). Boston, 
Massachusetts: Shambala Publications. 
Zahavi, D. (2005). Subjectivity and selfhood: Investigating the first person
perspective. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. 
Zimmerman, M. (1993). 'Heidegger, Buddhism, and deep ecology'. In C. 
Guignon (Ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger (pp. 240-269). 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Zuidervaart, L. (2007). Social philosophy after Adorno. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
268 
